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This dissertation seeks to explain and ascertain the relationship between state institutions 
and ethnic conflict in Iraq. The central argument is that institutions matter, and a divided 
society’s early institutional setup during the critical period of state formation and 
statebuilding determines that state’s sequential response to subsequent group conflict. 
Contextualizing the role of state institutions alongside ethnic elite behaviour facilitates the 
development of a nuanced understanding of the interplay between the state and its divided 
society. As a theory-building endeavour, the dissertation identifies the conditions under 
which groups grievances are advanced, the processes that lead to their mobilization, and 
the institutional constraints that shape their trajectory. By identifying historically-
contingent causal links during critical junctures and under more gradual processes of 
change that generate cumulative effects and patterns of ethnic dominance, we observe that 
ethnic elites and institutions determine the parameters of ethnic dominance and re-
dominance of the state during critical statebuilding periods where more inclusive 
governing options would have increased inter-ethnic cooperation and cohesion. In doing 
so, it explicates the causal mechanisms linking institutional design and ethnic conflict in 
divided, post-colonial states.  
I posit that ethnic conflict in divided societies emerges as a process rather than an 
abrupt rupture in the state’s structural and institutional composition. Specifically, as a 
social process, it unfolds overtime, at varying speeds, and with divergent outcomes in a 
given state and within a given institutional context. This process is preconditioned by the 




various statebuilding periods—authoritarianism and exclusion that produce and reproduce 
patterns of ethnic dominance. Conceptualizing the effects of these variables requires a 
temporal analysis of their development overtime and in a given institutional setting. In the 
case of Iraq, the state’s institutional response to discord has played a decisive role in 
moulding ethnic and religious mobilization and patterns of ethnic dominance in response 
to exclusion and authoritarian governance during three critical junctures—1920 as a result 
of exogenous state formation and state building by Britain; 1958 with the coup d’état and 
the birth of the republic, culminating in the Ba‘thist takeover in 1968 that cemented 
autocratic single-party rule; and, finally, post-2003 resulting in state reformulation and 
exogenously imposed democratization that has produced a stagnating state.  
The dissertation applies both qualitative and quantitative research methods within 
political science in order to frame the empirical puzzle. It draws on archival research using 
the British National Archives in London, the Ba’th Party archives at the National Defense 
University in Washington, D.C., and the Library of Congress. Extensive empirical 
research was also conducted at Harvard University’s Law School library which houses 
pertinent documents regarding cross-national legal codes. The quantitative component 
consisted of multiple linear regressions using the Fragile State Index which contains 
aggregate data measuring various socio-economic and political indicators. Lastly, the 
work also relies on elite interviews with community members in and outside of Iraq as 
well as American policy makers to gain a deeper understanding of U.S. policy outcomes 
on Iraq’s post-2003 governing trajectory.  
The dissertation’s findings are significant as it is the first study of its kind to apply 




and democratic transition in Iraq. The findings are triangulated in order to reframe our 
understanding of the processes that lead to ethnic mobilization, which has implications for 
measuring the success or failure of post-conflict statebuilding in ethnically divided 
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On June 6 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) entered Mosul—Iraq’s 
second largest city in the Nineveh Province, and a multi-ethnic and religious hub for Iraq’s 
Arabs, Assyrians, Kurds, Shabacks, Turkmen, and Yazidis. Within a week into the chaos, 
ISIL fighters managed to drive out the city’s security forces and declare an Islamic 
Caliphate across the vast territory it controls in parts of Iraq and Syria. Less than five 
months since ISIL’s takeover, the group has allegedly used chemical weapons to target 
Iraqi security personnel,1 and has systematically engaged in ethno-religious cleansing of 
Iraq’s Yazidi, Assyrian, and Christian, whose members were given the three ultimatums: 
convert to Islam, pay the jizya (an Islamic tax on non-Muslim communities), or die.2 
Systematic targeting through ethnic cleansing campaigns or mass summary executions of 
ethno-religious groups has become a daily reality for Iraqis living in ISIL controlled 
territories. As of September 2014—at the time of writing this chapter, the group has 
																																																								
1 Loveday Morris, “Islamic State militants allegedly used chlorine gas against Iraqi security forces,” 
Washington Post, October 23 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-state-
militants-allegedly-used-chlorine-gas-against-iraqi-security-forces/2014/10/23/c865c943-1c93-4ac0-a7ed-
033218f15cbb_story.html?wpisrc=nl-eve&amp;wpmm=1  
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council Resolution S-22/1, 
September 1 2014: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Session22/Pages/22ndtSpecialSession.aspx; 
Amnesty International, “Gruesome evidence of ethnic cleaning in northern Iraq as Islamic State moves to 
wipe out minorities,” September 2 2014: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/gruesome-evidence-ethnic-
cleansing-northern-iraq-islamic-state-moves-wipe-out-minorities-2014-0; Human Right Watch “Iraq: ISIS 





executed an estimated 1700 Shi’i soldiers in the town of Tikrit as well as Shi’i Turkmen 
in villages south of Kirkuk—one of Iraq’s most multiethnic and multi-religious cities.3 
Moreover, ISIL has kidnapped an estimated 2000 Yazidi and Christian women who have 
been systematically raped and sold into sexual slavery in Iraq and neighbouring Syria.4 
The human destruction follows a wave of systematic targeting and destruction of Iraq’s 
ancient Mesopotamian, Christian, and Islamic cultural heritage sites.5  
The near collapse of the state following authoritarian breakdown is symptomatic 
of the inability of ruling elites to govern Iraq has a divided society. From 2003-2013, we 
observe that the country’s political development remains on the margins even following a 
complete institutional overhaul of the Ba‘thist state. Using Freedom House political rights 
and civil liberties aggregated scores (8-not free, 0-free) we see insignificant variation in 
Iraq’s freedom ranking from 1973-2013, and while marginal improvements have been 
made since 2003 in the country’s political rights and civil liberties scores, its overall status 
remains “not free.” 
 
																																																								
3 Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Islamic State Executions in Tikrit,” September 2 2014: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/02/iraq-islamic-state-executions-tikrit; Washington Post, “Shiite 
villagers describe ‘massacre’ in northern Iraq,” June 23 2014: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/shiite-villagers-describe-massacre-in-northern-
iraq/2014/06/23/278b0fb2-76c8-4796-83f7-840c277e93d8_story.html 
4 U.N. News, “ISIL	may	have	committed	genocide,	war	crimes	in	Iraq,	says	UN	human	rights	report,”	
March	19	2015:	http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50369#.VS_acEu4NRH	;See	
also,	Evan Watson, “Treated like cattle’: Yazidi women sold, raped, enslaved by ISIS,” CNN October 30 
2014: http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/30/world/meast/isis-female-
slaves/?cid=ob_articlesidebarall&iref=obinsite  
5 Abdulamneer al-Hamdani, “Iraq’s heritage’s is facing a new wave of destruction,” Iraq Heritage, 
September 8 2014: http://iraqheritage.org/reports.php; Tim Arango, “Tears, and Anger, as Militants 








Figure 1: Iraq Freedom House Rankings, 1973-2013 
 
Data Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data.  
Similarly, while the country’s autocracy rating has improvement since 2003, 
jumping from -9 in 2002 (-10 being highly autocratic and 10 the least) to 3 in 2013, 
peaking in its autocracy ranking during the formative years of Saddam Hussein’s rule from 
1980-2002, its slow progression further points to an overall stagnation in the country’s 



































































Figure 2: Iraq Autocracy Rating, 1924-2013
Data Source: Polity IV Autocracy Index. Note: missing ranking data from 2003-2010 is coded as 66.  
 
Daily violence resulting in civilian deaths has fuelled the country’s stagnation, eleven 
years post-‘liberation’, 2014 has been one of the deadliest years for civilians since 2006 
(at the height of ethno-religious violence), as demonstrated below: 




















Data source: Iraq Body Count 
 
Framing state violence against ethno-religious groups is imperative to understanding the 
failure of ruling elites to govern Iraq as a plural society. The systematic targeting of ethnic 
and religious groups is not a phenomenon restricted to post-2003 as a result of state 
collapse and the deterioration of the security environment. Rather, state-sponsored 
violence against various communities has been a consistent policy of Iraq’s past 
governments throughout formative statebuilding periods, as demonstrated in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1: State-sponsored Violence against Ethnic and Religious Groups, 1933-91 
Event Targeted Group Year 
Simele Massacre 
Farhud 
Purges and executions 
 
Armed autonomist movement  
Mass expulsions 






Kurds, Assyrians, Communists 




































Gassing of Halabja 
Massacre following intifada 
Assyrians, Kurds 
Assyrians, Kurds, Yazidis 








 Source: Sargon George Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in the Twentieth 




This dissertation seeks to explain and ascertain the relationship between state institutions 
and ethnic conflict in Iraq as a divided society. The inquiry began as a curious 
investigation into the origins, causes, and effects of Iraq’s seemingly protracted ethnic 
violence that has plagued the country following state collapse and autocratic breakdown 
in 2003. In attempting to understand the failure to govern Iraq as a divided society, and to 
elucidate the processes and mechanisms that contribute to the surge in ethnic violence 
following an exogenously imposed democratic order, this research seeks to answer the 
following research questions: why has it been difficult to govern Iraq as a divided society 
both prior to and following authoritarian breakdown and the formal institutionalization of 
democracy? While this question underpins the epistemological assumption of this 
research, other significant lateral questions are equally relevant to contextualizing the 
current puzzle—namely, how have historical patterns of authoritarian rule, exclusion, and 
subsequent failures at statebuilding affected group grievances? And what role have 
institutions played in the temporal articulation of conflict along ethnic lines?  
As a theory-building endeavour, I seek to identify the institutional conditions 
against which groups grievances are advanced and the processes that lead to their 




and group conflict, it is imperative to place emphasis on early institutional engineering 
and structural barriers to inclusion during critical state formation and statebuilding periods. 
I apply historical institutionalism and its analytical toolkits to explicate the causal 
mechanisms linking institutional design and ethnic conflict in divided post-colonial 
societies. Contextualizing the emergence of ethnic conflict within a state’s institutional 
setting is imperative since formal institutions “structure incentives for political behavior 
of one kind or another.”6  
Chapter Outline 
 
The first section defines and explains ethnic conflict as it relates to the present inquiry. 
With this definitional background in place, section two defines the conditions that produce 
a divided society and provides an overview of dominant conflict regulation strategies and 
prescriptions for mitigating conflict. This section also examines works that emphasize the 
historical dimensions of conflict in divided societies in order to frame their relevance of 
the present case. In the third section, I situate the evolution of ethnic strife in Iraq vis-à-
vis the state’s political institutions by examining its evolution during critical state 
formation and statebuilding periods. Prominent works that address identity politics in Iraq 
are analyzed in order to demonstrate the gap this research intends to fill. I proceed to 
outline the argument underpinning this study by providing a nuanced explanation of the 
institutional mobilizing factors that have shaped ethnic grievances that have produced a 
divided society. In the last section, I demonstrate the importance of applying historical 
																																																								





institutionalism as an approach for mapping institutional formation and transformation 
along a given temporal setting to the study of ethnic conflict in divided societies like Iraq. 
The chapter concludes with a dissertation overview that frames the overall argument, the 
preliminary findings of this study, and a summation of proceeding chapters.  
Defining Ethnic Conflict  
 
Scholars of ethnic conflict fundamentally agree on the presence of segmental cleavages 
that incentivize mobilization and frame ethnic grievances. While acknowledging the 
sometimes rigid but often fluid and overlapping identities that constitute the complex and 
nebulous world of identity politics in Iraq, both historically and in more modern contexts, 
and in accounting for varied and often vague terminologies such as communal conflict in 
reference to ethnic, religious and sectarian strife, I adopt Donald Horowitz’s 
characterization of ethnic conflict to inclusively denote the articulation of conflict based 
on ascriptive group attachments such as race, language, religion, tribe and caste. 7 
Although communalism, communal conflict, ethno-religious conflict, sectarianism have 
all be used to characterize segmental group conflict in Iraq, their application to this study 
is limited in two ways. First, they are used to describe a subset of religious conflict such 
as the Shi’i-Sunni Arab sectarian divide, which precludes the focus on other types of 
conflicts as it confines it to those religious communities. Second, the terms lack theoretical 
rigor and fail to account for the plethora of ascriptive identities that exist in Iraq that fuel 
discord and mobilization against the state. Moreover, the escalation of sectarian and 
																																																								




religious conflict is often manifested in ethnic terms since “ethnicity is simply the larger 
set to which religion, race, language, and sect belong as subsets.”8  
 With this conceptual background in place, the discussion below shifts to normative 
explanations of the ideological and material causes of ethnic saliency that generate conflict 
in divided societies.   
Explaining Ethnic Saliency  
 
Three prevailing explanations facilitate a greater understanding of the root causes of group 
fragmentation in divided societies like Iraq. For Clifford Geertz, primordial 9  group 
attachments in post-colonial societies takes group identities as “givens” where social 
existence is predicated on “immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond 
them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, 
speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular 
social practices.”10 Contrasting from Geertz, Paul Brass adopts an instrumentalist view of 
ethnic mobilization that underpins the variability of ethnic identities and the factors that 
result in their manipulation and conversion. For Brass, the transformation of ethnicity into 
conflict is rooted in “the conversion of cultural differences into bases for political 
differentiation between peoples [which] arises only under specific circumstances which 
																																																								
8 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 5. 
9 It is imperative to note, primordialism as a concept for understanding the consolidation and attachment 
of group identities on the basis of blood ties, was first used by Edward Shils in “Primordial, Personal, 
Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on the Relationships of Sociological Research and 
Theory,” The British Journal of Sociology, 8. 2 (June 1957): 142.	
10 Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution,” in Old Societies and New States, ed., Clifford Geertz, 
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) 109.  Some primordialists attribute a biological basis to 
ethnicity as a variable in ethnic conflict. See for instance, Peirre Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon 




need to be identified clearly.”11 Hence, a combination of political and economic factors, 
elite competition, and the mobilization of groups in the absence of developed mass 
communication are all processes that contribute to the politicization and hardening of 
ethnic identities that result in conflict.12  
For others, ethnic saliency is an outcome of both primordialist and instrumentalist 
factors. McKay’s matrix model bridges primordialism and instrumentalism by examining 
the extent in which both explanations operate in varying degrees depending on 
circumstance rather than viewing the two models as diametrically opposed analytical 
categories.13 Likewise, Wolff defines ethnic conflict as “a form of group conflict in which 
at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies, 
along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide.”14 Similarly, Gurr, 
in accepting culture as a constitutive element and a key criterion by which ethnic groups 
define and identify themselves, notes the overlap between primordialist and 
instrumentalist causes of group conflict particularly when the presence and degree of 
competition and inequality between groups in a heterogeneous society fuels the saliency 
of group identities resulting in ethnic conflict.15 Of particularly theoretical relevance to 
																																																								
11 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1991), 13. 
12 Brass (1991), 116. 
13 James McKay, “An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to Ethnic 
Phenomena,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 5.4 (October 1982): 403-04. 
14 Stefan Wolff, “Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts,” in Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts, 
eds., Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), 1.  
15 Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 




the present case is Gurr and Harff’s typology16 of ethnic groups in modern states which 
views dominant minorities as a type of ethnoclass that have historically been more 
common and who use and monopolize the power of the state for their own political and 
economic gain over other majority groups, citing the control of the Iraqi state by the Sunni 
Arab minority as an example. 17  While acknowledging that ethnicity is shaped by 
environmental factors that enable elites to instrumentalize and politicize group grievances, 
Esman maintains that the presence of core beliefs, shared memories, and communal 
experiences collectively serve as the foundation for people’s ethnic attachments.18 Shared 
collective historical experiences, cultural markers, language, religion, and legal 
institutions become the basis for the hardening of ethnic solidarities that evolve into salient 
conflict in divided societies.19   
For the purpose of this research, I adopt a synthesized explanation of ethnic 
conflict that acknowledges that while primordial group attachments are a component of 
ethnic solidarity, other structural factors affect the saliency of those attachments across 
time and in a given institutional setting. This supports Haddad’s assertion that an analysis 
of sectarianism in Iraq must account for the contextual and temporal factors that have 
shaped group attachments at a given time. 20  In the given case, as the historical 
institutionalist analysis will illustrate, exogenous state formation by Britain constituted a 
critical juncture in the development of state structures and institutions that catapulted the 
																																																								
16 This typology is based on four categorizations: ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, communal 
contenders, and ethnoclasses.  For an in-depth analysis of these groups, see chapter two in Ted Robert 
Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 15-26. 
17 Gurr and Harf, 24. 
18 Esman (1994), 14. 
19 Ibid.  




Sunni-Arab minority to power and created a fissure in the socio-political dynamics of the 
nascent state. As a society deeply divided along many and often overlapping cleavages, 
early institutional constraints fuelled vertical fragmentation of its society as non-Sunni 
Arab ethnic and religious groups, such as Shi’is, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidis, and 
Jews saw themselves outside the emergent state.  
A few themes emerge out of this conceptual analysis of divided societies and 
ethnic conflict. First, racial, religious, cultural, and ethnic cleavages are contingent 
mobilizing factors for groups in divided societies. Whether these divisions are a result of 
primordialist, instrumentalist, or a synthesis of both, they define and characterize the 
political saliency of ethnic conflict particularly since “control of the state, control of a 
state, and exemption from control by others are among the main goals of ethnic conflict.”21 
Second, ascriptive ties with circumscribed boundaries combined with elite 
instrumentalization of group identities determines inter-group interactions in divided 
states that result in the mobilization22 and hardening of ethnic attachments. Ethnic conflict 
emerges when these factors intersect at a given time at in a given institutional context that 
ultimately determines an ethnic group’s mobilizing factors.  
In the following section, I survey conflict mitigating strategies found within the 
literature on governing in divided societies in order to both outline the varying 
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prescriptions within the existing literature and to frame their relevance to Iraq particularly 
following state and regime collapse in 2003.   
Conceptualizing and Explaining Governing in Divided Societies   
 
Before delving into a discussion of conflict mitigating approaches and strategies for in 
ethnically divided societies, the section below examines normative conceptualizations and 
explanations of divided societies in order to situate the interaction between socio-
structural conditions that fuel ethnic mobilization. Although normative definitions and 
typologies of divided societies vary, they commonly emphasize the presence of segmental 
cleavages as the basis for ethnic mobilization. Nordlinger, for example, contends that the 
intensification of segmental conflict that produces a deeply divided society occurs when 
“a large number of conflict group members attach overwhelming importance to the issues 
at stake, or manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions toward the opposing 
segment, or both. It now becomes apparent that intense conflicts may readily result in 
wide-spread violence and repression when one conflict group controls the government or 
the army.”23   Building on J.S. Furnivall’s Netherlands India, Rabushka and Shepsle 
contend that a plural society consists of culturally diverse and politically organized units 
exhibiting the presence of communal political parties, portioning of social groups along 
homogenous cultural subgroups, and political appeals that emphasize primordial 
attachments.24 
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Similarly, Lijphart maintains that deeply divided societies exhibit cleavages along 
religious, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and racial lines.25 Ian Lustick, on the other hand, 
builds on Nordlinger’s definition of a divided society as “plural,” “vertically segmented,” 
and “communally divided,” and contends that a society is deeply divided if “ascriptive 
ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with 
high political salience, sustained over a substantial period of time and a wide variety of 
issues.” 26  Thus, primordial group identifications become the legitimizing basis for 
political mobilization along ethnic or religious lines resulting in conflict. Peleg 
characterizes divided societies as those espousing an ethnic constitutional order (ECO) 
marked by a “regime privileging one ethnic group over all others by law, policies or 
practices and via the actions of the state.”27 Regime survival is based on coercive means 
or by the “hegemonic” acceptance of its fundamental principles, which may also produce 
contradictions coupled with exposure to external global values resulting in its demise.28 
Thus, for Peleg, the clash between ethnic communities and the politicization of communal 
cleavages resulting from diverging group claims over the control of the state and the 
institutionalization of ethnic-based nepotism produces a divided society. For the purpose 
of this research, I adopt Choudhry’s characterization of a divided as those where perceived 
inter-group identification and ethnic-based conflict is a defining and transformative 
marker and where, 
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these differences are politically salient—that is, they are persistent markers of political identity and 
bases for political mobilization. Ethnocultural diversity translates into political fragmentation. In a 
divided society, political claims are refracted through the lens of ethnic identity, and political 
conflict is synonymous with conflict among ethnocultural groups.29 
 
Two crosscutting themes emerge out of the aforementioned conceptualization.  First, the 
presence of politically salient segmental cleavages based on ethnic identifications. Second, 
the politicization of these identities leads to the hardening of collective identities, which 
produces group mobilization against the state. Thus, group grievances are couched in an 
ethnic frame and are thus viewed through an ethnic prism. Conceptualizing the underlying 
causes of ethnic conflict that underpins any analysis of a divided society means 
disaggregating and unpacking the factors that result in their development. Primordialism, 
instrumentalism, or a synthesis of both are three normative explanations that dominate the 
discourse on ethnic mobilization ethnicity in divided societies. Contextualizing the 
conditions and processes that result in group mobilization against the state requires an 
analysis of the factors that affect how ethnic groups emerge and the dynamics that result 
in the hardening of ethnic identity politics as a response to institutional constraints in a 
given state. This aids in identifying the causal mechanisms that have shaped grievances 
and ethnic saliency in Iraq since its formation. 
This conceptual background is significant as it frames the mechanisms that inflame 
group saliency in order to explain and ascertain the applicability of dominant conflict 
regulation paradigms. Broadly, the scholarship attempts to explain how and why and 
under what conditions groups mobilize along ethnic lines in a given conflict setting. The 
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central issue underpinning all research on divided societies is nested in the need to identify 
and apply conflict regulation models to societies exhibiting protracted ethnic conflicts. 
However, conflict regulation models often offer a one-size-fits all solution with little 
analysis of the historically relevant processes that fuel conflict, which may also house 
clues not only about why ethnic groups mobilize against the state, but how grievances can 
be addressed in a given institutional setting. 
The discussion below shifts to the normative and theoretical application of conflict 
regulation strategies. The literature on ethnic conflict is often intertwined with conflict 
regulating models and prescriptions. Dominant paradigms for governing deeply divided 
societies emphasize the need for implementing institutional design models that can 
mitigate conflict and sustain peace over time. While all dominant approaches emphasize 
the need to devise institutional mechanisms that can halt ethnic violence and sustain a 
peaceful transition to democracy, scholars diverge in their conflict regulation prescriptions 
and the institutional design choices that accompany them. 
Prescriptions for Conflict Regulation 
 
Scholars of governing in divided societies identify and apply prescriptions that can better 
mitigate group-based conflict in fragmented societies exhibiting segmental cleavages. 
Consociationalism and centripetalism are two theoretically and empirically divergent 
approaches that dominate the discourse on ethnic conflict management in plural societies. 
Although the presence and salience of segmental cleavages that result in the politicization 
and mobilization of ethnic groups underpin the conceptual and normative basis of this 




Accordingly, competing models of institutional engineering in emerging 
democracies focus on the capacity of the transitional state to implement conflict 
prevention strategies in deeply divided societies. This requires the formulation of 
constitutional and institutional tools that promote inclusion and national consensus 
whereby citizens share a common national loyalty.30  These models operate within a 
democratic framework; that is, they presuppose the viability of democracy as the most 
effective governing strategy for resolving conflict in deeply divided societies. Dominant 
accommodationist conflict regulation approaches can be dichotomized into two distinct 
electoral incentives—consociationalism as espoused by Arend Lijphart and Donald 
Horowitz’s centripetalism as an alternative to consociationalism.   
Broadly, these categories vary thematically between promoting more centralized 
versus decentralized forms of institutional design mechanisms for societies exhibiting 
salient ethnic conflict. For Lijphart, segmental cleavages can be moderated by adopting 
consociationalism and its four principles: a grand coalition; a mutual veto; proportionality; 
and segmental autonomy. 31  The utility of consociationalism rests with its ability to 
provide contending groups a stake in the legislative and executive decision-making 
processes by promoting political engagement of competing ethnic groups. Although both 
Horowitz and Lijphart agree on various institutional engineering strategies for divided 
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societies, 32  Horowitz contends that grand coalitions will only intensify centrifugal 
tendencies and will always override broad-based cooperation incentives in deeply divided 
societies.33 Alternatively, centripetalism entails drawing power to the centre in order to 
minimize centrifugal politics and the polarization of existing ethnic cleavages.34 It is 
characterized by the reduction of conflict through arrangements that advance policies that 
generate incentives for interethnic cooperation through electoral coalitions or preferential 
and territorial arrangements; encouraging alignment based on common interests rather 
than ethnicity; and lastly, reducing disparities between groups to mitigate the future 
eruption of conflict.35 Building on Horowitz and Timothy Sisk (1995), Benjamin Reilly 
contends that centripetalism is a political system where the focus of political competition 
is aimed at the centre and not on polarizing extremes in order to diffuse group attachments 
as the foundation of political engagement.36 However, elites are often reluctant to consign 
or relegate powers to a centralized authority under a presidential system particularly if the 
country has exhibited forced and violent political consolidation under an authoritarian 
regime, as the Iraq case demonstrates.  
Ian Lustick describes an alternative control strategy employed by states to govern 
a divided society that “would focus on the emergence and maintenance of a relationship 
in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce stability by 
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constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments.”37 
This is implemented through coercion or threat of coercion, political and economic 
mechanisms, institutional design, legal frameworks, and sociocultural circumstances.38 
The dilemma in Lustick’s control approach is the consolidation and centralization of 
coercion for states making the transition from authoritarian rule. In the case of post-2003 
Iraq, decades of autocratic single-party rule under the B‘ath regime meant that groups 
previously excluded from state structures and institutions lack the political incentive to 
relegate power to a centralized authority. While Sunni Arabs might favour a more 
centralized state, leaders and elites of majority and minority ethnic groups reject a highly 
centralized state fearing it would replicate the B‘athist system.39  
The strands of literature focus on formulating constitutional and institutional 
models for promoting inclusion and national consensus whereby citizens share a common 
national loyalty within a democratic framework.40 The importance of democracy to post-
conflict statebuilding is summarized by Przeworski in noting that although conflict is 
present in all societies and that democracy is not an end-all solution for resolving conflicts, 
it is nevertheless an important system for processing and managing conflicts. 41 
Underpinning this formula is the creation of an institutional design that is both democratic 
(on an institutional/statist level) and responsive to democratic politics (based on societal 
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interests) in post-conflict states. The process of designing new institutional arrangements 
is a crucial step for ensuring that new institutions can moderate ethnic tensions and 
grievances, while, at the same time, preventing the outburst of violence in transitional 
divided societies.42 This is predicated on testing the applicability and practicability of 
consociationalism and power-sharing versus centripetalism and cross-sectional and 
interethnic cooperation as the two competing electoral strategies of accommodation in 
post-conflict statebuilding in deeply divided societies.    
As noted by Choudhry, Lijphart’s analysis of deeply divided societies is one that 
is challenged by mutually reinforcing segmental cleavages where political divisions map 
onto “lines of objective social differentiation” characterized by race, language, culture and 
ethnicity. 43  The method by which segmental cleavages can be moderated is 
consociationalism, which encompasses four principles: grand coalition; a mutual veto; 
proportionality; and segmental autonomy.44  The utility of consociation rests with its 
ability to provide contending groups a stake in the constitutional making process while 
promoting political engagement of salient ethno-religious groups in divided societies. 
However, analytically, Lijphart does not account for preceding governing structures and 
institutional design that might impede the application of power-sharing consociational 
arrangements particularly during the critical phase of democratic consolidation. 
																																																								
42 Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 94. 
43 Choudhry, 17. 
44 Lijphart (1977): 118-19.  In later works, Lijphart outlines nine constitutional guidelines for 
consociationalism: legislative electoral system; guidelines within proportional representation; 
parliamentary or presidential government; power sharing in the executive; cabinet stability; selecting the 
head of state; nonterritorial autonomy; and power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliament.  See  




Although both Horowitz and Lijphart agree on various institutional engineering 
strategies for divided societies,45 Horowitz contends that grand coalitions as advocated by 
power-sharing arrangements only intensify centrifugal tendencies and will always 
override broad-based and cross-ethnic cooperation in deeply divided societies.46  An 
alternative approach based on centripetalism entails drawing power to the centre in order 
to minimize centrifugal politics in ethnically divided societies.47 It is characterized by the 
reduction of conflict through arrangements that advance policies that generate and 
incentivize interethnic cooperation through electoral coalitions or preferential and 
territorial arrangements, encouraging alignment based on common interests rather than 
ethnicity, and lastly, reducing disparities between groups that may serve as the mobilizing 
ground for conflict saliency.48 A drawback to this approach is the lack of incentives for 
elites to consign or relegate powers to a centralized authority particularly if countries have 
exhibited forced and violent political consolidation under authoritarian regimes, as the 
Iraqi case demonstrates.   
Building on Lijphart and Horowitz’s typologies, McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon 
reject Lijphart and Horowitz’s claim that ethnic identity necessarily translates to political 
mobilization in divided societies49 and compartmentalize institutional design approaches 
into integration versus accommodation as conflict regulating models.50 Integrationists 
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attribute ethnic conflict to the presence of group-based polarization in political institutions 
rather to tangible and salient factors, and thus renounce the ethnification of political parties 
and civic associations by favouring non-ethnic alignment of political factions. 51 
Accommodationists, on the other hand, accept the diversity of group identities in 
heterogeneous states and acknowledge the importance of taking ethnic saliency as a factor 
for developing conflict regulation strategies. 52  Categorically, centripetalism, 
multiculturalism, consociation, and territorial pluralism are the four main 
accommodationist approaches to governing a divided society, of which Lijphart, Horowitz, 
and McGarry, O’Leary, and Simeon subscribe to.  
The aforementioned categories vary thematically between those promoting 
centralized versus decentralized forms of institutional design models for divided societies 
exhibiting politically salient and often protracted ethnic conflict. A few critical 
observations and gaps in the literature are worth noting. First, the above institutional 
design mechanisms are prescriptions that assume that the imposition of democratic 
institutions leads to democratic politics, which may not always be the case.53 Institutional 
engineering in an emerging democracy, whether rooted in consociational or centripetal 
arrangements, are often packaged and compartmentalized as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution 
without examining the impact of preceding governing structures on ethnic grievances.  
Second, these models assume institutional engineering commences on a clean slate and 
focus on prescriptive rigidity that lacks a historical account of preceding governing 
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structures and processes that have served as the basis for political contestation and ethnic 
mobilization. Lastly, they seldom account for the presence and utility of indigenous 
structures and institutions that may have generated horizontal interethnic cooperation in 
deeply divided societies that may be incorporated into new institutions and the emergent 
democratic structure.   
I propose an explanation that explains how and why past institutional constraints 
shape ethnic saliency both under authoritarian regimes and following authoritarian 
breakdown. This explanation centres on historicizing the institutional conditions and 
processes that affect group mobilization during formative statebuilding periods. The 
section below explores works that have adopted a historical explanation of ethnic conflict 
in divided societies in order to situate the relevance of the present analysis within the 
broader discourse on governing in divided societies.  
Historicizing Institutional Design in Divided Societies 
 
The ontological underpinning of this thesis seeks to map the temporal conditions that 
structure the response of ethnic groups against authoritarianism and exclusion as 
governing mechanisms manifested in the state’s governing institutions. Although 
scholarship on ethnic conflict management and institutional design emphasize the need to 
effectively concoct post-conflict state institutions that can mitigate group conflict, they 
often underestimate how preceding institutions and institutional design choices for 
divided societies precipitate ethnic conflict. Large-n studies, for example, oscillate 
between those measuring the fluctuation of ethnic conflict to quantitative analyses that 




variation and intensity of said conflicts. A common denominator within the existing 
scholarship is the need to formulate functioning institutions that can moderate tensions 
and mitigate future outbursts of conflict. Alternatively, other works that employ within-
case analyses of small-n single case studies have elucidated the importance of engaging 
in a historical and contextual analysis of institutional design in divided societies.  
Particularly relevant to the premise of this thesis are works that juxtapose historical 
analysis with the study of institutional design in divided societies. 
In his seminal work on the politics of Belgium—a society divided along linguistic, 
ethnic, and regional lines, Deschouwer demonstrates the deterministic impact past 
institutional choices have had on contemporary politics and institutional options for 
Belgium. For Deschouwer, understanding the present state of affairs and future 
institutional options for this divided society must be cognizant of, and founded on four 
historical turning points or critical junctures:  (1) the critical period of state formation that 
saw the creation of a state divided along linguistic and religious segments; (2) the impact 
of successive electoral reforms, universal male suffrage, the introduction of proportional 
representation in 1900 and the development of the country’s two prominent Catholic and 
Socialist political parties that came to dominate politics; (3) the institutional and territorial 
demarcation and organization of the country’s linguistic divisions, which set the 
foundation for the country’s federal composition; and, lastly (4), the shift of the country’s 
economic power from the southern, largely French region to the northern Flanders 
region.54   
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Another regional example assesses the implications of state formation and early 
institutional design choices in Switzerland on the state’s current institutional design. 
Kriesi and Trechsel illustrate how early institutional choices during the Swiss 
Confederation shaped its governing structures. In particular, the country’s federal 
structure, its relationship with the highly autonomous cantons mostly divided along 
religious (Catholic and Protestant) and linguistic lines, attempted nation building by elites 
in the 19th century, and the formation and transformation of Swiss federalism largely tied 
to its early constitutional development, all contributed to the country’s constitutional 
history as well as its current institutional arrangement.55  Both cases demonstrate the 
inextricable and consequential links between past institutional choices and their effects on 
contemporary institutional configurations and outcomes by placing their development on 
a continuum of historical processes. 
Other works, particularly relating to post-colonial states, have also emphasized the 
impact of preceding institutional choices on the development and transformation of 
contemporary institutional design strategies for divided societies. Posner’s analysis of 
political institutions and ethnic politics in Africa demonstrates how political institutions 
not only shape ethnic politics and the saliency of ethnic identities, but also why “they 
shape peoples’ incentives for selecting one of these potentially salient ethnic identities 
rather than another, and then coordinate these choices across individuals so as to produce 
a society-level outcome.”56 Furthermore, Posner attributes the origins of ethnic identities 
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and their politicization in Zambia to institutions adopted by European colonial powers in 
the administration of Northern Rhodesia.57 More recently, Horowitz’s groundbreaking 
work on constitutional design and democratic transition in post-Suharto Indonesia reveals 
the utility of engaging in a historical analysis of early institutional design on transitional 
divided societies. In tracing the unconventional constitutional drafting process, marked by 
elections prior to the ratification of a new constitution following the collapse of Suharto’s 
dictatorship after his resignation in 1998, Horowitz underscores the way in which 
incremental changes, shaped by past historical experiences, adopted during the transitional 
period assisted in stabilizing and moderating mounting ethnic and religious tensions in 
this highly divided, pos-colonial state.58  The selection of an incremental process rather 
than an abrupt and complete overhaul of key institutions in 1998 is tied to past historical 
experiences and “when decisions are made incrementally, path dependence becomes 
important. The result was that those who revised the Indonesia constitution made some 
institutional choices at variance with more or less orthodox advice.”59  
Similarly, O’Donnell’s emphasis on historical “constants” demonstrates the 
relevance of historical processes on democratic transformation and institutional building 
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in Argentina.60 Cotler, on the other hand, employs a historical-structuralist approach to 
institutional design in Peru, emphasizing the residual effect of colonial institutions such 
as the country’s oligarchy on democratic consolidation and institutional transformation.61 
Other works on democratic transitions in post-communist Europe also underscore the need 
to contextualize the processes and institutional choices made during the third wave of 
democratic transition within a longer temporal setting. Johnson’s work on the 
reconfiguration and transformation of post-communist financial institutions applies a 
path-dependent, temporal analysis of past institutional legacies and post-communist 
institutional design, and notes that “the effectiveness of such institutional design depends 
on the interaction among policy choice, institutional legacies, state capacity, and policy 
sequencing.”62   
The above works demonstrate the utility of applying a historicized account of 
institutional change and the effects of colonial policies on ethnic conflict. In the case of 
the Middle East, British and French colonial policies bolstered the politicization and 
mobilization of inter-ethnic groups.63 This work builds on the aforementioned literatures 
by adding another non-Western case study to the repository of cases that underscores the 
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relevance of a historicized64 explanation of political change. Situating Iraq within this 
frame of explanation aids in identifying the causal mechanisms and processes that have 
produced ethnic discord in response to various stages of institutional design; i.e. why the 
sequences of events in Iraq’s statebuilding fuelled ethnic mobilization against the state.65 
Doing so requires a reconceptualization of the roots of ethnic strife in Iraq not as an 
indispensible component of societal interactions or a prescriptive marker of state-society 
relations but rather as an outcome of institutional constraints since the period of state 
formation and subsequently under various statebuilding periods. Hence, the interlocking 
theme here is the historical and the temporal.  
In the following section, I demonstrate the importance of theoretically situating 
ethnic conflict in Iraq within a systematic analysis of the state and its political institutions 
as mechanism that both impose constraints on society and that structure social behaviour. 
Using Iraq as a single case, I insert an institutional analysis of the evolution and 
development of ethnic conflict in Iraq during formative statebuilding periods in order to 
map the causal mechanisms and the processes that congealed the ethnification66 of group 
grievances against the state.  
State Formation, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict in Iraq   
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Although this research examines ethnic conflict as one aspect of state-society relations in 
Iraq, the central frame of analysis remains on state institutions as a product and an outcome 
of European colonial encroachment on the region following WWI. The emphasis on state 
institutions rests with the capacity of the state to exert its power on society and dictates 
state-society relations. In a Gramscian sense, the state constitutes both a political and civil 
society and maintains social and political hegemony over a given territory through a 
“governmental-coercive apparatus.”67 Thus, the state provides the context by which we 
can analyze the institutional/structural strategies of political actors and the historical 
context that shapes actors’ political behaviour.68 I adopt Joel Migdal’s definition of a state 
as “an organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s 
leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement 
the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social 
organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.”69  
Conceptualizing the impact of state institutions facilitates an examination of the 
causal mechanisms that delineate and determine the behaviour of ethnic elites as social 
forces that shape ethnic conflict in divided societies. I posit that asymmetrical ethnic 
power relations that have determined the trajectory of conflict and mobilization in Iraq 
were determined and shaped largely by its colonial past. This critical period of state 
formation cemented exclusionary governance as colonial administrators favoured the rule 
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of Iraq’s minority Sunni-Arab elites from urban areas. In providing a theoretical 
explanation of the processes that lead to the formation and deformation of Arab states 
based on the region’s colonial past, Saouli contends that what emerged in the Middle East 
are social fields rather than states, which “initially constituted the spheres of influence of 
the encroaching European powers.”70 Also rooting the analysis of state formation in the 
region’s colonial history, Ayubi notes that exogenous state formation by capitalist 
European powers ensured that nascent state structures served European economic interests 
and capitalist modes of production characterized by a growing dependency on external 
demands and interests.71 Ayubi’s analysis is particularly relevant for studying Iraq as a 
post-colonial state created by and administered under the British Mandate following the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. For conceptual clarity, state formation here 
denotes the consolidation or take-over, by political actors “of an organization that already 
performs at least some of the functions of the state.”72 Thus, identifying the processes that 
led to state formation aids in identifying and explaining the effects of inadequate early 
institutional design on ethnic discord in emergent divided societies like Iraq. As will be 
demonstrated in chapter 3, exogenous state formation and subsequent statebuilding in Iraq 
under the British Mandate cemented ethnic power asymmetries and determined the 
preferential treatment of one ethnic group over others to govern the emergent state.  
Before delving into an analysis of the theoretical implications of this study, the 
proceeding section surveys prominent works on Iraq in order to demonstrate the gap in 
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the existing literature this work seeks to fill and to better contextualize a systematic 
analysis of ethnic conflict and statebuilding alongside the state’s institutional development.  
Scholarship on Identity Politics in Iraq 
 
Although prominent works on Iraq highlighted the difficulties of governing Iraq as a 
divided society, literature on ethnic conflict in Iraq proliferated following the 2003 
invasion and subsequent state collapse.73 Unsurprisingly, such works often engage in a 
triumvirate analysis of the three dominant ethno-religious communities, the Shi‘i, Sunni, 
and the Kurds as they represent the largest numerical majority and minority factions. Fanar 
Haddad’s seminal work on sectarianism in Iraq is the most comprehensive English source 
on the topic, but one that views identity politics through the prism of Iraqi-Arab sectarian 
membership of the country’s Shi’i and Sunni communities. A detailed examination of the 
religious and ideological demonstrates the fluid and often overlapping nature of identity 
politics in Iraq. The political contestation of the Iraqi state by Shi‘is and Kurds is in 
response to the ethnic dominance of the minority Sunni-Arabs of the state until the 
collapse of the Ba‘thist regime in 2003 particularly as “the state represented not only a 
monopoly of the power in the hands of the Sunnis but also a political expression of Sunni 
cultural values.”74 In order to frame the theoretical and empirical contribution of this work, 
it is imperative to first explore prominent works particularly those that emerged post-2003. 
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Works on identity politics in Iraq are often meshed with larger works on the 
political history of the country. Charles Tripp, a historian of Iraq and the Middle East, 
considers the historical significance of early state formation on contemporary political 
developments through the analysis of three variables: patrimonialism, Iraq’s political 
economy, and the use of violence.75 For Tripp, the moulding of the nascent state after 
Ottoman institutions and administrative units by the British was purposive of ensuring 
control over a highly divided society. It is during this early statebuilding period we 
observe resentment among Shi’i and Kurdish segments of the population over religious 
dissent and socio-economic disparity over the unbalanced composition of key positions of 
the newly formed army by urbanized Sunni Arabs and Arabized Kurds and Turks, 
connected to the previous Ottoman administration.76 Consequently, “key state institutions 
became instruments in the hands of powerful individuals and their followings, 
encouraging factionalism among officials and throwing into question the nature of their 
royalties.”77 As a foundational book for a general history on Iraq, Tripp’s work does not 
solely examine and explain the causal mechanisms that have determined the trajectory of 
ethnic in Iraq.   
Similarly, Toby Dodge highlights critical junctures that resulted in the failure to 
produce an Iraqi nation following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and subsequently 
under the British Mandate. For Dodge, keys obstacles for Britain’s approach to governing 
Iraq was the need to maintain amicable control over governing the state on the one hand, 
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and relinquishing control in order to legitimize the rule of a foreign king (Faisal I, a 
Hashemite, was the son of the Sharif of Mecca in Saudi Arabia) over a highly divided and 
diverse population, on the other.78 These early structural failures continue to reverberate 
in post-2003 Iraq as manifested by the presence four interlinked problems: the deployment 
of extreme levels of organized violence; the use of state resources through a patronage 
system; the use of oil revenue by the state to make itself autonomous from society; and 
manipulation of ethnic and sectarian identities as a governing strategy.79 Although Dodge 
acknowledges the highly divisive and plural nature of Iraqi society, his analysis lacks a 
systematic analysis of the ways in which ethnic elites organized and structured 
mechanisms that fuelled ethnic divisions.   
Stansfield attributes the spike in ethnic violence to the suppression of group 
identities by the Ba‘th regime which were otherwise contained through coercion.80 The 
collapse of autocratic single-party system in 2003 meant that “the liquidation of the ‘Iraqi 
state’ and its agents of control (whether of an administrative government), political (the 
Ba’ath Party), security (e.g. the mukhabarat) or military (the army) nature) also released 
the patrimonial and coercive pressure which had successfully kept Iraq’s fractious 
communal ‘mosaic of discord’ together.” 81  Lacking in Stansfield analysis are well-
defined variables that have produced and reinforced this exclusive institutional design in 
Iraq, and how and why ethnic groups respond to institutional pressures, across time. 
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Conversely, Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala attempt to demonstrate the 
instrumentalization of ethnic sentiments following state collapse by analyzing the 
structural and institutional complexities that impeded effective governing strategies 
following 2003 and “do not accept that the significance of sectarian membership in the 
construction of Iraqis’ identities has been constant over Iraq’s history.”82 Moreover, they 
posit that the escalation of ethnic saliency is not due to pre-existing configurations, but 
rather an outcome of the rise of social, political and ideological factors in the modern 
world fuelled by the lengthy rule of a Sunni-Arab minority over Iraq since its creation, the 
rise of a global Shi’i activism, institutional rivalries coupled with political and 
international dynamics that result in the hardening of sectarian identities.83 However, their 
analysis fails to systematically analyze the historical causal mechanisms that fuelled 
ethnic mobilization against the state since the period of state formation and subsequently 
under various autocratic statebuilding periods in response to exclusion and 
authoritarianism. Citing survey polls taken in 2003 and 2004 that demonstrate Iraqis’ 
reluctance to adopt sectarian affiliations,84 the saliency of group membership became 
imbued in the compositions of particular neighbourhoods as the conflict progressed that 
led to the resurgence of sectarian and ethnic attachments. Moreover, figures regarding 
voluntary repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons point to groups seeking 
more ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods to return to.85   
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Andreas Wimmer’s work on ethno-religious conflict post-2003 provides a 
historical account of ethno-religious grievances against the state that fuelled the surge in 
ethnic conflict following the collapse in 2003.86 Wimmer attributes the politicization of 
ethnicity and fragmentation to two variables.  First, a weak state where resource access is 
demarcated along very selective lines that grant certain communities access to political 
power, equality before the law, and social security, as was the case with the minority 
Sunni-Arabs in Iraq. Second, civil society institutions and associations were created by 
state elites and were based on ethnic clientelism as a means of creating a “new power basis 
and transforming ethnic categories into groups of political solidarity.”87  
While the aforementioned works instructively illuminate the historical and 
political processes that affected state capacity and statebuilding in Iraq, they fall short of 
engaging in a systematic and temporal analysis of the causal mechanisms that affected 
ethnic mobilization against the state throughout formative periods in Iraq’s development. 
This thesis both confirms and challenges the aforementioned works in two ways. It accepts 
the view adopted by the aforementioned scholars that ethnic discord was neither novel nor 
necessarily the most salient feature of Iraqi society. Iraqis, as with citizens of many plural 
and multi-ethnic states, share bonds of conflict and cooperation, and the latter of which is 
manifested in both the presence of multi-ethnic political parties, such as the Iraqi 
Communist Party, as well as more urbane forms of cooperation among Iraqi intellectuals, 
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as demonstrated in Orit Bashkin’s seminal piece, The Other Iraq. This work diverges, and 
challenges existing works in its identification and analysis of the structural machinations 
that simultaneously impedes modes of inter-ethnic cooperation that also fuel ethnic 
discord. In doing so, it analyzes the institutional import at the root of ethnic mobilization. 
One way it does this is by limiting the parameters of the research agenda to specifically 
explain the effects of colonial and post-colonial state institutions and ethnic elite 
behaviour on ethnic fragmentation. Moreover, while the aforementioned works broadly 
address ethno-religious discord, this thesis adds a nuanced dimension to the study of the 
relationship between institutions and ethnic discord in Iraq that maps and identifies the 
effects of two interdependent variables, exclusion and authoritarianism during critical 
statebuilding periods. Thus, in challenging generalist works on the history and politics of 
Iraq, this work demonstrates that the upsurge in ethnic violence in the decade proceeding 
the American-led invasion in 2003 is an outcome of early institutional failures that that 
enabled ethnic elites, catapulted to power under the British Mandate, to suppress perceived 
threats to the state through exclusionary and authoritarian governance. This initial 
development, in addition to the precipitous and expedient statebuilding, I argue, explains 
the propensity of ethnic elites to reproduce this type of governing pattern following 
authoritarian breakdown and the formal institutionalization of democratic institutions 
post-2003. 
This work thusly challenges existing scholarship on Iraq in three ways. First, it is 
the first to address the interplay between state institutions and ethnic mobilization in Iraq. 
Second, it is the first to adopt a longitudinal explanation of group discord since the time 




a temporal dimension to understanding the relationship between state institutions and 
ethnic conflict in the given case allows for a more systematic analysis of the dynamics 
and processes that shape group grievances against the state since the time of state 
formation and throughout critical statebuilding periods. As a society divided along ethnic, 
religious, and sectarian lines, Iraq’s political development has inextricably been anchored 
in the historical and contemporary statebuilding processes and early colonial institutional 
engineering initial. Works relating to post-2003 democratization in Iraq have largely 
ignored or devalued the role of preceding governing structures and institutions on ethnic 
mobilization, which this work seeks to remedy.88 Third, it is the first work to benefit from 
applying a historical-institutionalist paradigm to explaining discord and mobilization, 
while also utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods to further its empirical 
contribution, both within political science and area studies.   
Grievances, Mobilization and Ethnic Conflict in Iraq 
  
 The formation and consolidation of a regionalized state system of the MENA region 
emerged as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, European (British and French) 
foreign policy interests in the region, and the discovery of oil.89 In the case of Iraq, British 
preference for urban Sunni-elites already, armed with military and administrative powers 
(numerically, a minority in comparison to the Shi’i community), in early institutional 
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building and their role in strengthening and developing the country’s petroleum producing 
capacities, technically and organizationally, shaped ethnic power dynamics in the 
emergent state.90 Moreover, the simultaneous amalgamation of the three Ottoman vilayets 
(provinces) of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra by the British in their creation of a centralized 
political entity and a territorially unified state produced a society that was “divided along 
racial, linguistic, religious, and sectarian lines, which have deeply influenced its political 
development.”91 Thus, state ownership was a symptomatic outcome of its post-colonial 
development that demarcated who belonged to the state.92   
Identifying state ownership and early modes of ethnic control and dominance is 
crucial for explaining how early institutional preferences and constraints shaped patterns 
of governance93 toward excluded segments in Iraq. Since the state holds a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of force, it is imperative to analyze the reverberating effects of early 
forms of ethnic dominance and capture of the state by the Sunni-Arab minority under 
British tutelage and explain the ways in which state institutions became the main apparatus 
for maintaining hegemonic control and ownership of the state by successive ruling elites. 
Consequently, governing this fragmented state was less concerned with accounting for the 
multiplicity of collective interests and more with ensuring the exclusive control of one 
segment over others. The result was the hardening of ethnic attachments as a response to 
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both Sunni minority rule and state-sponsored corporatism, which saw the centralization 
of the basic functioning of the state along clientelistic networks through an organized 
patronage system characterized by exclusive arrangements and defined by “subordination, 
encapsulation, and segmentary ‘capture’ of the state apparatus.”94 In a sense, external state 
formation was a catalyst for coagulating ethnic fragmentation that produced patterns of 
ethnic dominance sustained by a political culture rooted in authoritarianism and exclusion. 
Consequently, the exclusive feature of the early Iraqi state, designed and, for some time, 
administered by the British, sustained the state’s despotic power defined by a “range of 
actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised 
negotiation with civil society groups.”95 The lack of institutionalized negotiation with, 
and inclusion of other segments in the polity marked by the exclusion of the Shi’i majority 
and minority groups from the state’s institutions and power structures.  
The replication of these governing tactics by a new ruling elite illustrates the extent 
to which past grievances shape actors choices following regime collapse where a 
democratic opening could have fostered a the emergence of a new political culture. 
Attributing a historical explanation of ethnic mobilization to the critical period of state 
formation both provides the contextual framework by which ethnic mobilization can be 
framed and conceptualized as an outcome of failed statebuilding. Analyzing the historical 
development of the country’s institutional design overtime provides us with the temporal 
causal chain for tracing its effects on ethnic conflict both prior to and post-2003.  
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The American-led occupation in 2003 opened the political space for ethnic groups 
to openly contest the state and ruling elite. 2003 became a critical juncture that tilted the 
state toward a democratizing path imposed through an exogenous intervention that 
dislodged the B‘athist state and government resulting in the systematic overhaul of the 
state that existed for over three decades. Consequently, this abrupt and expedient 
transformation transposed group grievances, which had been previously suppressed under 
authoritarian rule, onto an emergent political arena. I argue that a contextual analysis of 
state institutions along a continuum of state policies is crucial for situating and mapping 
the evolution and trajectory of ethnic mobilization in deeply divided societies. It is this 
analytical and empirical gap this research also intends to fill. Rooting the present analysis 
in a historical explanation enables us to draw “inferences about the causes of specific 
outcomes in particular cases” to better understand the historic and contemporary 
relationship between institutions and ethnic fragmentation.96 In doing so, I intend to 
establish a relational and temporal understanding of the impact of early institutional design 
on the way in which elites governing weak and divided states devise strong institutions 
that affect the politicization and mobilization of ethnic groups by favouring the dominance 
of one group over others. The underlying assumption here is that ethnic conflict as a 
process should be analyzed within a given historical context and that as a tool of sound 
explanation, history enables us to “make implicit or explicit assumptions concerning 
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historical origins of the phenomenon and time-place scope conditions for the claimed 
explanation."97  
Two reasons underpin the case selection. First, the literature on Iraq and ethnic 
conflict has yet to systematically account for the impact of early institutional design on 
group fragmentation (ethnic, religious, and sectarian) during formative statebuilding 
periods. Second, as demonstrated in Nicos Poulantzas’ Marxist analysis of the state and 
its political power,  
The state apparatus—that special and hence formidable something—is not exhausted in state power. 
Rather political domination is itself inscribed in the institutional materiality of the State. Although 
the State is not created ex nihilo by the ruling classes, nor is it simply taken over by them: state 
power is written into this materiality. Thus, while all the State’s actions are not reducible to political 
domination, their composition is nevertheless marked by it.98  
 
As this study is concerned with power dynamics in a given institutional setting and its 
impact on group mobilization, it becomes increasingly imperative to examine how the 
state-as the primary apparatus of both political and institutional domination, affected 
fragmentation and group mobilization against institutional constraints it imposed on 
society. I have attributed a high degree of explanatory value to institutions in comparison 
with other social and economic factors because state institutions, as political and coercive 
instruments of ruling ethnic elites, define power imbalances, determine resource allocation 
and distribution, project state ideologies over time, and impose limits on societal 
contestation of governance. Juxtaposing ethnic mobilization alongside state institutions 
and state power shifts the focus on ethnic conflict from a primordialist understanding of 
grievances to a structural analysis of the impact of constraints since “the state’s political 
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institutions and capabilities structure ethnopolitical groups’ choices about the objectives 
to pursue and the means used to do so.”99 Likewise, as noted by Gurr, the limitations 
imposed by elites within a given institutional setting defines an ethnic group’s political 
opportunity structures as the state’s resources and administrative capacities limit group 
opportunities and since the “openness of the political system affects group leaders’ choices 
about whether to participate, protest, or rebel.”100  
This study aims to situate the relevance of institutions on ethnic mobilization by 
converging existing works on governing in divided societies and state formation with 
historical institutionalism in order to contextualize the ways in which divided societies 
reproduce governing structures that create and reinforce the saliency of ethnic conflict. 
Framing ethnic conflict within a state and institutionalist analysis also aids in explaining 
how institutions create the political opportunity structures (POS) that foster ethnic 
mobilization against the exclusionary and authoritarian state particularly since a POS 
“establishes the context in which ethnic movements shape their strategies and tactics, and 
perhaps their ideologies and goals as well. It furnishes incentives, limitations, permissible 
boundaries, potentials, and risks that inform the behavior of ethnic entrepreneurs and 
activists and influence the expectations of their constituents.” 101  I argue that the 
institutional configuration of the state and its political capacity during the period of state 
formation and subsequently under key statebuilding periods defined the POS of excluded 
ethnic elites and determined their propensity to mobilize against the state.    
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The POS of a given institutional setting exacerbate ethnic saliency in two ways. 
First, they provide the structural context under which the rules and practices that facilitate 
or hinder the mobilization of an ethnic movement unfold. Second, a country’s POS 
enables us to examine the strategies and choices that affect how a political regime 
recognizes the legitimacy of such claims and determine subsequent accommodation 
measures.102 Thus, a country’s political opportunity structure provides the institutional 
context that shapes the trajectory of ethnic mobilization and the institutional mechanisms 
that determine an ethnic movement’s ideology, strategies, and tactics. In the case of Iraq, 
an analysis of the country’s POS provides us with the institutional and structural context 
by which we can analyze the effects of exclusion and authoritarianism under successive 
regimes on the strategies of ethnic groups.   
Making institutions the focal point of an analysis of ethnic conflict in Iraq is 
particularly relevant as the country continues to grapple with institutional incongruities 
stemming from exogenous statebuilding following an invasion and subsequent occupation. 
I postulate that understanding the current challenges to governing Iraq requires an analysis 
of preceding institutions within their given political opportunity structures since the 
establishment of the Iraqi state that have produced—and continue to reproduce, weak state 
structures and institutions that exacerbate ethnic conflict. 
More precisely, engaging in a historical analysis of institutional design vis-à-vis 
ethnic conflict requires an examination of Iraq, as a post-colonial state, through three 
formative periods. These periods serve as critical junctures in the longitudinal analysis of 
																																																								




the country’s political history as each period has altered the course of the country’s 
institutional design to serve new goals, ideologies, and ruling elite. The periods to be 
analyzed are i) the 1920 external state formation by the British Mandate, which saw the 
creation of an externally imposed foreign monarchy in 1932; ii) the emergence of the 
republic in 1958 following a coup d’état culminating in the rise of the B‘ath regime and 
the subsequent usurpation of power by Saddam Hussein; iii) what I refer to as post-2003 
external state reformation following the U.S. led invasion which resulted in the expedient 
overhaul of the state’s political, social, and economic institutions. The analysis of these 
time periods is illustrated in the figure below: 
Figure 4: Temporal Sequence of Iraq’s Institutional Analysis  
 
 
These periods were selected because they constituted a fissure in the political development 
of the state. As the empirical chapters reveal, the events and processes that developed 
during these ruptures affected the institutional composition of the state and altered the 
mobilization calculus of ethnic groups as they renegotiated their position amid new 
structural and political limitations. As contingent events, all periods mark a shift in the 















and exclusion.103 Although each of these periods experienced variable constraints in the 
state’s capacity to govern, the temporal periods chosen illuminate how modifications to 
the state’s institutional configuration produced new pressures and forms of group 
contestation of exclusion and authoritarianism. The three periods also serve as intervening 
variables in that they frame the three major attempts at state building, which aids in 
developing explanation in a causal theory.104  
A demonstrated, a systematic analysis of the effects of historical processes that 
produced the ethnic dominance enabled excluded ethnic elites to look to past grievances 
to mobilize and legitimize their renewed claim to the state following autocratic breakdown. 
An analysis of the difficulty of governing Iraq as a divided society must account for the 
temporal development of the country’s institutional design during formative time periods 
in order to frame the trajectory of ethnic conflict as an outcome of failed statebuilding.  
Historical Institutionalism and Ethnic Conflict: Testing the 
Applicability of a Paradigm 
 
In the following section, I demonstrate the need to infuse a longitudinal historical 
institutionalist approach in order to better ascertain the impact of institutions on past and 
contemporary ethnic strife by situating their evolution along a historical continuum. I 
postulate that a historical explanation is instructive for making “sequences of linked causal 
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factors” as “outcomes are explained by connected evens that unfold over time.”105 The 
application of this model to this inquiry is necessary in order to analyze the ways in which 
institutions not only shape actors strategies (as advocated by the rational choice approach) 
but their goals, relations of conflict and cooperation, and how they shape political 
situations and determine political outcomes.106 Moreover, a detailed historical analysis of 
Iraq’s institutional development demonstrates how ethnic elites both shaped institutions 
to maintain their dominance and how excluded ethnic groups responded to such 
constraints. Placing institutions as the central variables of analysis helps to better explain 
the processes that have produced exclusionary state structures that reinforce ethnic 
saliency. 
Since this study is concerned with analyzing how state institutions affect ethnic 
mobilization in divided societies like Iraq, it is imperative to identify critical historical 
moments that have shaped the country’s institutional design including critical ruptures 
such as military coups and autocratic consolidation as well as gradual and incremental 
changes stemming from the policies of successive governments that shaped ethnic 
exclusion. As succinctly noted by Tilly, comparing and analyzing large structures and 
processes allows for a historically-grounded and systematic analysis of past and current 
conditions, which aids in understanding causes and effects of a particular phenomenon.107 
For the present inquiry, the relevance of situating history within the broader analysis of 
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state institutions in divided societies is that “the past exerts this sort of influence over us 
is the central claim of history as a discipline, and that is the peculiar emphasis it imparts 
to its various forms of institutionalism.”108 Historical institutionalism facilitates such a 
historical analysis as it places emphasis on the processes and junctures that determine the 
development of state institutions and state-society interactions in a given temporal setting. 
In the case of Iraq, ethnic conflict is both a product and a reflection of the country’s early 
institutional design that, since the critical period of state formation, produced exclusive 
state structures and institutions. Consequently, we observe a pattern whereby early and 
successive institutional constraints imposed by ruling elites fuelled ethnic grievances 
among ethnic groups excluded from governing structures.  
As an approach, historical institutionalism investigates the construction, 
maintenance, and adaptation of institutions109 and encompasses both formal organizations 
and informal rules and procedures that define and organize behaviour.110 Moreover, and 
particularly relevant to this work, is the ways “institutions structure relations of power 
among contending groups in society, and especially the focus on the process of politics 
and policy-making within given institutional parameters.”111 Although institutions have 
widely been used as variables for explaining micro-level socio-economic and political 
transformations and to explain the survival and continuity of authoritarian regimes,112 
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research on institutional design and governing in divided societies has largely focused 
how institutions shape political outcomes while ignoring the historical development of 
institutions as sources of contention.  
Diverging from this, I argue that a historical analysis of institutional formation and 
transformation demonstrates how and why institutions defined the parameters of inclusion 
and exclusion. This, in turn, can explain the dynamics and processes that produce ethnic 
dominance and its effect on post-conflict transitions of a state experiencing protracted 
ethnic conflict like Iraq. Thus, historical institutionalism, as a paradigm for surveying the 
way institutions shape power relations and reinforce power asymmetries, can bridge an 
empirical and conceptual gap by deconstructing the processes of change that have affected 
institutional design in divided societies.     
 Accordingly, a longitudinal examination of the processes of institutional 
development and change requires an analysis of the critical moments that pivot a state’s 
institutional configuration to accommodate emerging processes of change and the elites 
that accompany them. Such critical junctures represent ruptures in the ordinary 
functioning of the state that produce a divergent path that “place institutional arrangements 
on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter.”113 In other words, critical 
junctures modify preceding institutional arrangements and decisively alter institutional 
and political outcomes, which, in turn, modify how excluded groups negotiate their 
position within the state and with incumbent elites. For Mahoney, this deterministic effect 
is a product of the formation of persistent institutional arrangements that are not receptive 
																																																								




to change and transformation.114 This study treats the three previously mentioned time 
periods of Iraq’s history as critical junctures because each time period affected and altered 
both the country’s institutional configuration and the mobilizing calculus of suppressed 
and excluded groups.   
  To reiterate, I take the position that ethnic mobilization and conflict in Iraq evolved 
as a sequential response to the state’s exclusionary institutional design at the critical time 
of state formation that set the path by which successive ethnic elites came to dominate the 
state under authoritarian governments. The mobilizing incentives that fuelled group 
grievances against the state rested less with discord between Iraq’s ethno-religious groups 
than with the capturing of the state by a narrow group of ruling elites that institutionalize 
exclusion through authoritarian means. As will be demonstrated in the proceeding chapter, 
historical institutionalism enables us to map the temporal causal mechanisms that structure 
political behaviour and that have affected the patterns of exclusion and ethnic dominance 
in Iraq. As the empirical chapters will demonstrate, framing and explaining ethnic conflict 
in Iraq (as the dependent variable) on a continuum of failed institutional design (as an 
independent variable) throughout the three formative time periods (as the intervening 
variables) enables us to reconceptualise the mobilizing conditions that shape group 
grievances since the time of state formation. I utilize archival data to specifically 
illuminate how and why institutional engineering at the onset of state formation and early 
colonial statebuilding set the parameters for ethnic dominance and determined subsequent 
mobilization against the emergent state. Likewise, exploring regime-society relations 
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using state archives of the Ba’th government aids in explaining how authoritarian regimes 
both capture power but also maintain ethnic dominance as a tool for controlling and 
governing a divided society. I utilize quantitative statistical analysis to demonstrate the 
socio-economic and political variables that affect statebuilding following authoritarian 
breakdown and externally-imposed democratization in order to better explain the 
institutional conditions that have affected ethnic mobilization since 2003. This work also 
benefits from interviews of both ethnic elites to complement the aforementioned methods. 
The interview selection pool included Paul Bremer, the former head of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) to shed light how and why ethnic dynamics shaped 




The central argument is that institutions matter, and a divided society’s early institutional 
setup during the critical period of state formation determines that state’s sequential 
response to subsequent conflicts during critical statebuilding periods. Institutional choices 
provide the political opportunity structures that define and determine the trajectory of 
ethnic mobilization in divided societies by imposing structural limitations that favor the 
ethnic dominance of one group over others. I view ethnic discord in Iraq as a symptomatic 
outcome of causal processes that have been unfolding overtime and linked to the country’s 
institutional configuration and transformation throughout critical statebuilding periods 
that produced varying patterns of ethnic dominance.115 The post-2003 breakdown of the 
																																																								




authoritarian order simply provided the opportunity structure for previously suppressed 
and excluded groups to emerge as political contenders vying for a stake in the state and 
its confines of power. Moreover, the shifting patterns of ethnic dominance and re-
dominance of the state by previously excluded groups since 2003 reflects an egregious 
failure of new ruling elites to both refrain from repeating previous authoritarian patterns 
of governance and their failure to devise inclusive institutions that could accommodate 
past and emerging group grievances.  
Framing ethnic conflict alongside Iraq’s institutional development by focusing on 
its origins, development, and transformation is crucial for understanding the processes and 
mechanisms that affected its trajectory. I argue that the interplay between ethnic power 
asymmetries and early institutional design during the critical time of state formation 
cemented ethnic power relations. Overtime, institutional barriers enabled the ethnic 
dominance of the state by a particular group while ethnic elites adapted and transformed 
the institutional playing-field to maintain a particular ethnic status quo. Thus, a historical 
explanation also enables us to identify the path dependent sequences that produce and 
sustain ethnic fragmentation in divided societies since “the past affects the future; initial 
conditions are causally important; contingent events are causally important; historical 
lock-in occurs; a self-reproduction sequence occurs; a reactive sequence occurs.”116 
Elucidating the role of state institutions alongside ethnic elite behaviour facilitates the 
development of a nuanced understanding of the interplay between the state and its divided 
society.  
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I postulate that ethnic conflict in divided societies emerges as a process rather than 
an abrupt rupture in the state’s structural and institutional composition.117 Specifically, as 
a social process, it unfolds overtime at varying speeds with divergent outcomes in a given 
state and within a given institutional setting. 118  In the given case, this process is 
preconditioned by the presence of two interdependent variables: authoritarianism and 
exclusion that produce and reproduce patterns of ethnic dominance that result in group 
mobilization against the regime. This mobilization can be an outcome of fear, hatred, rage, 
and resentment as emotive factors that fuel ethnic hostility toward the state and its ruling 
elite.119 As this work attempts to demonstrate, conceptualizing these variables requires a 
temporal analysis of their evolution overtime and in a given institutional setting.  
My preliminary findings point to the presence of two critical variables that have 
affected ethnic mobilization resulting in the articulation of violent conflict we observe 
since 2003—namely, exclusion and authoritarianism within Iraq’s governing institutions 
and the rejection and failed consolidation of the exogenously imposed democratic order.  
Dissertation Outline 
  
The dissertation is structured as follows. The second chapter is a theoretical exploration 
of the utility and applicability of historical institutionalism as the main theoretical 
paradigm underpinning the analytical component of this thesis. I argue that 
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conceptualizing role of institutions in divided societies through the application of 
historical institutionalism as a paradigm that emphasizes a longitudinal analysis of 
political and social processes is constructive for both understanding the factors that 
precipitated ethnic violence and for developing nuanced ethnic conflict regulation 
strategies that takes seriously the impact of preceding institutions on group grievances and 
mobilization following authoritarian breakdown. I draw on the methodological toolkits 
found in the analyses of institutional formation and transformation and test their 
explanatory clout for the given inquiry.  
Chapter three marks the first critical juncture of Iraq’s statebuilding and identifies 
the historical conditions that led to the emergence of the Iraqi state as a colonially created 
state. As the first sequence in the temporal causal chain, and through a close scrutiny of 
archival British colonial archival sources, it examines the institutional legacies that were 
created by Britain under the British Mandate, the factors that led to the formation of the 
monarchy and emergent modes of inclusion and exclusion that cemented early patterns of 
Sunni-Arab domination of the state and its governing structures that set the foundation for 
ethnic discord in an deeply divided society. I posit that colonial policies favoured the 
ethnic dominance of the Sunni-Arabs as a policy for controlling the nascent state to 
accommodate British colonial and later imperial interests in the region.  
In chapter four, I analyze institutional and political factors under the monarchy 
that contributed to its subsequent collapse following a military coup in 1958 and the 
subsequent emergence of the first Iraqi republic. The chapter identifies ideational and 
material causes of the revolution and the processes that led to the subsequent Ba‘thist 




frame, I identify and explain how and why institutional exclusion and authoritarian 
governance under this time period fostered ethnic grievances against the state and the 
regime by large segments of the population. Using Ba‘th party archives, state documents, 
and elite interviews, I demonstrate that Ba‘thist ideology, rooted in Pan-Arabism, enabled 
the regime to penetrate society and imposed a nationalist vision of the state predicated on 
Sunni-Arab rule. This resulted in two outcomes. First, ethnic and religious groups not tied 
to the minority-ruling regime were excluded from the state and sought other means of 
contesting the state and regime. Second, the regime’s imposition of a monolithic identity 
and its monopolization of the state’s governing institutions obviated the formation of a 
civic culture based on common and shared notions of citizenship. Consequently, this both 
led to the ethnification of grievances and cemented the rejection of the state by the 
majority Shi’i and minority groups such as Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidis, and 
Mandeans who were excluded, and, at various times, suppressed by the state.  
 In accounting for the institutional causal mechanisms that shaped group 
grievances prior to 2003, chapter five analyzes the institutional and political factors and 
processes that have exacerbated ethnic tensions resulting in the failure to institutionalize 
democracy following authoritarian breakdown. I posit that preceding institutional and 
governing legacies have had a profound affect on the governing patterns of ethnic elites 
catapulted to power resulting in the replication of preceding exclusionary and 
authoritarian patterns of governance to the inability of ruling elites to consolidate and 
address group grievances.  
 The dissertation concludes by emphasizing the relevance of engaging in a 




Iraq as a divided society. I posit that the persistence of exclusion and authoritarianism has 
had a reverberating effect on ethnic mobilization against the state throughout formative 
statebuilding periods. Moreover, if we accept the claim that ethnic conflict is a process 
that unfolds over time, during various conjunctures, and as a sequential response to 
institutional barriers, we observe that failed statebuilding following regime collapse and 
the institutionalization of formal democracy in Iraq can be explained by examining 
historical patterns of governance during critical statebuilding periods that cemented group 











Historical Institutionalism and Ethnic Conflict: an Institutionalist 
Explanation of Discord in Divided Societies 
 
History Matters.  It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the 
future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. Today’s and tomorrow’s 
choices are shaped by the past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional 
evolution. 
 
Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 




This chapter serves two purposes. First, to theoretically engage with a comparative 




institutionalism as an approach to the sequential study of institutional formation and 
transformation. The application of this approach stems from the need to go beyond current 
explanations within the contemporary literatures elaborated in the previous chapter in 
order to provide a nuanced analytical explanation for framing and reconceptualizing the 
current puzzle of why it has been difficult to govern Iraq. Second, and building on the 
toolkits found within historical institutionalism, I adopt an alternative theoretical model 
for conceptualizing and contextualizing institutions and institutional design in divided 
societies based on the two interlinked variables of authoritarianism and exclusion. 
Whereas this work builds on the existing literature of institutional formation and change, 
it proposes an institutionalist explanation underpinning the relationship between state 
institutions and ethnic conflict in post-colonial divided societies like Iraq. The application 
of historical institutionalism to the study of ethnic conflict as a social process enables us 
to analyze the processes that concern the macroscopic development of institutions and 
organizations as well as aggregates of people overtime.120 I argue that the emphasis on 
the historical and temporal evolution of institutions vis-à-vis ethnic conflict is crucial for 
developing a causal explanation of ethnic mobilization that emphasizes a close scrutiny 
of initial state founding conditions that produce forms of exclusion and authoritarianism 
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The chapter is structured as follows. I begin by defining and examining the applicability 
of historical institutionalism as an approach for mapping institutional change along a 
sequential continuum of state policies. Crucial to this analysis is an examination of path 
dependence and critical junctures as toolkits that facilitate a historical and temporal 
inquiry of institutional formation and transformation. In the second section, I elucidate the 
importance of a historical institutionalist explanation of ethnic conflict by focusing on two 
interlocking variables: exclusion and authoritarianism. After defining the variables and 
their application, I proceed by demonstrating how they will be operationalized as 
explanatory causal mechanisms in the given case. The final section outlines the research 
design and methodology of this study by examining the utility of a comparative historical 
analysis, single-case study research design, and process tracing.    
 
A Historical Institutionalist Explanation of Ethnic Conflict 
 
Although historical institutionalism (HI) emerged largely throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
as an alternative explanation for the development of democratic institutions based on 
stable economic growth post-WWII, 121  political scientists 122  have adopted it as an 
approach for analyzing institutional change and continuity as it places institutions on a 
continuum of state policies in order to divulge the function of institutions as “political 
legacies of past historical struggles.”123 Pierson and Skocpol outline three main features 
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of a historical-institutionalist approach: substantive agendas that address big questions of 
interest to academics and non-academics alike; temporal arguments that specify the 
sequence of events and transformative processes; and, lastly, historical institutionalist 
scholars emphasize contexts and configurations in the formulation of hypotheses about 
the effects of institutions.124 It provides an instructive analysis that goes beyond taking 
snapshot views of political interactions by focusing instead on the construction, 
maintenance, and adaptation of institutions overtime.125  As an approach for studying 
institutional change, it underscores real-world empirical questions, historical orientation, 
and the role of institutions as mechanisms for structuring and shaping behaviors and 
outcomes in a polity.126  
Three approaches dominate comparative institutional analysis (namely, rational 
choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism).127 
Thelen and Steinmo note that historical institutionalism attributes a greater role to 
institutions as variables that both shape politics and political history. 128 Viewed in this 
way, historical institutionalists are not only interested in how institutions shape actors’ 
strategies, but how the institutional context also determines the goals actors pursue.129  
Since the institutional context can aid in determining the factors that affect actors’ 
behavior within a given institutional setting, it also facilitates a temporal investigation of 
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why a divided society’s early institutional design is significant for explaining the state’s 
sequential response to ethnic mobilization. This can also have implications for 
understanding its success or failure to mitigate future conflicts depending on the extent to 
which the state is willing to alter or transform its institutional configuration to adapt to 
rising communal claims. The present inquiry benefits from the emphasis on temporality 
and the identification of causal mechanisms found in the application of a historical 
institutionalist paradigm to analyzing the structural drivers of ethnic saliency and 
mobilization in multi-ethnic states like Iraq. Adopting a historical institutionalist approach 
to identifying, explaining, and understanding group mobilization and ethnic conflict in 
divided societies confirms its utility in two ways. First, it demonstrates the applicability 
of HI as an approach for temporally engaging with a systematic analysis of the evolution 
and transformation of institutions, overtime. Second, I emphasize HI’s reliance on context 
to demonstrate the importance of situating mobilization as but one dimension of state-
society relations— one that accounts for the institutional conditions underpinning ethnic 
and religious grievances and discord against the state. Broadly, contemporary works on 
HI advance research agendas relating to the socio-economic and political developments 
and democratization across Western Europe and North and South America.130  
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For the given inquiry, HI facilitates and advances a structural explanation of ethnic 
discord in divided, post-colonial states as a determining factor for assessing state-society 
relations. HI’s emphasis on preceding conditions manifested through a temporal 
exploration of how and why institutional causal mechanisms affect the trajectory of a 
given phenomenon provides nuanced empirical and theoretical flexibility to explaining 
and understanding the roots of group grievances and mobilization at the heart of the debate 
on identity politics in Iraq. It also affords the research the ability to clearly delineate the 
causal mechanisms underlying the central variables of this study, namely ethnic 
mobilization, exclusion and authoritarianism. 131  Moreover, as succinctly noted by 
Lieberman, identifying and analyzing sequences of events, processes, and outcomes 
within a given comparative and longitudinal analysis advances causal relations since 
“causes must precede effects.” 132  I posit that historical institutionalism assists in 
developing a nuanced understanding of institutional transformations that underscores 
causes and effects within a given temporal setting both during critical junctures and under 
incremental changes during prolonged periods of stability, both of which are 
consequential for understanding Iraq’s ethnic conflict vis-à-vis institutional design. The 
analysis of Iraq’s institutional configuration focuses on three time periods that represent 
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ruptures in the ordinary functioning of the Iraqi state: i) exogenous state formation by 
British colonial powers in 1920 and the imposition of a foreign monarchy in 1932-1958; 
ii) the birth of the republic in 1958 following a coup d’état culminating in the rise of the 
B’ath regime and the subsequent usurpation of power by Saddam Hussein; iii) external 
state reformation following the 2003 U.S. led invasion. These time periods were chosen 
because they abruptly and incrementally transformed the country’s institutional 
composition in its treatment of ethnic and religious discontent and mobilization. Equally 
relevant to this discussion is an exploration of institutional causal mechanisms that have 
hindered national unity resulting in Iraq’s struggle with democratic transition under the 
latter state reformation period.   
Before delving into an explanation of the relationship between institutions and 
ethnic conflict, the section below defines institutions as variables of analysis that 
underscore the empirical chapters of this study. This conceptual background is necessary 
for framing the scope of the particular phenomenon being observed and explained and is 
a crucial first step in order to situate the historical and contemporary relationship between 
institutions and ethnic conflict in divided societies and in this case, Iraq.    
Institutions: Fusing the Structural-Societal Divide 
 
Although scholars have attempted to provide some variables by which the effects and 
processes of institutions and institutional change can be measured and analyzed, there is 
much debate on defining them. Since this study is an analysis of the formation, 
transformation, and reformulation of political institutions vis-à-vis state-society relations 




historical continuities and cross-national variations in policy.”133 Equally relevant is the 
extent to which institutions shape the behavior of political actors and effectively dictate 
political outcomes.134 Further, and as succinctly noted by Varshney, the design of a 
divided country’s political institutions can “explain why some multiethnic societies have 
violence, and others, peace.”135  
For the purpose of the present inquiry, I adopt Thelen and Steinmo’s definition of 
institutions as mechanisms that encompass both formal organizations and informal rules 
and procedures that define and organize behaviour.136 Moreover, and particularly relevant 
to this work, is the way “institutions structure relations of power among contending groups 
in society, and especially the focus on the process of politics and policy-making within 
given institutional parameters.”137  As succinctly noted, 
In sum, institutions are not just another variable, and the institutionalist claim is more than just that 
‘institutions matter too.” By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational choice), but their goals 
as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political 
situations and leave their own imprint on political outcome.138 
 
To better situate the relevance of an institutional understanding of ethnic mobilization 
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underpinning the present inquiry, I contend that elites devise institutions in order to 
structure relations of power in authoritarian divided societies where they function to 
perpetuate asymmetrical relations of ethnic inclusion and exclusion that produce varying 
dynamics of ethnic dominance during formative statebuilding periods. This, I argue, 
provides the mobilizing incentives among contending ethnic groups to reject and contest 
the state. Infusing the structural with the functional aids in capturing how the constraints 
that determine vertical power asymmetries between ruling elites and contending ethnic 
groups over the three formative time periods in Iraq become institutionalized— that is, the 
“process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.”139  The 
acquired value gives institutionalization a temporal dimension that enables ethnic elites 
to adapt (as will be observed under the monarchical and Ba‘thist regimes) or where 
previously excluded incumbent elites reorient state institutions toward the reproduction of 
the causal mechanisms that fuelled ethnic discord in the past under a new institutional 
setting (as we observe post-2003). Thus, under all time periods, we see that Iraqi elites 
operating within state and its agencies sanction exclusion and authoritarianism through 
“established rules, monitor conformity and exert sanctions if necessary.”140  
The focus on institutions is crucial as they “specify what can be done, by and to 
whom, for what purposes, and when, but also what happens when the rules are breached 
and who decides when they are.”141 Similarly, explaining the effects of state institutions 
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on ethnic conflict is imperative since “institutions rest on a set of ideational and material 
foundations that, if shaken, open possibilities for change.”142 Within the given context, 
institutions produce and define power imbalances during various statebuilding periods 
where incumbent ethnic elites alter the ideational and material conditions to maintain and 
sustain their grip on power from the previous regime. Delineating the effects of 
institutional constraints on ethnic mobilization requires an exploration of the ideational 
and material constraints imposed by ethnic elites that result in exclusion and authoritarian 
governance. While some of Iraq’s institutions have existed since the time of state 
formation, I have selected key political institutions143 that corresponded with the given 
time periods to be analyzed throughout the empirical chapters. The institutions include 
constitutions, the National Assembly and Parliament, the administration, the army, the 
security and intelligence apparatus, Ba’thist as an ideological variable that infiltrates 
institutions, and consociational and power-sharing design for the post-2003 period. The 
institutional analysis of ethnic conflict proposed here shares theoretical insights from 
Lieberman and Singh’s analysis that endogenizes ethnic identify formation within a given 
institutional setting, noting that “when institutions create or reify intergroup comparisons, 
this signals that a dividing line exists between “us and “them,” priming relational status 
concerns and shaping how subsequent facts are likely to be interpreted within a political 
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context.” “144 and the extent to which they not only structured the state, but have also 
defined the extent in which the state was able to penetrate all aspects of social and political 
spheres in Iraq. Second, their presence throughout Iraq’s formative statebuilding periods 
sets a path dependent trajectory that enables us to measure their evolution and 
transformation and their impact on ethnic mobilization.    
In the proceeding section, I explore the toolkits within historical institutionalism 
that facilitate an institutional explanation of ethnic mobilization in order to assess their 
applicability to the present case study. The application of path dependence to the analysis 
of institutional formation and transformation is predicated on two analytical claims: first, 
it involves identifying “crucial founding moments of institutional formation that send 
countries along broadly different developmental paths; the second suggests that 
institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and 
ongoing political manoeuvring but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories.”145  
Hence, I examine path dependence as a tool to structure the empirical schema by which 
the temporal, sequential, and consequential (feedback mechanisms) development of Iraq’s 
state institutions are identified and measured.  
Path Dependence, Temporality, and Institutional Change in Iraq 
 
As previously noted, this work relies heavily on identifying and mapping the causal 
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mechanisms during critical periods or ruptures that produced institutional change in order 
to both deconstruct and contextualize the ways in which institutions form and transform, 
overtime.146 As succinctly noted by Ikenberry, a state’s institutional composition is the 
“outcome of a confluence of historical forces that shape and reshape the state’s 
organizational structure.” 147  I argue that the development of Iraq’s institutions is 
fundamentally linked to the historical forces (both internal and external) that shaped the 
state’s formation and transformation. Situating this relationship between state institutions 
and ethnic conflict on a continuum of various attempts at statebuilding requires the 
identification of the sequence of events that affected the ways in which the Iraqi state 
responded to ethnic claims. Before delving into developing the proposed theoretical model, 
some definitions of the present toolkits are necessary in order to frame their relevance 
within the given case study. 
Broadly, path dependence refers to “historical sequences in which contingent 
events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic 
properties” 148  or “dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which generate 
multiple possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which events 
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unfold.”149 The relevance of path dependence to the study of institutions and ethnic 
conflict is best captured by Pierson’s analysis of political life in noting, 
The key features of political life—public policies and (especially) formal institutions—are change-
resistant. Both are generally designed to be difficult to overturn for two broad reasons. First, those 
who design institutions and policies may wish to bind to their successors…political actors must 
anticipate that their political rivals may soon control the reins of government. To protect themselves, 
they may create rules that make preexisting arrangements hard to reverse…Second, in many cases, 
political actors also are compelled to bin themselves…To constrain themselves and others, 
designers create large obstacles to institutional change.150  
 
The initial institutional configuration since the time of state formation epitomizes the 
complex and stringent dynamics that continuously impede institutional change as ethnic 
and sectarian elites either revert to maintaining exclusionary institutions through 
authoritarian means or find it too difficult to deviate from the existing configuration. Thus, 
while elites change, they nevertheless replicate exclusionary institutions to serve new 
goals based on their prior experience. This relationship is demonstrated below: 
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Particularly relevant to this study is the reliance of path dependence on the identification 
of causal mechanisms and explanations of the hypothesized relationships for delineating 
the variables that affect institutional change within a given context.  
For the purposes of this study, I adopt Gerring’s characterization of causality and 
causal explanation as, “to be causal, the cause in question must generate, create, or 
produce the supposed effect.”151 Thus, the emphasis on mechanisms and causality aids in 
re-conceptualizing the interdependent relationship between Iraq’s institutional design, 
explained through a historical continuum of various statebuilding attempts, and ethnic 
conflict in this deeply divided society. One way of understanding why certain mechanisms 
have become resistant to change is by examining Pierson’s dynamics of increasing 
returns.152 I postulate that successive ethnic elites, even during critical periods where a 
divergent path could have been taken, found the cost of switching to an alternative 
institutional design too costly as it would diminish their control of the state.  When 
examining increasing returns, we also observe that timing and sequencing discern 
formative moments where certain paths are chosen at particularly times over others, as 
succinctly noted by Pierson, “in an increasing returns process, it is not only a question of 
what happens but also of when it happens. Issues of temporality are at the heart of the 
analysis.”153  
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Operationalizing this longitudinal analysis requires an event-structured analysis in 
order to frame the causal narrative by comparing the sequence of events across cases to 
“determine if the cases can reasonably be seen as following aggregated causal patterns at 
a more fine-grained level.”154Accordingly, framing path dependence within the temporal 
study of institutional design and ethnic conflict entails situating the processes within 
formative temporal settings of Iraq’s political development in order to identify how 
institutions were formed and how and why they were sustained over time. I do this by 
identifying and situating the processes that produced critical junctures in order to frame 
the longitudinal timeframe of this study since understanding a particular phenomenon 
requires an analysis of the “processes over a substantial stretch of years, maybe even many 
decades or centuries.”155  
Critical Junctures and Institutional Change 
 
A major requirement for mapping and analyzing the causal processes that affected ethnic 
mobilization and conflict within a given temporal setting is the need to identify critical 
moments that created shifts in the state’s political trajectory resulting in the reproduction 
of path dependent conditions that replicated exclusionary and authoritarian governance. I 
adopt Capoccia and Kelemen’s definition of critical junctures as “relatively short periods 
of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices 
will affect the outcome of interest”156 and contend that the three formative time periods 
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mentioned earlier constitute different statebuilding attempts that created asymmetrical 
power relations between contending ethnic groups. 157  Linking various attempts at 
statebuilding and the transformation of the country’s state institutions during these critical 
periods contextualizes the conditions that shape state-society relations as “governments 
reflect the distribution of power and prestige among ethnic communities; they also 
influence these relationships by the policies they enact and enforce. Thus, the modern state 
is a critical participant in inter-ethnic affairs.”158 These periods, I argue, provide the 
institutional context for analyzing and explaining the political and social conditions that 
precipitated mobilization among contending ethnic groups during formative moments that 
caused shifts among ruling elites.  
 Two interdependent variables underpin the present analysis: exclusion and 
authoritarianism that collectively provide a new causal explanation for understanding the 
relationship between institutional design and ethnic conflict in Iraq. Infusing the current 
analysis with these variables is purposive of demonstrating why institutions that are 
embedded in the authoritarian process during formative statebuilding periods limit the 
extent in which actors can alter their position by creating institutional barriers that not 
only entrench the authoritarian nature of the state, but also define “which people the state 
should belong to.”159 Framing the analysis of these variables means situating them within 
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the processes that have produced critical junctures throughout Iraq’s historical 
institutional development. Moreover, an analysis of the aforementioned variables allows 
us to explain how institutions constrain power for certain groups and why elites design 
such institutions to maintain or reproduce exclusionary power dynamics that cement the 
ethnic dominance of one group over others, and how this, in turn, affects the mobilization 
calculus of excluded groups.  
Mapping this change requires identifying critical junctures that have shaped Iraq’s 
historical development in order to structure the empirical chapters and explain why 
changes in the causal mechanisms that underpin the ideational and material patterns 
produced exclusionary institutions and cemented the dominance of one group over others 
resulting in the hardening of ethnic cleavages. Thus, just as path dependence is important 
for elucidating the causal mechanisms and outcomes of engaging in a historical 
institutionalist analysis, the identification of critical junctures is crucial for engaging in a 
temporal analysis of the patterns that shape future institutional outcomes alongside other 
interconnected processes of change.160 Nevertheless, while critical junctures demonstrate 
the abrupt way in which historical moments altered the Iraqi state’s institutional design 
that had consequential effects on ethnic conflict, slower processes of change alongside 
more formative critical ones are equally relevant for ascertaining the present inquiry.  
Streeck and Thelen demonstrate the empirical relevance of distinguishing between 
incremental and abrupt critical change within historical institutionalism. Rather than 
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compartmentalizing change as either abrupt or gradual, they emphasize differentiating 
between processes of change (can be both incremental or abrupt) and outcomes of change, 
which may result in the continuity or discontinuity of given institutions.161 Effectively, 
understanding and explaining institutional formation and transformation in Iraq rests with 
the ability to better identify how the processes of change altered the institutional terrain 
that led to the production and reproduction of exclusive state institutions resulting in the 
coagulation of ethnic grievances. I view incremental change as an important factor for 
understanding why certain institutions survived in Iraq and how their survival affected 
ethnic conflict.  
One way of conceptualizing the impact of slow incremental changes and 
institutional transformation is through institutional layering and institutional conversion. 
Whereas the former involves renegotiating elements of particular institutions, the latter 
demonstrates how existing institutions come to convey new purposes either in the role 
they perform or the functions they serve.162 In the given case, we see actors renegotiate 
key institutions such as the constitution, federalism, and electoral laws throughout the 
formative time periods to serve new political goals, while, at other times, the institutions 
were rebranded to serve particular regime interests, as seen under the Ba‘thist period. This 
is discernable in the country’s constitutional history. Here, we observe how actors 
reformulated the country’s constitutions during formative periods in order to define and 
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redefine the parameters of inclusion and exclusion based on their vision of how to govern 
Iraq as a divided society.  
Accordingly, while abrupt critical changes resulted in major shifts in the country’s 
institutional configuration, we see the survival of certain institutions and their 
reintegration into the political and structural landscape of the polity by successive 
governments. Hence, understanding the effects of institutional change also requires an 
explanation and identification of “what aspects of a specific institutional configuration are 
(or are not) renegotiable and under what conditions.”163 Viewing institutional change in 
Iraq as a result of both abrupt changes during the critical periods of state formation and 
statebuilding will aid in contextualizing the impact of such changes on state-society 
relations particularly relating to ethnic strife. It also supports a key hypothesis of this 
study: critical junctures that transpired during formative time periods and the institutional 
transformation that they produced had consequential effects on the intensification of 
ethnic sentiments in this highly divided state. The more exclusionary and authoritarian the 
state becomes, the more ethnic and sectarian communities see themselves outside the state 
and thus result in the contestation and of its structures and institutions. This relationship 





























The above diagram demonstrates the processes and conditions that affected institutional 
design in Iraq. Whereas the critical junctures (CJ) represent the abrupt fissure throughout 
the noted time periods, the broken lines that link the CJ together represent incremental 

































marks the institutional design chosen for the specific time period and its effect on the 
dependent variable, ethnic conflict. The intervening variables represent external factors, 
or what Wimmer calls exogenous shifts that transform a country’s institutional landscape 
such as imperial conquest and nation-state formation,164 all of which have influenced the 
trajectory of institutional development in Iraq during the formative time periods. In 
particular, the exogenous factor during the 1958 juncture enabled regime transition from 
the monarchy to the republic as the elites who instituted the coup were divided among 
those who were in support and against pan-Arabism. By factoring in these conditions, I 
intend to demonstrate that a) significant changes occurred under each period; b) that the 
changes were distinctive from preceding transformations, but incremental transformations 
continued to unfold over time; and c) that these transformations produced and reproduced 
exclusionary and authoritarian state that fuelled ethnic and sectarian discord and impeded 
successive efforts at national reconciliation. 165  I have selected these periods for 
understanding ethnic grievances and mapping mobilization for two reasons. First, they 
represent major fissures in Iraq’s political development that markedly altered the state, its 
institutions, and the modus operandi of incumbent ruling elites that either reinforced 
exclusion and authoritarianism or imposed new institutional constraints on contending 
ethnic elites. Second, these periods unable us to emphasize the importance timing and 
sequencing as they illuminate how institutions develop, how ethnic groups respond to 
																																																								
164 Andreas Wimmer, “The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: a Multilevel Process Theory,” 
American Journal of Sociology 113.4 (January 2008): 1005. 




institutional constraints, and why this produces grievance and mobilization that culminate 
in conflict, overtime. 
The objective so far has been to demonstrate how historical institutionalism will 
be used as an approach to explain Iraq’s institutional transformation and ethnic 
mobilization throughout formative statebuilding periods. I have identified the relevance 
of engaging in a path dependent analysis and the need to frame critical junctures and 
slower incremental changes in order to rethink the way we view and conceptualize the 
country’s grapple with ethnic strife. Contextualizing the trajectory of Iraq’s institutional 
development helps us identify and sequence the variables that underpin ethnic conflict 
throughout this study: namely, exclusion and authoritarianism. Building on historical 
institutionalism, I view the role of history as a binary link that can better explicate the 
relationship between institutions and ethnic discord.  
Beyond illustrating the empirical relevance of applying a HI approach to 
understanding the relationship between institutions and ethnic discord, the discussion 
below moves to exploring its theoretical implications. My intention here is to test the 
applicability of the toolkits found in historical institutionalism in order to contextualize 
the cause and effect of institutional choices throughout the Iraq’s critical junctures on 
ethnic conflict. This is based on tracing the effects of two interrelated and interdependent 
variables: exclusion and authoritarianism, when combined, provide a nuanced 
understanding of the institutional barriers that have produced asymmetrical power 
relations resulting in that have facilitated the ethnic domination of the state by one 
particular ethnic group, which, has prevented other ethnic and religious groups from 




An Institutional Explanation of Ethnic Mobilization 
 
Building on the empirical utility of HI and its toolkits, and adding to the repertoire of cases 
mentioned in the previous chapter that juxtapose historical conditions and processes with 
institutional development in divided societies, I develop a model that posits that the 
processes that have produced and sustained segmental cleavages are embedded in 
interlinked forms of institutional exclusion and authoritarianism that sustained the 
hegemonic control of the state by a given ethnic ruling elite throughout critical 
statebuilding periods. The emphasis on a temporally grounded analysis of institutions vis-
à-vis ethnic conflict during critical statebuilding periods in divided societies like Iraq 
advances our understanding of the effects of historical and contemporary mechanisms and 
processes on group mobilization and conflict eruption. This is particularly relevant as 
institutions structure the modes, forms, and opportunities for conflict manifestation in 
fragmented states particularly since “the formation, the identities, the power, and the 
proclivities of groups reflect in large measure how the system within which they operate 
is structured.”166 Moreover, institutions embody a “repertoire of procedures and rules they 
use to select among them. The rules may be imposed and enforced by direct coercion and 
political or organizational authority, or they may be part of a code of appropriate behavior 
that is learned and internalized through socialization or education.”167 A longitudinal 
historical exploration of these processes demonstrates a pattern of ethnic control of the 
state that resulted in the “emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the 
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superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the 
political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments.” 168  As will be 
demonstrated, we observe that institutions have perpetuated the power of a few ethnic 
ruling elites since the time of state formation that culminated in the ethnic dominance of 
the state as a way of controlling a divided society. Hence, while institutions do serve to 
impose constraints that “shape human interaction”169 these constraints are embedded in 
asymmetrical power relations in authoritarian states where institutions are not independent 
of the ruling regime. The emphasis on temporality, institutions, and history complements 
existing works that explore the effects of historical processes on the manifestation and 
eruption of ethnic and communal conflict in divided societies.170 
I postulate that conceptualizing ethnic mobilization in divided societies requires a 
longitudinal171 analysis of the effects of preceding institutional choices made at critical 
junctures throughout a country’s political history. If a divided society’s early institutional 
setup is designed in a way that precludes and excludes large segments of the population 
the outcome will produces institutional constraints and barriers that reinforce exclusion172 
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as a way of controlling and thus preventing other ethnic and religious groups from gaining 
access to the state and its centres of power, it will create inequality among contending 
groups in authoritarian states. In the case of Iraq, state institutions have been a key 
mechanism for sustaining ethnic dominance of a particular group and their control of the 
state. Thus, “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; 
rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the 
bargaining power to devise new rules.”173 I attribute the subversive nature of institutions 
to their initial design under the British colonial Mandate that set the preference path for 
the ethnic domination of Sunni-Arabs over a highly fragmented state and society. 
Overtime, this has generated the reproduction of exclusionary and authoritarian 
governance by ethnic elites seeking to maintain their ownership of the state.  
Grounding the empirical puzzle within a given temporal setting aids in 
understanding how what transpired before provides the “context for current efforts and 
the platform on which we necessarily craft our own contributions”174 and determines 
subsequent mobilization among contending ethnic groups, particularly as ethnic elites rely 
on historical experiences to legitimize grievances. This requires a re-evaluation of why, 
for instance, we see the durability of certain institutions throughout critical periods of 
Iraq’s history and the collapse of others during these “critical junctures.” Moreover, rather 
than viewing statebuilding in divided societies as a linear exercise in institutional 
engineering, a longitudinal analysis can shed light on the perennial effects of institutional 
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choices on subsequent conflict management strategies. Much of this requires a reversal in 
the ontological and analytical causal flow that attributes primacy to residual effects of a 
state’s early institutional design on subsequent statebuilding and conflict management 
strategies.  
Thus, I diverge from current causal explanations and argue that the institutional 
conditions that fuel ethnic mobiliztion must be conceptualized along a historical 
continuum since the critical period of state formation. This enables me to demonstrate the 
extent to which exclusionary institutional engineering at the time of state formation 
determines the sequential responses of groups excluded from the political process. This, I 
argue, can  determine a  state’s subsequent success or failure to mitigate conflict following 
a democratic opening. Furthermore, a reversal in the causal flow demonstrates the need 
for inserting a historical-institutionalist explanation that factors in the temporal effect of 
ethnic exclusion on conflict outcomes. Thus, we need to look at history not only because 
history matters, but because an examiniation of a state’s institutional development reveals 
why preceding decisons matter and how they shape current decisions and outcomes in 
divided societies like Iraq. 
I seek to explain why ethnic elites operating within the state’s institutional 
landscape replicated exclusionary and authoritarian governance by identifying the array 
of factors, mechanisms, and processes that locked-in these governing patterns that have 
produced the outcomes we see post-2003.175 The focus on state institutions rather than 
other binding norms that structure behaviour is predicated on the state possessing the 
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bureaucratic, hierarchical, and coercive capacity to administer and define state-society 
interactions.176  The cooptation of institutions by ethnic elites set the conditions that 
structure exclusion and ethnic responses to the state by marginalized groups. Thus, 
institutions become the instruments for enforcing the ethnic dominance of the state by a 
particular ethnic group. Elucidating the effects of authoritarianism on institutions and 
ethnic conflict is imperative since “authoritarianism systematically denies most actors the 
agency and access necessary to alter political institutions.”177 Conceptualizing the effects 
of institutions on ethnic discord is particularly relevant since “institutions are excellent at 
exclusion and poor at inclusion,” particularly in states exhibiting ethnic conflict as with 
the present case.178   
In the proceeding section, I define and explain the proposed theoretical model 
based on the two aforementioned variables of exclusion and authoritarianism. Doing so is 
necessary in order to go beyond the current analyses of ethnic conflict in Iraq in order to 
explore an alternative explanation of the relationship between state institutions and ethnic 
conflict in post-colonial divided societies.   
Exclusion, Authoritarianism and Ethnic Conflict in Iraq 
 
Thus far, I have demonstrated the need to contextualize the trajectory of Iraq’s domestic 
institutional development as it relates to ethnic mobilization and conflict by situating its 
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progression along a historical continuum of state policies and their effect on society; in 
this way, this study is as much about state-society relations as it is about institutional 
design and ethnic conflict. I insert an institutional imperative to the present analysis by 
exploring how and why institutional constraints have affected ethnic conflict in Iraq.179 
In this section, I propose an alternative theoretical model based on the two interlinked 
variables 180  of exclusion and authoritarianism that I hope will explain the current 
empirical puzzle, while, at the same time, alter some of the ontological assumptions found 
in the literature on statebuilding, governing in divided societies, and historical 
institutionalism as discussed in the previous chapter.  
Before delving into the crux of the argument, a definition of exclusion and 
authoritarianism is necessary in order to conceptualize their applicability to the present 
analysis. I have selected and isolated these variables for two reasons.  First, because they 
are present in all the three formative time periods that frame the longitudinal analysis of 
this study. Second, the emphasis on institutions forms the basis for identifying and 
elaborating on the causal mechanisms that have affected group mobilization and conflict 
in Iraq.  
Exclusion here is used as a categorical reference to forms of institutionalized 
discrimination that produces asymmetrical power distributions favouring one 
ethnicity over another. I adopt Lemarchand’s definition in reference to political 
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exclusion as “the denial of political rights to specific ethnic or ethnoregional 
communities, most notably the right to vote, organize political parties, freely 
contest elections, and thus become full participations in the political life of their 
country.”181 Discriminatory institutions are key political factors that may aid in 
the eruption of ethnic strife.182 
Authoritarianism I adopt Levitsky and Way’s characterization as a “regime in 
which no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive 
power.”183 Authoritarianism is often institutionalized through the state’s coercive 
apparatus, which suppresses opportunities for reform. 184  Consequently, this 
sustains the institutional mechanisms that secure the regime’s survival.  
In order to contextualize the relationship between exclusion and authoritarian institutions 
and delineate the significance of these variables for explaining and understanding ethnic 
conflict in Iraq, I explore the conditions that led to their emergence and reproduction 
through the application of a historical-institutionalist approach during the three formative 
time periods, which form the temporal component of this research. The aim is twofold: 
identify how they are connected and the conditions under which they are formed and 
reproduced by ethnic elites with competing interests, and why this reproduction has 
impeded governing Iraq as a divided society. 185  Carment and James capture the 
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relationship between institutional constraints and ethnic bargaining in fragmented 
authoritarian states noting that, 
Leaders in many states have no popular mandate, but instead rule on the basis of force or coercion, 
elite pacts, heredity, or even divine intervention. These elites enjoy low institutional constraints by 
virtue of the fact that their power does not depend upon the support of the population at large. Elite 
decision-making in such states is relatively unconstrained by popular opinion or constituent 
interests…Where such regimes exist, policies result from elite bargaining over the distribution of 
resources—lower levels of government operate primarily through coercion or patron-client 
relations.186 
 
Hence, juxtaposing these two variables enables us to make empirical statements about the 
relationship between the historical development of Iraq’s state institutions and the 
persistence of ethnic strife throughout the noted critical junctures discussed previously.187 
Similarly, placing these variables within a given temporal setting enables us to identify 
and explain their historical origins to better ascertain their contemporary implications on 
democratization and governance following regime collapse post-2003.   
Framing the Argument 
 
Building on the above, I posit that institutions in post-colonial authoritarian states are not 
as independent of the regime as they are under liberal democracies, but are embedded in 
the regime itself. The collapse of the state, either as result of exogenous (foreign 
intervention) or endogenous (e.g., coup d'état or revolt) shocks produces two interlocking 
outcomes. First, institutions maybe converted to serve new interests through slow, 
incremental change.188 Second, the fragility of institutions in divided societies makes 
them susceptible to cooptation by regimes and autocrats in authoritarian states.  Thus, 
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ethnic mobilization is a product of exclusionary institutional barriers that both prevent 
contending ethnic groups from accessing the state, while, simultaneously, formulating 
policies that ensure the survival of the incumbent authoritarian regime. Effectively, the 
presence of these two variables in Iraq has produced what Saouli calls cycles of 
domination involving the construction of institutional barriers and constraints that sustain 
regime preferences through the state’s coercive apparatus in order to “prevent contenders 
from challenging the power of the dominant faction.”189 Perceived in this way, institutions 
in post-colonial divided societies, and in particular, Iraq, become part and parcel of the 
regime itself. This is also echoed in Migdal’s analysis of the selection and distribution of 
institutions in exclusionary states, nothing  
Rather, allocations of posts reflect the loyalty of particular groups, the threat of other groups, and 
the importance of specific state agencies. The most loyal elements, often the tribe or ethnic group 
of state leaders themselves, are assigned to the agencies that are potentially most threatening to 
state leaders that would exercise the most control in society, such as the military.190   
 
One way of explaining ethnic elite behavior and exclusion in authoritarian societies is to 
apply the logic of political survival whereby “the desire to survive motivates the selection 
of policies and the allocation of benefits; it shapes the selection of political institutions 
and the objectives of foreign policy; it influences the very evolution of political life.”191  
In the given case, this is best exemplified by the survival of the Ba‘th party under the 
leadership of Saddam Hussein for over three decades where, as will be demonstrated in 
chapter four, state institutions became instruments of the exclusionary regime and its 
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survival. Hence, I articulate the need to examine ethnic conflict in Iraq as a process 
embedded in the political and institutional configuration of the state and reflective of the 
disinclination of ruling elites to integrate contending ethnic elites in governing the state 
rather than solely as an outcome of intergroup discord or primordial hatreds. Figure 9 
below illustrates the causal mechanisms linking institutional design and ethnic conflict in 
Iraq: 
Figure 7: Operationalizing the Variables and Causal Mechanisms192 
 
   
I argue that theorizing early institutional design during the critical period of state 
formation determined a) who belonged to the state and who was not, and b) why the 
preference of one group over another produced exclusionary policies that bolstered and 
sustained authoritarian politics during critical periods where divergent institutional 
choices could have mitigated the politicization and mobilization of contending ethnic 
groups. This institutional dimension is critical as succinctly noted by Wimmer 
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“institutional frameworks specify the historical context within which the dynamics of 
ethnic boundary making unfolds.”193 Likewise, as succinctly noted by Mahoney, the logic 
of exclusionary institutional design serves to reinforce predicable power dynamics within 
a given institutional setting where,  
 
The institution initially empowers a certain group at the expense of other groups; the advantaged 
group uses its additional power to expand the institution further; the expansion of the institutions 
increases the power of the advantage group; and the advantage group encourages additional 
institutional expansion.194  
 
Thus, if the initial institutional configuration is exclusionary and authoritarian, as was in 
the case of Iraq, elites will mould and alter its institutional configuration to suppress ethnic 
rivalries. Repression fuels the mobilization and politicization of ethnic sentiments 
resulting in conflict as elites seek to legitimize grievances against the state. This path 
dependent relationship becomes increasingly difficult to alter as the costs of switching to 
more inclusive and representative alternatives could yield new power dynamics that alter 
the ownership and control of the state, which create newly marginalized groups, as seen 
in post-2003 Iraq. This feedback loop is demonstrated in figure 8: 
Figure 8. Ethnic Mobilization Feedback Loop  
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Let us explore this cyclical relationship as it relates to the present case. As a post-colonial 
divided society, Iraq experienced incongruities with its institutional design, which created 
structural barriers rooted in exclusion and authoritarianism. I have selected the period of 
state formation as the first critical juncture since, as succinctly noted by Wimmer, “ethnic 
conflicts arise during the process of state formation, when a fight erupts over which 
‘people’ the state should belong to.”195 As will be demonstrated in the third chapter, 
British colonial administrators favoured a Sunni-Arab urban minority as the guarantors of 
the state, which systematically excluded large segments of majority and minority 
populations. The cyclical progression of grievances and sentiments mobilized and 
politicized existing ethnic attachments that exacerbated tensions and conflict between the 
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state and its fragments. Overtime, successive ethnic elites reinforced exclusion through 
authoritarian governance by employing the state’s coercive apparatuses to suppress 
dissidence as observed under the Ba‘thist period and the subsequent reversal of these 
governing tactics by previously excluded ethnic elites following authoritarian breakdown 
post-2003.  
Positioning Iraq’s institutional development and ethnic conflict alongside critical 
statebuilding periods requires the identification and contextualization of the causal 
mechanisms that contributed to these governing patterns. While a confluence of factors 
contributed to the formation of the modern Iraqi state—the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, European foreign incursions into the region, and the discovery of oil196, external 
state formation was a catalyst for coagulating fragmentation along ethnic and religious 
lines. Upon a closer examination of these developments within the current framework, we 
see that the initial institutional configuration determined the path future Iraqi leaders 
would adopt and the modus operandi by which the exclusionary state was administered 
and controlled and set in a motion a sequence of events that affected how ethnic groups 
saw themselves in relation to the central state.197 The initial and subsequent exclusion of 
large segments of the population such as the majority Shi’i Arabs and minority 
communities such as Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Mandeans from 
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the state’s governing institutions set the country on a deterministic path of exclusion and 
shaped the trajectory of ethnic mobilization throughout other transformative periods. 
Successive authoritarian leaders reinforced and maintained this pattern despite critical 
movements marked by military coups and revolutions, and more recently, following 
regime change due to external intervention in 2003.  
Building on the above, the following hypotheses guide the expectations of the 
empirical chapters. First, an exploration of institutional development in Iraq will aid in 
illuminating the institutional causal mechanisms and processes that have affected 
governing this highly divided society. Identifying the causal mechanisms is integral for 
explaining the relationship between institutional development and ethnic conflict in 
Iraq.198 Second, since the initial conditions of Iraq’s early institutional configuration were 
rooted in exclusion, we find that successive ethnic elites reproduced the same system 
through authoritarian means in order to control and eliminate potential rivals from laying 
claim to the state. This leads to the third hypothesis—the post-2003 trend is markedly 
indicative of a reversal in ethnic power dynamics as previously excluded and oppressed 
ethno-religious groups, particularly the majority Shi’i-Arabs and Kurds, attempt to rectify 
past grievances by reclaiming the state resulting in the exclusion of Iraq’s Sunni-Arab 
elites.  Lastly, I posit that past and present institutional choices rather than primordial 
group attachments alone have undermined national conciliation of Iraq’s diverse ethnic 
and religious groups and have contributed to political stagnation since 2003.  
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I postulate that conceptualizing the exclusionary and authoritarian tendencies of 
Iraq’s institutional configuration during various statebuilding processes requires an 
examination of why ethnic elites operating within a given institutional setting have failed 
to accommodate inter-ethnic rivals upon capturing the state during critical junctures. 
Testing this proposition entails tracing the processes that have produced exclusionary and 
authoritarian governance, and their reproduction following the 2003 democratic opening. 
This, this examining this temporal trajectory, I argue, aids in explaining and 
conceptualizing the causal links between institutions—as manifestations of vertical power 
relations, and ethnic mobilization resulting in discord. Such an analysis requires a 
multifaceted exploration that takes into consideration various causal mechanisms that 
have affected institutional development resulting in the failure of Iraqi elites to mitigate 
ethnic conflict. Moreover, by applying a path dependent analysis, we see that post 2003 
institutions have been used to alter and reverse power dynamics by previously 
disenfranchised ethnic elites at the expense of the previously dominant Sunni-Arab ruling 
minority.199 Thus, tracking the development of these variables in a given temporal and 
contextual setting reinforces North’s assertion that history matters.  
As will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters, exclusion and authoritarianism 
have been two constant variables that have dictated the state’s institutional and structural 
power dynamics as contending groups sought to control the state. An emerging trend is 
the continued survival and replication of this institutional design so as to maintain and 
sustain the power and, by extension, interests of a given particular ethnic group.  
																																																								




The proceeding section will outline the research design of this study as a single, 
within-case comparative historical analysis of the causal mechanisms and processes that 
have shaped ethnic conflict in Iraq during transformative, statebuilding periods.  
Methodology and Research Design 
Historical Inquiry and Comparative Historical Analysis 
 
This study nests the analysis of ethnic conflict and institutions in Iraq within a historical 
framework. Specifically, a longitudinal and temporal evaluation of ethnic conflict across 
time and for the given case study demonstrates the importance of engaging in a 
comparative historical analysis of the evolution of ethnic conflict in divided societies like 
Iraq. The ‘historical turn’ in the social sciences has facilitated more systematic and in-
depth analyses of political phenomenon particularly since, in the given case, it enables us 
to look at history going forward and analyze the lasting consequences of institutional 
transformations during crises in Iraq’s statebuilding history on ethnic conflict.200 Further, 
as noted by Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu, the utility of engaging in a historical 
explanation rests with the ability to generate “inferences about the causes of specific 
outcomes in particular cases” by explaining past occurrences.201 In adapting Capoccia and 
Ziblatt’s postulation of the relevance of a historical turn to the study of democratization, 
I posit that in order to understand the emergence and evolution of ethnic conflict in Iraq, 
we must analyze critical moments that resulted in the initial institutional design and 
“undertake a thorough analysis of the ideologies, resources, and institutional legacies 
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shaping the choices of actors involved in the process of institution building.”202    
Since this research seeks to explain how institutions affect ethnic conflict in deeply 
divided societies and why earlier institutional design choices determine the Iraqi state’s 
response to ethnic grievances, it is imperative to situate the study within a relevant 
historical context by adopting a sophisticated approach to historiography and paying 
detailed attention to processes, timing, and historical trajectories in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the case.203 A comparative historical analysis facilitates such an inquiry 
as it is concerned with “causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use 
of systematic and contextualized comparison” in order to measure the evolution of a 
particularly phenomenon—in this case, ethnic conflict.204 Furthermore, it enables us to 
engage in an in-depth analysis of causal mechanisms along a temporal setting, as 
succinctly noted by Ruseschemeyer,  
Comparative historical work that uses both within-case and cross-case analysis can explore more 
complex interactions among causal factors, it can better trace multiple paths of causation, and it 
does not make the assumption of a linear relation between independent and dependent variables 
that—in the absence of historical information suggesting other relations between causal factors and 
outcomes—multiple regression analyses often adopt.205 
 
As an approach that allows researchers to eclectically employ both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, it is concerned with explaining and identifying causal 
configurations that produce major outcomes and allows researchers to explicitly analyze 
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historical sequences and pay serious attention to how processes unfold in time and 
overtime.206   
In addition, a historical within-case comparative analysis of the three periods will 
support a chronological structure207 by analyzing institutional design during formative 
periods. Following a chronological rather than a linear-analytic or in-case comparative 
structure provides a better investigation of the changes in the processes and structures of 
the subject matter and allows for an explanation of causal sequences that occur in a linear 
manner over time;208 hence, attention is paid to timing and sequencing. Furthermore, a 
detailed analysis of these time periods will foster a nuanced understanding of the 
institutional casual mechanisms that have affected ethnic conflict in Iraq. In doing so, I 
intend to link the stated proposition to possible explanatory variables found in the 
governing structures of the state throughout the mentioned time periods in order to 
illuminate the relationship between institutions and ethnic conflict.  
 Delineating the temporal and contextual historical processes that affect ethnic 
conflict requires the application of process tracing a tool for explaining and analysing the 
relationship of critical temporal historical processes that shape the outcome of the state’s 
institutional development as it relates to ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization resulting 
from ethnic exclusion and authoritarian governance in Iraq. 
 
Process Tracing  
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As a tool for assessing and analyzing within-case causal interpretations, processing tracing 
“attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal 
mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable”209 and allows the researcher to “examine the process whereby initial 
case conditions are translated into case outcomes.”210 Beach and Pedersen succinctly 
define a causal mechanism as a Theorized system that produces outcomes through the 
interaction of a series of parts that transmit causal forces from X to Y. Each part of a 
mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, 
which together produces Y. The parts of causal mechanisms are composed of entities 
engaging in activities.211  It thus equips a researcher with the ability to make causal 
inferences by using “observed empirical material to make conclusions about 
causation.”212  For Bennett and Elman, process tracing in qualitative research draws 
comprehensive findings using a single or multiple case study method by having a clear 
chronological account of the historical narrative, minimizing ruptures in the causal 
explanation of the case to reinforce its theoretical significance, accepting the implications 
of alternative explanations as a way of reinforcing theoretical grounding, and finally, is 
more persuasive if the researcher has accounted for confirmation bias—that is, taking into 
account the implications of alternative explanations to bolster the theory’s significance.213 
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This is particularly important for analyzing the threads of continuity and survival of 
specific state institutions in Iraq during the aforementioned time periods.  
Since the task of this research is to explain the effects of institutional design (as an 
independent variable) on ethnic conflict (as the dependent variable), process tracing 
supports the use of archival documents and interviews, which serve as the basis for the 
data collection component of this research, to test the validity of hypothesized causal 
processes found in the sequence and values of the intervening variables and to generate 
new variables to explain a sequence of events in deviant cases.214   
Single-Case Study Approach  
 
The dissertation relies on a comparative, in-depth single-case study approach of three 
temporal time periods as a form of empirical inquiry because it facilitates an analysis of 
the contextual relevance of a phenomenon when the “boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident.”215 As a theory-testing project, it uses empirical 
evidence to evaluate the relevance of historical institutionalism as a paradigm within 
comparative politics216 and to assess the validity and scope of the theoretical framework 
for explaining causal mechanisms throughout the three periods.217 Moreover, historical 
institutionalism allows for an analysis of a case within a given temporal setting by 
explaining how institutions affect and change conditions and variables over time 
particularly as the selected time intervals “would reflect the presumed stages at which the 
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changes should reveal themselves.”218  
A general critique of this method is its weakness in obtaining broad social inquiry. 
Case studies are often perceived to be limited in drawing and controlling correlations 
between the variables being analyzed in comparison with large-n studies.219  This is 
particularly difficult considering this is the first study that strictly focuses on the long-
term role of institutions and institutional design on ethnic conflict in Iraq as a divided 
society. Two related criticisms of the case study method rest with its limited 
generalizability and comparability coupled with the method’s limitation in theory testing 
and development.220 Others note limitations in controlling interceding variables that are 
better controlled in large-n experiments that can account for the effects of omitted 
variables,221 and that small number of cases limit inferential leverage of the case study 
method in qualitative research.222 The weaknesses of this study are further complicated 
by the lack of comparable cases that engage in a temporal analysis of the effects of 
institutions on ethnic mobilization across time. Others note its inability to generate an 
explanatory causal inference based on a single observation.223  
However, single-case research designs have shown to be useful for testing the 
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applicability of a well-formulated theory.224 Specifically, this method fosters conceptual 
validity by identifying and measuring indicators that are representative of the theoretical 
concepts and by emphasizing the role of contextual factors and processes. 225  The 
emphasis on a contextual analysis frames the centrality of institutional design in divided 
societies by placing the trajectory of institutional development and ethnic conflict 
regulation on a continuum of  institutional engineering in Iraq. For the given inquiry, the 
selection of a single-case design aids in testing the utility of historical institutionalism as 
a paradigm that explains the role of state institutions and institutional design on ethnic 
conflict in Iraq.  
Methodology and Data Collection 
 
As noted above, this dissertation combines an in-depth single case comparative analysis 
with descriptive statistical analyses. For greater analytical and explanatory leverage, this 
project employs a mixed-methods research design of Iraq as a single case study. The 
application of qualitative and quantitative research tools enables us to provide more 
comprehensive evidence of the given phenomenon and aids in answering questions that 
cannot be answered using one method alone.226 This research will adopt a longitudinal 
approach to data collection that allows a “diacronic analysis of the incidence of conditions 
and events.”227  Brady, Collier, and Seawright define a longitudinal analysis as an analysis 
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of change over time by focusing on one or more variables or cases.228 Similarly, Hay 
asserts that a diachronic analysis emphasizes the “process of change over time” by 
compartmentalizing the process into phases of development.229 Using the longitudinal and 
diachronic methods of data analysis will support the empirical and theoretical components 
of this study by providing the historical context of institutional design in Iraq in order to 
situate its historic and contemporary impact on ethnic conflict.     
A large portion of the research relating to Iraq’s institutional design was obtained 
using primary and secondary data. Primary historical data was obtained from archival 
research at the British Archives, the Saddam Hussein Regime’s Collection at the Conflict 
Records Research Center at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., the 
Library of Congress, and Harvard University’s Law Library. Primary data contain 
documents relating to Iraq’s governing institutions since the British Mandate until the fall 
of the Ba’th regime in 2003. Secondary data was used alongside primary materials to aid 
in interpreting the temporal conditions that affected group mobilization and to highlight 
the added value of this work to existing scholarship on Iraq and governing in divided 
societies regarding the mobilizing incentives that fuel group grievances. I intentionally 
omit the usage of person memoirs due to the dearth and difficulty of obtaining such 
materials, and particularly since this work does not adopt an ethnographic research agenda. 
Although works by Peter Sluglett, Adeed Dawisha, Charles Tripp and Toby Dodge 
also employ British archival sources, this work diverges from their research agendas in 
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two ways. First, the aforementioned scholars provide general historical narratives of the 
Iraqi state, focusing on broad socio-economic and political factors that affected its 
maturation within a newly created regionalized state system. Although Fanar Haddad’s 
seminal work on sectarianism in Iraq also employs archival material, my analysis herein 
differs in that it is a broader analysis of ethnic conflict and its diffusion in society, inclusive 
of ethnic, religious, and sectarian affiliations. Second, the application of the archival 
materials focuses specifically illuminating early forms of ethnic resistance to 
authoritarianism and exclusion under the British Mandate and subsequently under the 
British-installed Sunni-Arab monarchy. While this study utilizes the same archives, my 
research agenda diverges from the aforementioned scholars in that it explores the 
institutional consolidation of the Iraqi state and ethnic responses to early impediments to 
state formation and statebuilding in order to illuminate the drivers of ethnic mobilization. 
I explore how Iraq’s majority and minority communities dealt with institutional barriers 
throughout formative periods, and their responses to the state.  
With regard to the Ba’thist state archives, prominent Iraqi historians, including 
Dina Rizk Khoury and Joseph Sassoon have conducted extensive research utilizing the 
archives housed at Stanford’s Hoover Institution and at the National Defense 
University.230 These seminal works provide intricately detailed accounts of the inner 
workings of the Ba’th Party and its ruling elite. My research using the Ba’thist archives at 
the National Defense University specifically explored how the regime dealt with ethnic 
and sectarian dissidence since the regime’s consolidation under Saddam Hussein from 
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1979-2003. The specific focus on ethnic and religious tensions under the Ba’thist period, 
I complement the aforementioned works by adding an understudied dimension to existing 
works on Iraq using the same archival data.  
With respect to the study’s quantitative contribution, descriptive data found in the 
last empirical chapter was obtained from the Polity IV dataset, which measures state 
autocracy across time, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index which measures levels of 
corruption, and Freedom House’s country freedom scores which measure political and 
civil freedoms across time. Multiple regressions measuring the effects of various social 
and political indicators on group grievances and ethnic fractionalization from 2005-2013 
were conducted using data from the Fragile State Index, formerly known as the Failed 
States Index—created by the Fund for Peace and incorporates twelve socio-economic and 
political indicators that are aggregated to give a final score fragility score.  
Building on these analytical toolkits, the chapters below test the applicability and 
utility of historical institutionalism as an approach for explaining the origins, development, 
and durability of ethnic conflict in divided societies like Iraq. The proceeding chapter 
marks the first critical juncture during the time of state formation and initial statebuilding 





Setting the Path: Exogenous State Formation, Institutional 






[T]there is still—and I say this with a heart full of sorrow—no Iraqi people but unimaginable 
masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and 
absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually 
ready to rise against any government whatever.  Out of these masses we want to fashion a people 
which we would train, educate, and refine…The circumstances, being what they are, the 
immenseness of the efforts needed for this [can be imagined].231  
 





This chapter maps early institutional choices that determined the state’s sequential 
response to ethnic discord in Iraq during the first critical period of state formation and 
statebuilding. It identifies the institutional processes and governing constraints that 
produced exclusionary and authoritarian governance that culminated in the politicization 
and mobilization of ethnic sentiments during the formative period of exogenous state 
formation and statebuilding under the British Mandate from 1920 until the collapse of the 
monarchy in 1958. While deploying both political and coercive mechanisms of control, 
the British Mandate in Iraq created and defined the country’s nascent institutional 
configuration and sequentially determined the trajectory of ethnic discord that defined the 
parameters of inclusion and exclusion in the nascent state.   
During this initial critical juncture between 1920-1932, we observe that ethnic 
relations vis-à-vis the state became entangled in an institutional design embedded in 
mechanisms of exclusion and authoritarianism rather than conciliation and inclusion. This 
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early pattern of statebuilding set the foundation by which Iraq’s fragments both perceived 
and negotiated their grievances in the emergent state. As will be demonstrated, early 
institutional choices locked-in oppressive and exclusionary modes of governance 
effectively sustained and administered by a ruling Sunni-Arab minority. I postulate that 
early preferential treatment of ethnic and religious elites by colonial powers entrenched 
ethnic politics culminating in ethnic and sectarian grievances at the onset of state 
formation. By examining the relationship between early institutional design and the 
factors that shaped and framed ethnic grievances, I demonstrate why ethno-religious 
attachments, although a constitutive element of Iraq’s socio-cultural fabric, became 
instruments of exclusionary politics.  
I proceed to explain the impact of initial governing choices on the crystallization 
of ethno-religious identities as elites in the emergent state attempted to consolidate its 
territorial, political, and socio-economic footing in a newly established regionalized state 
system. The initial statebuilding schema produced two interlinked processes—the creation 
of the state’s governing institutions and the simultaneous ethno-religious opposition to 
this initial configuration. Surveying the causal chain of events enables us to reframe the 
impact of Iraq’s early institutional design and initial modes of exclusion and 
authoritarianism on subsequent governments. While being cognizant of the ontological 
predicament of studying ethnic conflict in Iraq as “both alarmist and reductionist accounts 
of ‘sectarianism’ in Iraq are able to furnish their arguments with countless historical 
examples of sectarian hatred or unity depending on the author’s predisposition,”233 I argue 
																																																								




that an analysis of early institutional design provides us with a deeper understanding of 
the relationship between institutional design and ethnic conflict in divided societies like 
Iraq and equips us with the necessary toolkits to identify, trace, and explain its subsequent 
trajectory. Conceptualizing these incongruities of Iraq’s institutional formation and 
transformation vis-à-vis ethnic conflict also aids in answering a seminal question posed 
by Sluglett: “why the political structures introduced by Britain failed so signally and so 
rapidly in Iraq.”234  
Chapter Outline 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I analyze the economic and geopolitical 
processes that led to the emergence of a regionalized state system following the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent European encroachment into the region. The 
second section explores the state’s early institutional design and statebuilding under the 
British Mandate in order to contextualize the state that emerged following independence. 
In the third section, I examine the effects of institutional constraints on group grievances, 
competing elite ideologies, and the role of the army that cemented authoritarian 
governance post-independence. Lastly, I analyze ethnic responses to exclusionary and 
authoritarian governance under the monarchy from Iraq’s majority and minority groups 
as reflected in petitions against the state, civic and associational groups, and the 
emergence of oppositional political parties.   
  
																																																								




Imperial Collapse, Colonialism, and State Formation 
 
Ethnic Politics under Ottoman Iraq  
 
The waning of the Ottoman Empire around the First World War created a fissure in a 
regionalized system united under a territorially and administratively bound monolith since 
the sixteenth century. Its collapse resulted in the creation of arbitrarily drawn autonomous 
states out of otherwise heterogeneous territories following European colonial intervention 
in the region. Iraq mirrored this developmental trajectory as the product of a colonially 
created state system.235  Although its territorial composition is a consequence of this 
regional development, the Ottoman administration of Iraq treated the territory as a distinct 
entity with special links between the three Mesopotamian provinces of Mosul Baghdad 
and Basra.236 Iraq’s state formation can thusly be attributed to two overlapping historical 
junctures: the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent colonization of the three 
vilayets (provinces) of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra by Britain following WWI.     
The ethnic and religious composition of Ottoman Iraq consisted of Arabs, Kurds, 
Turkmen, Persians, Assyrians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, Yazidis, and Sabeans, 
divided along three primary religious sects: majority Arab Shiʿi in the south, 
predominantly Arab Sunni in the west, and predominantly Sunni Kurds in the north, with 
Christian populations mainly situated in and around Mosul, and a large Jewish community 
in Baghdad.237 Out of a population of three million at the beginning of the Mandate, an 
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estimated half were Shi’is, 20 percent Kurds, and an estimated 8 percent belonging to one 
of Iraq’s smaller minority groups such as the Christians, Yazidis, Sabeans and 
Turkmen.238 In contrast, the Sunni Arabs, who constituted less than 20 percent dominated 
ministerial positions, key governing institutions, and the army’s officer corps. The three 
main provinces were highly fragmented along religious and ethnic lines along with 
localized tribal and communal identities and attachments that dictated communal 
interactions with Ottoman administrators. 239  Ethno-religious communities were 
administered by the millet system, an institution that granted religious communities, 
namely Christians and Jews, a fractional degree of autonomy and self-rule. 240  The 
country’s territorial configuration also reflected the ethnic and religious composition of 
the country.241 The post-independence configuration of the provinces reflected a path 
dependent composition found under the preceding Ottoman regime. Whereas Baghdad 
formed the heart of the Sunni-Arabs, who dominated key administrative posts, Mosul was 
predominantly Kurdish and Turkoman with amicable cultural and economic ties to 
Istanbul, and Basra was an overwhelmingly Shi’i province with traditional ties to 
Persia. 242  These geopolitical divisions determined and defined inter and intra-group 
relations with the central Ottoman administration. The cities were subdivided along 
neighbourhoods demarcated by religious, sectarian, ethnic, or tribal lines.243 This system 
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was purposive of both guaranteeing a level of autonomy for the tribes and ethno-religious 
communities while maintaining control within the Empire. Geopolitical and ideological 
threats became two factors that dictated sectarian tensions between mid-19th and early 20th 
centuries.244 In particular, the central administration perceived the Shi’i community and 
Shi’i expansionism in Iraq as a threat to its stability due to the community’s perceived 
alliance and allegiance to Iran, the contending regional power, as succinctly noted by 
Centisaya, 
The Ottoman Empire was a Sunni state, with which its Shi’i subjects could not be trusted to identify. 
Nor, in principle, did Shi’i Muslims recognize the Ottoman claim to possession of the Great Islamic 
Caliphate, a claim which Sultan Abdülhamid repeatedly emphasized in an effort to give religious 
legitimacy of his regime. In short, the Shi’is were regarded as potentially disloyal.245  
 
The historical grievances of the Shi’i stemming from their marginalization particularly 
following the second half of the nineteenth century under Ottoman Iraq would shape their 
demands during the critical statebuilding period in the early part of the twentieth century.  
The expansion of British and French colonial interests and their subsequent 
colonization of the region under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916246 following the 
collapse and defeat of the Ottoman Empire altered the territorial composition of the 
Middle East as a regional system as each power delineated their sphere of influence over 
the emerging states.247 To a large extent, European powers created, administered, and 
developed—both politically and economically, the institutional capacities of emerging 
states in the region based on British and French geopolitical and strategic. Consequently, 
																																																								
244 Ebubekir Ceylan, The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 212-13. 
245 Centisaya, 99, 126. 
246 See Appendix B for a map of European spheres of influence.  
247 Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian, “Introduction,” in The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, 




critical policy formulations on how to govern Iraq as a divided society and the creation of 
appropriate institutional choices were largely made by Britain under Mandatory Iraq.  
Colonialism and State Formation 
 
State formation in the Middle East and Iraq is entwined with the study of European 
colonial encroachment in the region. Although the regional system that came to 
characterize the Middle East following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire differed 
markedly from its European counterpart, the configuration of the nascent states mirrored 
those of its European architects with respect to its administrative, bureaucratic, and 
coercive governing structures and institutions. 248  However, the arbitrary territorial 
demarcation of the new states produced divided societies where “traditional categories 
such as ethnicity, tribe, and various cross-cutting clientelistic networks predominated.”249 
As noted by Dawisha, this was apparent in the incongruity of the new states in relation to 
their ethnic composition where, 
States were thus created not necessarily in response to the national demands of indigenous 
populations, but to satisfy the political and economic interests of the imperial powers. The resultant 
artificial creations were faced not only with the task of governing, an already difficult undertaking, 
but also with fusing multiple, and more often than note conflictual, indigenous identities and 
interests.250 
 
Thus, exogenous state formation and statebuilding under the British Mandate in Iraq 
similarly sought to consolidate the territorial, political, and socio-economic spheres of the 
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newly formed state. As outlined under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the newly 
established territorial composition was carved into two primary spheres of influence with 
France obtaining control over Syria and Lebanon and Britain over Palestine, Trans-Jordan, 
and Iraq.251  Once the distribution of the territories was formalized, Britain obtained 
control of the three Ottoman provinces resulting in the consolidation of the territorial 
composition of modern day Iraq. The absence of contractual bargaining between 
communal elites residing in these territories meant that “nationalist alliances were often 
agreements of convenience rather than durable quid pro quo exchanges.”252 Thus, the 
Iraqi state, since its inception, was incapable of consolidating its institutional governing 
capacity with its divided society. Exacerbating these dilemmas of colonial statebuilding 
was the absence of a social contract that could legitimize and consociate the country’s 
governing elites with the state’s diverse society.  
I argue that Britain’s quest for the creation of a territorially-centralized 
government under its tutelage produced a monarchical regime incapable of governing and 
consolidating the multifarious demands of its diverse and divided society. Britain’s 
statebuilding schema following state formation produced an institutionally-equipped state 
but one devoid of a social contract that could reconcile a society divided along tribal, 
ideological, ethnic, and sectarian lines. The regime’s lack of legitimacy dictated its 
developmental trajectory in terms of its capacity to govern, consolidate, and penetrate 
society. The outcome was the production of a despotic state whereby the British-installed 
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monarchy and its handpicked elites were empowered to act “without the routine, 
institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.” 253  Lacking autonomy and 
reflecting the weakness of the state to accommodate divergent interests of a plural society, 
state institutions became instruments of control for maintaining the dominance and 
interests of Sunni-Arabs since the time of state formation. Moreover, the reliance of the 
state on coercive institutions and the exclusion of non-Sunni Arabs from governing the 
state contributed to the deterioration of state-society relations.  
Exploring Britain’s colonial legacy prior to Iraq’s independence allows us to 
contextualize the processes that culminated in the formation of the state in 1920. Doing 
so requires a parallel examination of the domestic factors that affected the trajectory of 
the state’s development following its independence in 1932 is essential given that a policy 
priority during the state formation period was the creation of functioning state institutions 
to guide the internal and external policies of the emergent state. Administrative and 
coercive institutions initially created and administered by colonial powers enabled Sunni-
Arab ruling elites to direct society through key governing institutions relating to the 
economy, education, and the armed forces.254 The autonomy of these institutions and 
pervasiveness in society produced two outcomes. First, they were reconfigured and 
reproduced at different critical periods by ruling elites seeking to either maintain or alter 
control of the state. Second, the coercive capacity of the state to penetrate every aspect of 
Iraqi society both sustained successive regimes’ control of society and became the 
instrument of exclusionary and authoritarian governance.  
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Britain, Iraq, and Exogenous State Formation 
 
The fissure created following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire facilitated the 
encroachment of France and Britain as key European contending powers in the region. 
The Mandate system in the Middle East became the key institutional impetus for 
consolidating European regional domination, with its development determined by 
European economic interests rooted in maintaining a delicate balance of power.255 As 
noted by Migdal, 
The new system of mandates resembled colonialism because it involved the direct appropriation 
of the highest formal decision-making posts in the society by the outside power…The mandatory 
powers sought ways to build local forces that could secure their interest in the region without a 
permanent colonial presence.256 
 
Imperial interests were imbued in expedient modernization and Westernization policies 
reverberated by their geopolitical division of the region, which, lacking legitimization, 
could only be rationalized in “terms of the joint interests of the European, nationalist, 
capitalist states seeking to stabilize their world, diminish the chances of conflict among 
themselves, and shift the burdens of their mutual accommodation onto other peoples.”257 
Thus, Iraq’s territorial consolidation into a functioning state is a product of what Harik 
succinctly calls the colonially-created state system.258  For British administrators, the 
colonial state’s formation required the creation of some semblance of legitimacy. The 
invention of the Mandate system had “many of the features of an old-fashioned colony 
but it also required the mandate holders to submit to certain internationally sanctioned 
																																																								
255 Binder (1999), 12. 
256 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 147. 
257 Binder, 12. 




guidelines, notably the need to establish constitutional governments in the new states as a 
way of preparing their peoples for eventual independence.”259  
On a structural level, the Mandate came to resemble a tutelage form of governance 
administered and financed through indirect rule that sought to both shape and maintain 
the political, social, and economic configuration of the embryonic state. While the League 
of Nations entrusted Iraq to be developed politically, economically, and socially to Great 
Britain in order to equip the state with all the necessary tools for its independence, British 
administrators would continue to play a pivotal role within its operational and institutional 
structures.260 Three fundamental reasons bolstered Britain’s creation of Iraq: geopolitical 
geostrategic security; the discovery of oil; and to fulfil its wartime promises to its Sunni-
Arab Hashemite allies of granting Faysal a kingdom in Iraq,261 as outlined in an undated 
memo from the Colonial Office, 
(a) Strategic: We require the facilities granted under the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty for the 
defence of Iraq and of the Middle East. Of these the most important is the use of the 
air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba. The Treaty, which came into force in 1932 is due 
to run until 1957. From October 3rd this year either side has been entitled to ask for its 
revision. The oil of Iraq is of great military value to the United Kingdom in peace and 
war. 
(b) Economic: Iraq is one of the main sterling oil producing countries of the Middle East. 
Production this year of the Iraq Petroleum Company and associated companies will be 
in the region of 20 million tons and is rapidly rising. Under Iraqi Law 70% of Iraq’s 
share of the oil revenues are devoted to development projects to be undertaken by the 
Iraqi Development Board. If this Board shows results, Iraq would be an example to 
her neighbours of the wise use of western resources. The country would also offer 
increased possibilities for United Kingdom imports and technical assistance. Iraqi oil 
is an important factor in the United Kingdom’s balance of payments. At the same time 
it is in our interest to ensure that Iraq remains in the sterling area and we must therefore 
do whatever we can to demonstrate to her the advantages of her so doing, particularly 
by meeting her legitimate requirements of imports from sterling sources.  
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(c) Political: Iraq’s voice at such bodies at the Arab League and the United Nations is of 
value to us particularly if it can influence her representatives against supporting 
extreme anti-British declarations. Moreover we hope that, so far as the state of Anglo-
Egyptian relations permits, Iraq may use her influence with the Arab States in favour 
of a Middle East Defence Organisation. 262 
 
By replacing the traditional characteristics of direct rule, the Mandate engendered a new 
form of imperial control for colonial powers whereby emergent states had to be equipped 
with all the necessary domestic institutional and structural capacity to govern their internal 
affairs in order to be fully integrated as autonomous states within the international system 
and to maintain Britain’s geostrategic alliance.263 Attempting to maintain a veneer of 
legitimacy, Britain’s policy for Mandatory Iraq shifted toward the creation of a system 
whereby “real political power had to be devolved to the institutions of the nascent Iraqi 
state and the Iraqi politicians running them.”264  However, while acknowledging the 
delicate balancing act of attempting to devolve power to local elites, while, simultaneously, 
controlling a deeply divided society, British officials favoured the creation of strong 
governing institutions to counteract anti-British nationalists and religious leaders.265 As 
will be demonstrated, these early institutional preference created a path dependence of 
how successive leaders perceived the role of state institutions in relation to governing this 
highly complex society.  
 British relations in Iraq were formalized following the Arab Revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire (1916-1918), led by the sharif 266  of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, a 
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descendant of the Prophet Muhammed and the father of King Faysal I of Iraq, who hailed 
from a prominent Sunni-Arab family. The revolt sought to abolish Ottoman control of the 
region and form a unified Arab kingdom with the aid of Britain. Consequently, France 
was awarded Syria and Britain gained control of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, 
Baghdad, and Mosul at the San Remo conference in 1920.  The alliance between Hussein 
bin Ali and Britain against the Ottomans resulted in Sunni-Arab dominance of emergent 
states in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Trans-Jordan. As succinctly noted by Sluglett, 
The British authorities chose to set up an Arab government, recruited largely from the Sunni 
dignitaries of the towns and the Sunni officers who had fought with Faysal in the Arab Revolt, 
backed by a network of British advisers in the ministries in Baghdad and in the headquarters of the 
provincial administrations.267 
 
Thus, the instalment of Faysal by the British was purposive of garnering a minimal sense 
of legitimacy due to his respected lineage combined with the necessity to control the new 
state through the artificially imported monarchy. However, Faysal’s powerbase consisted 
of Sunni Arabs from Baghdad and Mosul’s lower-middle class strata and were former 
Ottoman army officers, trained and educated in Istanbul. A few sharifians268 supported 
Faysal’s accession to the throne in Iraq for two reasons: one, they shared his vision of a 
pan-Arab Iraq and region; two, having no elite power base to represent their interests, 
Faysal’s reign facilitated their social aspirations within Iraq.269 This path dependent trend 
replicated Ottoman Sunni dominance in the governing structures of the new state, which 
institutionalized “Sunni dominance over the various ethnic, sectarian and linguistic groups 
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populating the three geographically distinct areas artificially united after the war was 
meant to create a united and homogenous society.”270 Consequently, the importation of a 
foreign, Sunni-Arab, Hashemite monarchy not only resulted in the absence of indigenous 
support, but instilled distrust among the country’s majority Shi’i and dominant Kurdish 
minority groups.271 This exclusionary beginning would reverberate throughout critical 
statebuilding periods in Iraq as replicated by successive regimes until the collapse of the 
state in 2003.  
Building on Britain’s colonial experience in Africa and India, British colonial 
officers learned early on that a form of direct rule was not possible in Iraq. Particularly, 
the 1920 revolt, shortly following the San Remo conference, coalesced into a national 
struggle against what both rural and urban, Shi’i and Sunni populations saw as foreign 
and European imperial rule. 272  Adopting policy choices from Africa and India, the 
Mandate system enabled colonial powers to maintain forms of indirect rule that sought to 
create a decentralized form of institutional control of elites and native populations 
predicated on the maintenance of European imperial interests.273 Although the carefully 
selected local elites who would participate in the making of the nascent state were tolerant 
of British rule and the Mandate, Britain needed an institutional apparatus that would 
secure its tutelage position.  
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The annexation of Iraq was formalized by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 (later 
revised in 1930 two years prior to Iraq’s independence) and signed by Britain’s High 
Commissioner Percy Cox and the Naqib of Baghdad as the country’s first Prime Minister, 
‘Abd-Ur-Rahman. It formalized and defined the relationship between Britain and the Iraqi 
monarchy under King Faysal I. The treaty ensured that Iraq, under Britain’s aegis, became 
both financially and politically receptive to British colonial interests. Article IV 
summarily captures this relationship,  
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles XVII and XVIII of this Treaty, His Majesty the 
King of Iraq agrees to be guided by the advice of his Britannic Majesty tendered through the High 
Commissioner on all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations and 
interests of his Britannic Majesty for the whole period of this Treaty. His Majesty the King of Iraq 
will fully consult the High Commissioner on what is conducive to a sound financial and fiscal 
policy and will ensure the stability and good organisation of the finances of the Iraq Government 
so long as that Government is under financial obligations to the Government of his Britannic 
Majesty.274  
 
The treaty served two purposes. First, it legitimized British administration of Iraq in order 
to ready the newly formed colony for independence—a position favoured by the League 
of Nations. Second, it operationalized this position on a partnership basis financed by 
Britain with prominent members of Iraq’s emerging rule elite, composed primarily of 
Sunni-Arab nationalists from Baghdad who had also formed Iraq’s governing elite under 
the Ottoman administration. This critical position would come to resonate with successive 
ruling elites during formative statebuilding periods in Iraq as Sunni-Arab elites would 
come to dominate governing structures and institutions. Thus, Iraq, from its inception, 
fostered an exclusionary conception of who belonged to the state, while its nascent 
																																																								




institutional apparatus and governing structures served to legitimize this exclusionary 
narrative.  
In sum, Iraq’s state formation mirrored that of most post-colonial states and 
societies, albeit with varying dynamics, processes, and outcomes. If statebuilding 
(administrative capacity-building) and identity-building (the creation of a common 
national civic identity) are entwined in the process of nation-building, it became apparent 
that the absence of the latter at the expense of former has defined Iraq’s state and 
institutional development.275By mapping and outlining the processes that defined Iraq’s 
state formation, I intend to divulge the conditions that underpin this critical period that led 
to the production of the dual processes of what Spruyt calls governmental capacity and 
territorial definition of the state, both of which are crucial for analyzing and determining 
a state’s regime type.276 Furthermore, identifying the causal mechanisms that determined 
Iraq’s state and institutional composition is purposive of illuminating and contextualizing 
the initial conditions that set the path for the development and institutionalization of 
authoritarian and exclusionary governing patterns. 
 
 
Setting the Path: Statebuilding under the British Mandate 
Colonial Institutional Design 
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Statebuilding in Iraq began in the 1920s with the creation of the state’s governing 
institutions, basic infrastructure capacity building, and the consolidation of the state’s 
territories under British auspices led by colonial administrators. British officials initially 
looked to their statebuilding efforts in India to model the basic foundations of the nascent 
state whereby “the country was organized along Indian lines with political districts run by 
British officers who reported back to the central administration.”277 In fact, a total of 2216 
Indians were employed along with British and some native Arabs, Kurds, and Jews in 
Iraq’s early administrative positions.278 Three years into the Mandate, Iraq was equipped 
with an army, monarchy, provincial and municipal governments and governing councils, 
a parliament and cabinet, elections and electoral laws, literary, scientific and charitable 
institutions, national police, prisons, and financial institutions.279  
Cognizant of Iraq’s ethnic divides, the formation of the Provincial Government in 
1920 was carefully crafted by Percy Cox (Britain’s colonial administrator) to be 
representative of the country’s ethnic and religious elites. The first governing structure of 
the nascent state consisted of a nine-person Provisional Governing Council, consisting of 
the following institutions and representatives:280 
Table 2: Composition of Iraq’s First Provisional Governing Council 
Ministerial Position Representative 
Council President  ‘Abd-ur-Rahman, Naqib (Captain) of Baghdad 
Interior Saiyid Talib Pasha 
Finance Sasun Effendi Haskail (Jewish, Baghdad) 
Justice Mustafa Effendi Alusi 
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Defence Ja‘far Pasha al‘Askari 
Public Works  ‘Izzat Pasha 
Education and Health Saiyid Muhammad Mahdi Tabatabai (Shi’i, 
Karbala) 
Commerce  ‘Abdul Latif Pasha Mandil 
Auqaf (Religious Endowments) Muhammad ‘Ali Effendi Fadhil  
 
In order to make the Council more representative, Cox appointed an additional nine 
members from Iraq’s Shi’i, Christian, Sunni communities to ensure that the Council 
“represented very comprehensively the various interests and communities of the 
people.” 281  The subsequent Electoral Law of 1924 similarly delineated proportional 
representation for Iraq’s minority communities in the liwas (provinces) where they 
comprised a substantial numerical group, as demonstrated in Table 3:282 
Table 3: Proportional Representation of Minorities by Province 
 Mosul Baghdad Basra 
Christians 2 1 1 
Jews 1 2 1 
  
The law also granted universal suffrage for all men aged twenty years and older, 
established an Electoral College for each province, with the following distribution of 
deputies per eligible male population: 1 deputy/10,000-20,000, 2 deputies/30,000, 3 
deputies/50,000, 4/70,000+.283     
The next step in the statebuilding schema was the establishment of a monarchy by 
crowning of Faysal as the first king of Iraq, who secured a 96 percent electoral victory in 
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a moot national referendum.284 By July 11 1921, the council had passed a resolution 
announcing Faysal as the first king of Iraq and a “constitutional, representative and 
democratic Government limited by law.”285 The provisional government and the council 
were abolished following Faysal’s accession to the throne and replaced by a new cabinet 
shortly thereafter, albeit, with special British advisers overseeing all ministers and cabinet 
meetings.286 Although the majority of the country’s urban and part of its rural Arab 
population (both Sunni and Shi’i Arabs) supported Faysal’s accession, the country’s 
prominent minority groups, the Kurds and Turkoman of Kirkuk and Mosul rejected 
Faysal’s candidacy citing concerns over the instalment of an Arab government, while the 
Kurds of Sulaymaniya boycotted the referendum. In addition, provinces along the 
Euphrates also rejected Faysal’s accession, favouring continued British control instead; 
thus, calling into question the purported overwhelming support for the new king.287  
In this period of early state formation and statebuilding, we also see the 
promulgation of laws that also prescribed state-citizen relations. The consolidation of the 
state required that former Ottoman subjects be integrated into the statebuilding schema. 
By 1924, the Iraq Nationality Law defined the boundaries of political incorporation by 
granting Ottoman subjects Iraqi citizenship who were “declared to have ceased to be 
Ottoman subjects and to have acquired ‘Iraq nationality on that date.”288 Other laws were 
created to impose institutional constraints on civil society and civic participation.  
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Circumspect of the nascent country’s ethnic and religious divisions, the King 
commissioned a Law of Associations in 1922, which defined and, to an extent, severely 
limited the formation of civic associations for the following purposes:  
(a) Which are formed for objects contrary to Law or public morality. 
(b) Which are formed for objects dangerous to public safety or the integrity of the territories of 
‘Iraq. 
(c) Which seek to foster differences between the various elements of the population of ‘Iraq. 
(d) Which seek to change the established form of Government.  
(e) Which being of a political nature, purport to represent any of the various racial or religious 
elements of ‘Iraq. 
(f) Which, being of a political nature, are formed under a name from which the objects of the 
Association cannot be clearly understood. 
(g) Which are of a secret nature or do not disclose the purposes for which they are formed.289 
 
These institutional constraints reflected fears of invoking identity politics within civil 
society that would lead to the state’s loss of control over the emergent public sphere. 
Interestingly, successive Iraqi governments would impose similar institutional constraints 
throughout different time periods in Iraq’s political history culminating in the Ba’thist 
absolute penetration of the social, economic, and political spheres that lay outside the 
state’s coercive apparatuses.  
 The country’s institutional landscape changed drastically a decade into the 
Mandate as British colonial administrators and Iraqi elites assembled the emergent state. 
By 1930, Iraq was equipped with fifteen governmental ministries and departments 
governing all aspects of the public sector and public works.290 The drafting of a national 
constitution in the form of an “organic law” was a critical component of the statebuilding 
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process that defined the administrative and institutional capacity of the state. This top-
down exclusionary process was devised by British administrators and the General 
Assembly with the aid of a select few Sunni Arab ruling elites and lacked broad-based 
indigenous support in the form of negotiations between the state, citizens, and Iraq’s 
diverse ethno-religious elites.291 Article III of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 mandated 
the creation of the “Organic Law” as a mechanism for inculcating a semblance of 
legitimacy and democratic and liberal ideals that would define the structural and political 
organization of the state. 292  The constitution proclaimed the state a hereditary 
constitutional monarchy with a representative government, delineated the functions of the 
Crown, the legislature and the ministers, established the country’s courts and judicial 
branch, and regulated the country’s financial and administrative duties.293 Politically, the 
new state was a bicameral parliamentary democracy with executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government. Although a semblance of separation of powers and a 
system of checks and balance was maintained, the King exercised supremacy and 
executive authority over parliament and the assemblies through a royal irada (decree) and 
in the powers allotted to him through the selection of the prime minister, cabinet, and 
ministerial appointments structured as following,294 
Figure 9: Governing Structure of Iraq’s first Parliament  
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The prime minister and council of ministers (not exceeding nine and no less than six and 
could serve in either the senate or the chamber of deputies) were appointed by the King to 
serve as his advisors and regulated the functions of state ministries. The senate, not 
exceeding twenty members and serving a maximum eight year-term, were directly 
appointed by the King and served alongside the chamber of deputies (directly elected by 
eligible voters to serve a four-year term) and were tasked with conducting and regulating 
the legislative affairs of parliament. The chamber of deputies, the only directly elected 
body in parliament, representing 1/20,000 males, served four-sessions terms. Laws were 
passed by both assemblies of parliament and ratified by the King.295 
 In terms of ethnic representation, the new constitution allotted group-based rights 
and entitlements for religious and sectarian communities. Article 16 permitted the right of 
Iraq’s Jewish and Christian communities to establish communal and linguistic schools and 
Article 69 divided the judiciary into three separate branches: civil courts (addressed civil 
and criminal proceedings of all Iraqis), religious courts (Shari’a- concerning matters 
pertaining to the Shi’i and Sunni communities), and special courts of the Spiritual 
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Councils of Iraq’s Jewish and Christian communities.296 Similarly, Articles 78 and 79 
permitted the formation of Jewish and Christian Spiritual Councils and Article 112 
facilitated the creation of Administrative Councils in the given provinces.297 Although the 
constitution failed to define groups along ethnic lines, religious and sectarian concessions 
were constitutionally entrenched as mechanisms for consolidating the country’s social 
divisions with the state’s governing structures and institutions while also incorporating 
the rights and privileges enjoyed by Iraq’s ethno-religious communities under Ottoman 
control.  
While the country’s institutional configuration reflected the nuanced changes that 
were taking place within the evolving state, the continuation of some Ottoman structures 
and institutions were discernible as the country’s institutional transformation oscillated 
between institutional conversion (reorganizing old institutions to serve new purposes that 
are attached to old structures) and layering (new conditions attached to existing 
institutions for the purpose of slowly altering their status and structure)298 that served to 
coalesce the former Ottoman provinces into a territorially-centralized independent state 
by 1932. This was echoed in Article 113 Iraq’s first constitutional document, which 
stipulated that, 
Ottoman Laws published before the 5th November, 1914, and laws published on or after that date 
and which have remained in force in ‘Iraq up to the time of the publication of this law, shall remain 
in force in ‘Iraq so far as circumstances permit, subject to any modification or repeal in conformity 
with the proclamations, regulations and laws referred to in the following article, and until the year 
altered or repealed by the legislative power, or the High Courts issues a decision rendering them 
null and void in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.299 
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Similarly, Article 114 safeguarded all laws promulgated by Britain’s administrators from 
November 5 1914 until the signing of the constitution in 1925.300 This was also reflected 
in the continued administration of the three major provinces based on the Ottoman Vilayet 
(provincial) Law of 1864 and the continuation of the land tenure system through tapus or 
title deeds introduced in 1858, which effectively introduced private land ownership.301 
The latter was served a dual purpose: to consolidate and strengthen Ottoman 
administration, while, simultaneously, minimize the power of tribal sheikhs in the 
countryside.302 Additionally, although the British occupation brought a temporary halt to 
provincial elections that were conducted under Ottoman rule, they were reintroduced in 
1921.303 New institutions were designed to serve new ends. For instance, the British-
created Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulation provided rural tribal sheikhs 
autonomous powers in administering their affairs such as settling disputes and collecting 
taxes.304 This incremental transformation of Iraq’s institutional landscape both shaped and 
defined the political composition of the new state.  
Paradoxically, it is during this contentious beginning that we see the emergence of 
exclusionary and authoritarian governance. Although the constitution defined the 
institutional composition of the state, it also enshrined authoritarianism as reflected in the 
executive powers allotted to the King over the electorate in numerous ways. First, the 
broad and pervasive constitutional powers assigned to the King and the executive branch 
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left little room for the bona fide institutionalization of a system of checks and balances 
and a separation of powers. While Article 26 allotted vast executive powers to the 
monarchy relating to holding elections for the chamber of deputies and the functions of 
parliament (including confirming laws, opening, adjourning, and dissolving parliament 
and the chamber of deputies), Article 27 gave the King a royal irada or decree, which 
effectively enabled him to exercise an executive veto over parliament and the 
legislature. 305  Similarly, Article 28 proclaimed that “Legislative power is vested in 
parliament and the King. Parliament is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies.”306  Whereas the senate, council of ministers, and prime minister were all 
appointed by the King, the chamber of deputies was the only elected body in parliament, 
which also required confirmation by the King. Second, the institutionalization of a Sunni-
Arab hereditary monarchy with vast constitutional powers that severely limited both the 
electoral process and democratic governance further cemented this minority community’s 
dominance of the nascent state and governing institutions from the Ottoman 
administration. As will be demonstrated, this trend would only be reversed with the 
toppling of the Ba‘th party in 2003. 
Configuring a ‘Nation’-State  
 
Statebuilding under Mandatory Iraq oscillated between configuring the state’s governing 
structures and institutions on the one hand and the orientation of a fragmented society to 
accept the emergent political order and power dynamics, on the other. Further, the 
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reintegration of predominantly Sunni-Arab Ottoman-trained Sharifian military officers 
into the governing structures of the state played a pivotal role in reproducing and 
sustaining Ottoman ruling elites.307 Moreover, this initial exogenous statebuilding period 
was predicated on the manipulation of local identities and elites in order to ensure both 
the creation and survival of the nascent Iraqi state. The latter occurred simultaneously with 
the creation of new institutions to structure and accommodate the newly established 
parliamentary monarchy. However, the manufacturing of a “nation-state”—“a political-
institutional approach that attempts to match the political boundaries of the state with the 
presumed cultural boundaries of the nation, or vice versa,” instead of the formation of a 
“state-nation” by devising a “political-institutional approach that respects and protects 
multiple but complementary sociocultural identities”308 both delegitimized the state that 
emerged and resulted in the absence of a binding national civic identity predicated on 
common bonds of citizenship. This produced two outcomes. First, the types of 
institutional and structural restraints shaped the types of resistance that emerged against 
the state, particularly under the monarchical and subsequent republican periods. Second, 
these early governing problems stemming from the inability of the state to consolidate, 
integrate, and reconcile its diverse ethno-religious groups as well as the country’s rural 
populations cemented Sunni Arab rule for decades to come. In essence, early statebuilding 
in Iraq institutionalized and coagulated the rule of a few over the many.  
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Likewise, the entrenchment of exclusion during period of colonial statebuilding 
set the institutional path by which successive ruling elites defined the parameters of 
inclusion and exclusion of ethnic groups from the emergent political arena post-
independence. In sum, the British Mandate in Iraq sought to both consolidate and solidify 
the nascent state’s territorial and institutional composition as well as its geopolitical and 
socio-economic position in a developing regional state system. The arbitrary demarcation 
of new states meant their territorial composition was not always reflective of their 
heterogonous populations. Rather, the territorial boundaries were, and continue to be, 
reflective of a heterogeneous mixture of ethnic and religious populations residing in 
contiguous nation-states. As an artificially and externally created state, Iraq exemplified 
a fractured nation with competing ethnic and religious groups seeking to consolidate 
divergent, and at times, mutually exclusive socio-economic and political objectives.309 
Britain’s mandatory responsibilities as noted in the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(PMC) was never the, 
Attainment of an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability as a necessary condition 
either of the termination of the Mandatory regime or of the admission of Iraq to membership of the 
League of Nations. Nor has it been their conception that Iraq should from the first be able to 
challenge comparison with the most highly developed and civilized nations of the modern 
world.310 
 
The resulting state was a concoction of shifting ideologies and boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion defined and manufactured by a state with “a multiplicity of shifting 
groupings and forces that had conflicting interests and sentiments, but that were speaking 
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the language of patriotism, the nation, and representation and constitutions, albeit in the 
context of vague and shifting spheres of reference.” 311  Moreover, although the 
institutional design of the colonial state mirrored that of its Western European counterpart, 
the transplantation of Western models of statehood to states in the Middle East resulted in 
a “political field,” characterized by, and discursively framed in Western notions of modern 
forms of organization, administration and rule permeated by structural and institutional 
transformations of the newly established territories, without them being Western states.312  
These early institutional constraints also shaped the type of resistance that emerged 
against the state. The Mandatory period, I argue, produced three outcomes: first, it defined 
the state’s institutional setup; second, exclusion cemented the trajectory of ethnic discord 
as groups mobilized to respond to the state; third, the path dependent nature of this early 
institutional setup that favoured one group over others and the inability of the state to 
consolidate the demands of its fragments shaped successive institutions and governing 
patterns. Actors and elites altered institutions to serve emerging ideologies and regimes 
particularly under the Ba’thist era where institutions were transformed to serve new 
exclusionary and authoritarian ends. These historical legacies of Iraq’s colonial 
experience provide a crucial explanatory variable for conceptualizing the emergence of 
authoritarianism and exclusion and their impact on ethnic mobilization. As succinctly 
noted by Sluglett, the limitations of governing Iraq under the monarchy and beyond can 
be traced to mechanisms and institutional choices made under the Mandate.313 In order to 
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map the legacies of these causal mechanisms, it is instructive to explore why the country’s 
institutions under the monarchical era reproduced exclusionary governing structures that 
became ineffective at consolidating a social contract between the King and his people.  
Governance Post-Independence: Institutions, Elites, and the Army 
Consolidating a Divided State 
 
Iraq’s independence was formalized in October 1932 following its recommendation into 
the League of Nations resulting from the 1930 treat with Great Britain. 314  The 
circumstances leading to its independence were a product of a shift in the international 
order following WWI and Wilson’s Fourteen Points emphasizing and legitimizing state 
sovereignty based on the formation of nation-states within the global community of 
states315 and Britain’s expedient attempt at relieving itself of its financial obligations to a 
costly statebuilding project in Iraq.316 At the time of independence, Iraq was a deeply 
divided society exhibiting segmental cleavages along ethnic and sectarian lines between 
the country’s Sunni and Shi’i Arabs as well non-Arab minority groups such as Kurds, 
Assyrians, Yazidis and a strong rural/urban divide all of which resulted in their lack of 
incorporation within the governing structures of the nascent state. 317  Failed British 
promises to the Assyrians, Turkmen, Kurds and Yazidis at the time of independence 
cemented their reservations about the emergent state.318 A stipulation presented by the 
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League, of which Iraq promised to uphold, was the protection of minorities following 
independence.319 Thus, territorial consolidation did not follow national conciliation as 
state institutions continued to be the exclusive domain of ruling elites. Complicating 
matters was the ethno-religious breakdown of the country according to the first national 





Table 4: National Ethnic Distribution, 1947     
Ethnic Group Total Percentage of the population 
Arab Shi’i  
Arab Sunni 
Kurd Sunni 
Persian Shi’i  
Turkmen Sunni 
Turkmen Shi’i  
Kurd (Fayli-Shi’i) 
Assyrian and Armenian Christians 
Jews 













Source: Hanna Batatu (1978), 40.  
 
As will be demonstrated, the modes and processes of exclusion that emerged since 
independence in 1932 following exogenous statebuilding from 1920-1932 were 
symptomatic of the statebuilding schema adopted under the Mandate period particularly 
the institutionalization of Sunni-Arab minority rule over an ethnically and religiously 
																																																								




diverse society. The lack of accommodation of non-Sunni Arabs did not diverge greatly 
under the monarchy from the Mandate era. Rather, institutions devised prior to 
independence became instruments for cementing exclusionary governance under the 
monarchical era as Sunni-Arab ruling elites sought to maintain the pre-independence 
status quo allotted to them by British colonial administrators.  
Institutions and Authoritarianism under the Monarchy 
 
From the onset, the parliament and cabinet defined the institutional composition of the 
state. Parliament was chosen as an alternative to direct rule following a treaty with King 
Faysal. 320  However, confounding this institutional design was limitation placed on 
parliamentary and cabinet powers by the executive veto power allotted to the King through 
a royal irada (decree) in Article 27 of the 1925 constitution. The inclusion of a clause that 
limited the power of the only elected branch, the Chamber of Deputies, was purposive of 
institutionalizing and securing colonial control of the government, as noted by Henry 
Dobbs, the High Commissioner, 
In light of experience of other Oriental Assemblies, there is to my mind real danger that an 
irresponsible extremist majority may in early stages of Self-Government seek to paralyse state 
activities by refusing supplies for essential services…It is therefore essential to have provision for 
enabling the Executive to carry on.321 
 
Agitation to the 1930 treaty with Great Britain defined the nature and purpose of 
opposition both prior to and following Iraq’s independence in 1932. The institutional 
limitations of the monarchy were reflected in the exclusionary and constricted nature by 
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which they were created under the Mandate resulting in a large rural-urban divide and 
lower urban classes exacerbated by the coagulation of urban Sunni-Arab rule over the 
state.322  The institutionalization of exclusionary politics at the time of independence 
resulted in the production and maintenance of authoritarian governance as “key state 
institutions became instruments in the hands of powerful individuals and their followings, 
encouraging factionalism among officials and throwing into question the nature of their 
royalties.”323 Thus, institutions, as with ideology, became the exclusionary instrument by 
which elites attempted to politically consolidate the nascent state.  
 The inability of ruling elites to incorporate contending groups through a social 
contract became reflected in Iraq’s developmental trajectory. The ex-sharifian officers—
predominantly Sunni-Arabs from Baghdad and the northern part of the country who had 
served as officers in the Ottoman army monopolized premiership appointments between 
1921-1958.324 The lack of adequate representation and incorporation of Iraq’s minorities 
and the Shi’i majority within governing institutions led to the reproduction of exclusionary 
patterns under the Mandate.325 This is best evidenced by the ethnic representation in 
ministerial and cabinet positions. Although Shi’is comprised 51.4 percent of the total 
population as of the 1947 census, they remained underrepresented in ministerial positions 
during the monarchical years between 1921-1958, as demonstrated in Table 5 below: 
Table 5: Distribution of Shi’is in Ministerial Positions under the Monarchy  
 
Years Total Appointments Shi’is Appointments Percentage 
1921-1932 113 20 17.7 
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1932-1936 57 9 15.8 
1936-1941 65 18 27.7 
1941-1946 89 25 28.1 
1947-1958 251 87 34.7 
Total 575 159 27.7 
Source: Adapted from Batatu (1978), 47. 
 
This pattern is also observed in the disproportionate representation of Sunni-Arab in 
premiership positions from the Mandate until the fall of the monarchy. Of the twenty-
three premiers that were appointed between 1921-1958, 19 were Sunni-Arab (4 of which 
were Arabized-Kurds) and 4 Shi’i.326 Further, the communal breakdown of cabinets posts 
held between 1920-1936 further reinforces Sunni-Arab control of the state. Out of 59 
cabinet posts, 14 were Shi’is, 2 Christians, 1 Jew, and the remainder 42 posts were allotted 
to Sunni-Arabs. 327  It is imperative to note the disproportionate representation of 
appointees from Baghdad and city-notables of professional and military backgrounds in 
the aforementioned institutions.328  
Complicating this governing trend was the commandeering of the institutional 
landscape by a few select ruling elites. This is reflected in the duration of elected officials 
under the monarchy. Between 1930-1958, Iraq transitioned between forty-eight cabinets 
averaging five and a half months, where fifty-percent of cabinet ministers and portfolios 
were rotated between fourteen prominent, mostly Sunni-Arab ruling elites.329 Two men 
held twenty-one out of the forty-eight PM positions: Nur al Sa‘id, fourteen times, and 
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Jamil al Midfa‘i, seven times, both Sunni-Arabs.330  These trends reveal two critical 
assumptions in the state’s governing patterns. First, they reflect elite cooptation of the 
state’s institutional and structural landscape in order to maintain the Sunni-Arab and urban 
governing status quo. Second, and as a result of the first, diverging from this exclusionary 
governing pattern became more difficult as institutions were influenced by the socio-
political dynamics of the monarchical era. Thus, the cost of switching to a more inclusive 
and representative government became increasingly difficult as elites viewed switching to 
more conciliatory alternatives a zero-sum game that would only produce on set of ethnic 
winners and losers.  
The inadequate representation of Shi’is trickled down to provincial and district 
officers as noted in a 1921 intelligence report that highlighted the absence of a Shi’i 
representative in the five provincial governors positions and the appointment of 1 Shi’i 
out of 9 positions for district officers.331 Moreover, although the Kurds constituted 17 
percent of the population, they held 22 percent of high-ranking government posts, while 
the majority Shi’i held 15 percent in 1930 due to the reluctance of Iraq’s Sunni rulers to 
include Shi’is in governing positions and the latter’s rejection of Sunni and British rule.332 
Of the smaller non-Arab minority communities, only Hasqayl Sasun—a Jewish financier 
who had held positions in Istanbul, was appointed as the Minister of Finance in Iraq’s 
early cabinets.333 The exclusionary nature of state institutions echoed throughout the 
monarchical era. In 1947, Iraq elected its first Shi’i Prime Minister, Salih Jabr, whose 
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tenure lasted less than one year, as was the case of his Shi’i successor, Muhammad as-
Sadr.334 Kedourie attributes Jabr’s short-lived tenure to the unfolding political processes 
stemming from the Anglo-Iraqi treaty negotiations as well as rising anti-Shi’i sentiments 
from various Sunni-political classes.335  
The fragility of early democratic institutions was a product of shifting power 
struggles between predominantly Sunni-Arab elites who sought to maintain exclusionary 
patterns of governance. Two contending institutions emerged between 1930-1958: the 
parliament and the army, both dominated by elites that vied for distinct spheres of power 
and influence. As noted by Dawisha, a key weakness of parliament was the constant 
rigging of elections coupled with the selection and approval of deputy candidates prior to 
elections. 336  This is exemplified by the 1924 Electoral Law, which underwent two 
amendments in 1946 and later in 1952, both restricting the elected house in parliament 
while allotting greater powers to the King and the executive branch. It is in the latter period 
we see an alteration in the pattern of political consolidation that effectively 
institutionalized exclusionary governance exemplified by a list of amendments proposed 
and approved by parliament. The first included an amplification of penalties against 
individuals making defamatory remarks or statements regarding the electoral process or 
the selected candidates, which the opposition and the press viewed as clear manipulation 
of the electoral process noting that the government sought to “impose a ‘barefaced’ 
dictatorship on the people and to deprive them of their constitutional right to check 
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election results.” 337  Another critical amendment was the elimination of Jewish 
representation in parliament that had been guaranteed in the Electoral Laws of 1924 and 
1946 with the abrogation of any reference to “Jew” or “Jewish” from representation in the 
Chamber of Deputies. 338  This was a consequence of wider regional developments 
following the creation of the state of Israel as the Jewish homeland in 1948 following the 
expulsion of Palestinians from Palestine. The representation of Christians in the three 
main provinces to the Chamber of Deputies was maintained in the new Electoral Law of 
1952.  
Similarly, the government’s attempted interference with civil society by way of 
the legislative and executive branches delegitimized democratic governance. For example, 
Press Ordinance No. 24 of 1945 severely restricted the free press by setting limits on 
publication content. Specifically, Article 20 prohibited the publication of any materials 
criticizing the King and the government, while Article 21 proscribed the publication of 
any content perceived to incite religious or communal hatreds or threats to public order.339 
Circumspect of rising ethnic and sectarian discontent, parliament passed the Associations 
Ordinance of 1954 that arbitrarily limited the formation of associations. In particular, 
Article 3 prohibited the formation of organizations and associations for the following 
purposes: 
a) It is not permissible to form an association whose aims are contrary to public order and 
morality, or seek to disturb public safety or to endanger the unity of the country, or to 
change the established form of Government, or to foster differences in society. 
b) It is not permissible to found a political association on either a racial or a sectarian 
basis. 
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c) It is not permissible to found an association the aims of which conform with those of 
an already existing association.340 
 
Additionally, Article 15 gave the executive branch unprecedented powers to intervene in 
civic organizations by granting the Ministry of the Interior the power to administer the 
internal affairs of civic associations and organizations; thus, severely limiting and 
delegitimizing civil society.341 The increasing threat of communism to both British and 
Iraqi officials became another justification for the restrictions placed on associations and 
civic engagement. Resistance to the 1954 Ordinance came primarily from political parties 
that viewed the law as a mechanism for suppressing the opposition within parliament— a 
position echoed by the National Democratic Party and the Independence Party in 1954.342 
The ability of the government to severely limit and abolish associations reflected the 
growing despotic power of the state, which set the path for how the Ba‘th Party infiltrated 
and essentially co-opted all civic associations under its command.  
These institutional constraints were also cultivated and shaped by competing 
ideational factors. Specifically, the crystallization of Arab nationalism and the rise of Arab 
nationalists concerned with bolstering Iraq’s institutions and its geopolitical position 
within the Arab world affected the exclusionary pattern of the state.343 Much of Iraq’s 
institutional transformation in the form of elite cabinet shuffles and parliamentary discord 
under the monarchical era reflected these antagonistic visions. Here, we observe that the 
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behaviour and ideological divides of ruling elites shaped governing outcomes as 
institutions were manipulated to serve competing interests.   
 
Elites and Ideology  
 
The interplay between elite behaviour and ideological divergence as mechanisms of social 
engineering shaped institutional choices and ethnic mobilization during this critical period. 
Two dominant yet contrasting ideologies emerged throughout the mandatory and 
monarchical eras that attempted to forge a unifying national identity, both with varying 
consequences. One the one hand, Iraqi nationalist elites advocated a unifying Iraqi identity 
that was sympathetic to the various ethno-religious groups, and supported largely by 
groups “that lay outside the traditional Sunni center of political power.”344 On the other 
end of the spectrum were army officers propagating an Arab identity and Pan-Arabism 
and who saw Iraq as an integral component of the larger Arab world.345 Competition over 
the institutionalization of the varying ideologies produced a cult of personalities who came 
to dominate Iraq’s institutional governing structures whereby the policies of government 
came to depend on the personalities of the elites and their ambitions, networks of clients, 
and associates, and modes of inclusion and exclusion from their powerbase.346 While Iraqi 
nationalism resonated with Iraq’s non-Sunni Arab groups, Pan-Arabism advocated an 
exclusionary narrative of who belonged to the state. The origins of Arab nationalist 
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ideology particularly among the ruling Sunni-Arab political elites347 can be traced to 
Ottoman schools and military academies. Sunni-Arabs were predominantly represented in 
Ottoman institutional and governing structures of Iraq as military officers and 
administrative bureaucrats—a policy which, as demonstrated in the preceding section, 
would come to define the Iraqi state until its collapse in 2003. This minority elite sought 
to mobilize the effendiyya 348  and institutionalize Arabism within Iraq’s evolving 
education system, which they perceived as “an instrument for the propagation and 
internalization of Pan-Arab nationalist ideology.”   
Marr elucidates the influence of German military training (emphasizing 
centralization and the state) and French revolutionary ideas and the emergence of Arab 
nationalism among this elite minority to the emergence of nationalist ideology among 
Ottoman trained officers and governing elites.349 The latter would come to define the 
scope and type of resistance that emerged among educated Sunni-Arab elites (ex-Ottoman 
officers) who saw Arabism as an avenue for unifying an emerging regional order based 
on a common Arab language and a shared Arab heritage.350 The institutionalization of this 
ideology reverberated in the education system where its key proponent, Sati al-Husri, 
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sought to inculcate Arabism and Arab nationalism within Iraq’s educational structures and 
institutions. Al-Husri—a Syrian Arab who had followed King Faysal to Iraq following the 
Arab revolt against the Ottomans, became Iraq’s Director of Education from 1921-1927 
and later the director of the Teacher’s Training College until 1937. For Al-Husri, Arabism 
was the solution for managing and governing a society fractionalized along ethnic and 
religious cleavages, noting that, 
Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab people. Every individual belonging to one of these 
Arabic-speaking peoples is an Arab. And if he does not recognize this, and if he is not proud of his 
Arabism, then we must look for the reasons that have made him take this stand. It may be an 
expression of ignorance; in that case we must teach him the truth. It may spring from an 
indifference or false consciousness; in that case we must enlighten him and lead him to the right 
path. It may result from extreme egoism; in that case we must limit his egoism. But under no 
circumstances, should we say: “As long as he does not wish to be an Arab, and as long as he is 
disdainful of his Arabness, then he is not an Arab.” He is an Arab regardless of his own wishes. 
Whether ignorant, indifferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without 
consciousness or feeling, and perhaps even without conscience.351 
 
Pan-Arab elites disseminated this ideology as a method for coalescing the centrifugal 
tendencies of the Shi’is and Kurds.352 Among the Shi’is, the non-sectarian nature of Arab 
nationalism was, to an extent, successful in subduing sectarian sentiments and provided 
an avenue for expressing unified Arab discontent at British imperial and colonial policy 
in Iraq.353 Arab nationalism was thus a tool for alleviating divisions in order to perpetuate 
the control of the state and its institutions by a ruling Sunni-Arab elite. However, the 
permeation of this ideology in key governing institutions had dire consequences on how 
non-Arab populations of Iraq viewed and negotiated their position in the political sphere. 
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While the institutionalization of Arabism as a unifying secular ideology that gave 
“stability and meaning to social behaviour in a society”354 played a significant role in the 
expansion and standardization of the country’s educational curriculum, particularly 
among the rural and Shi’i populations, it, nevertheless, institutionalized an exclusionary 
ideology that paved the way for the exclusion of Iraq’s non-Arab minorities, particularly 
the Kurds and Assyrians.355 The ideational factor that framed this exclusionary narrative 
of what the state was and who it belonged to would later sustain authoritarianism under 
the Ba’thist era and its reversal post-2003.  
Nevertheless, Sunni-Arab elites’ seeking to govern a divided society viewed this 
ideology as a mechanism for consolidating and unifying state-society relations, which then 
produced equally opposing forms of resistance against the state. The manipulation of 
Iraq’s emerging institutional configuration by the Sunni-Arab ruling elite created a fissure 
in the state’s governing trajectory. This augmented the control of the state in favour of an 
elite minority group who lacked the support of Iraq’s majority Shi’i-Arabs and minority 
groups such as the Kurds, Yazidis, Assyrians, and Turkoman. As noted by Guclu, the 
effects of having Iraq’s prominent national leaders who were born in the late 19th century 
and received military training in Istanbul and governed under the Mandate and the 
monarchy was that “methods and views of the military-bureaucratic elite had not changed 
since their Ottoman days.”356 Likewise, Arabism, as a dominant ideational factor among 
a small but influential group of Sunni Arabs was diametrically opposed to how Iraq’s 
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ethnic fragments, particularly the Kurds, viewed and negotiated their position within the 
state.357 This ideology would come to dominate some of the most influential governing 
institutions in Iraq including the army, parliament, bureaucracy, and civil and political 
administration until 1958. 358  This produced two interlinked outcomes. First, elites 
institutionalized this exclusionary ideology by occupying key governing structures and 
institutions. Consequently, institutional constraints cemented exclusionary governance, 
which, in turn, shaped the type of resistance that emerged from Iraq’s diverse ethno-
religious groups.  
Institutionalizing Coercion: the Army under the Monarchy 
 
Since its inception, the army and air force played a pivotal role in maintaining and 
legitimizing the coercive capacity of the Iraqi state both under the mandate and the 
monarchy. The absorption of former military officers into the rank and file of the nascent 
army and the creation of the Royal Iraqi Air Force in 1930 cemented the coercive power 
of the security sectors above all other institutions. Former Iraqi (predominantly Sunni) 
Ottoman officers who had been active in the revolt with King Faysal against the Ottomans 
were reintegrated into the national army upon its formation in 1921.359 Consequently, 
ethno-religious divisions were manifested in what would come to be the most decisive 
governing institution in Iraq, as Kurds, Shi’is and Christians remained underrepresented 
in key army positions as “the Sunni political elite, cognizant of its minority status in the 
population, was inclined to fill the ranks of the most sensitive state sector, the military-
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security establishment, with its own people.”360 Although conscription diversified the 
officer corps, Sunni-Arabs dominated the upper echelons of the army, and would continue 
to do so until the collapse of the Ba’thist regime in 2003.   
The army created a class of ruling elites and military officers who exerted 
extensive political clout over the state’s fragile institutional composition obscured by a 
highly fragmented society. In controlling and monopolizing the state’s physical coercive 
capacity, the army officers came to play an important “part in deciding the future of the 
nation.”361 Since independence, the army increased in size to 800 officers and 19,500 men 
by 1936 and to 1426 officers and 26,345 men by 1939,362 growing in total strength from 
12,000 to 43,000 between 1932-1941.363 Hashim attributes the radicalization of the army 
officers as an ideological response to national humiliation resulting from British 
domination and the latter’s cooptation of ruling elites and senior officers resulting in the 
“inability of the cabinets to maintain domestic stability.”364 Further, “Iraq’s complex 
political and social situation and weak state institutions provided fertile soil for 
conspiratorial politics on the party of the military.”365 The consolidation of the three 
Ottoman provinces and the centralization of their administration around Baghdad 
reinforced the necessity of the army as the institutional apparatus by which the nascent 
state can be governed and unified.366 Heller cogently attributes three purposes for the Iraqi 
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army: to replace Britain as an enforcement agency and unify the new state; to satisfy 
nationalists’ demands for bolstering Iraq’s independence and sovereignty (through the 
army); and lastly, to provide an employment base for discontent and unemployed ex-
Turkish officers (within the ranks of the new army).367 Early ethnic tensions rested with 
the reluctance of non-Sunni Arabs, particularly the Kurds and Shi’is to join the army 
fuelled by their stance against conscription which bolstered the Sunni-Arab character of 
the army’s officer corps.368 Accordingly, the reintegration of ex-Turkish and ex-Sharifian 
officers into the national army resulted in the over-representation of Sunni-Arabs over 
Shi’is, Kurds, and Christians within its upper echelons.369   
The durability and authoritarian nature of the most coercive apparatus of the state 
would come to define its response to Iraq’s fragmented society. The first act of the 
independent army was the massacre of unarmed Assyrian Christian civilians in the 
northern town of Semele. The Assyrians had replaced the Arab and Kurdish Gendarmerie 
corps of 1920 and proved a formidable fighting force for maintaining order in the 
emergent state. Rising anti-British sentiments as a result of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 
coupled with the country’s growing nationalist fervour and unresolved territorial 
settlement of some of the Assyrians in the northern provinces made this small minority a 
scapegoat for the crystallization of the army and the growing power of the officer corps.370 
In August of 1933, while King Faysal was in Geneva on medical leave, the Iraqi Army 
led by General Bakr Sidqi (an Arabized Kurd), and under the auspices of Hikmat 
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Sulaymann (Minister of Interior), Jalal Baban (Minister of Defence, also of Kurdish 
origin), Subih Majib (Director-General of Police),371 and Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-
Gaylani (Arab nationalist and sympathetic to Hilter and fascism) led a campaign against 
unarmed Assyrians, which resulted in the massacre of Assyrians villagers and the 
destruction of their villages and towns followed by the looting of their possessions by 
Kurdish tribesmen.372 As a result of the army’s propaganda campaign, the massacre was 
applauded throughout Iraq and Sidqi was celebrated as a national hero. A visit to the site 
of the massacre by the Minister of Interior, Hikmat Sulaymann resulted in a decision to 
“conceal from the world the truth” of what had ensued during the first two weeks of 
August 1933.373 As discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, Sidqi, an Iraqi nationalist, 
subsequently initiated the 1936 coup against the monarchy and was later killed in a counter 
coup by a group of Sunni Arabs driven by pan-Arab nationalism as a solution to governing 
Iraq as a divided society.374 
The event and the actions of the army were legitimized to the Iraqi public by 
dubious claims that it had preemptively suppressed an Assyrian rebellion in the northern 
region.375 In reality, the event was used as a propaganda tool to bolster the position of the 
army, as concisely noted by Eric Davis, “What the Assyrians (and much of the world) 
viewed as a bloodbath, urban Iraqis, especially Sunni Arabs, saw as a triumph for Iraqi 
political unity. For the Kurds, the repression of the Assyrians eliminated a traditional 
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enemy.”376 A few points are worth noting regarding the significance of this event in the 
causal chain of Iraq’s political development and its effect on ethnic groups. First, it 
illuminated and epitomized critical issues facing Iraq at the time of independence 
regarding “the nation-state’s territorial integrity, British colonial rule, the army’s efficacy, 
and the allegiances of minorities.”377 Second, it cemented the coercive capacity of the 
army as “force to be reckoned with.”378  As succinctly noted by Marr, the Assyrian 
massacre “brought the army into national prominence for the first time and showed its 
future political potential. The affair elevated Bakr Sidqi to the position of a national hero. 
Offers to serve in the army now poured in from tribesmen and Kurds, enabling the passage 
of a conscription bill. This legislation strengthened the military and the nationalists.”379 
Thus, the crystallization of the army as a formidable institutional force at this critical 
period of state formation defined how successive leaders would deal with minorities and 
political dissidence. The strength of the army not only set the stage for successive military 
coups under the monarchy, but also set the trajectory of the rise of the military state under 
Ba‘thist rule.   
 The centrality of the army and its effect on Iraq’s governing capacity made it a key 
mechanism for sustaining exclusionary and authoritarian governance. This is best 
observed by a succession of three military coups beginning in 1936 until the fall of 
monarchy in 1958. In 1936, General Baki Sidqi mounted an assault against the 
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government of the young King Ghazi led mostly by Iraqi Kurds and Shi’is for the purpose 
of eliminating Yasin al-Hashimi’s government whose authoritarian and Arab nationalist 
sentiments resulted in the institutionalization of compulsory military education, 
suppressed the tribes and potential provincial revolt, abolished newspapers critical of his 
government, and prevented public protests in Baghdad.380 As succinctly noted by Marr, 
for army officers influenced by the rising authoritarian governments in Europe 
(particularly Germany and Italy), a “monolithic form of government seemed to offer a 
more effective means of unifying fragmented countries and modernizing backward 
societies than did constitutional democracy and the free enterprise system.”381  Sidqi 
succeeded in mounting the coup and overthrowing al-Hashimi, who was expediently and 
with the support of the King replaced by Sulaymann.382 Sidqi would later be eliminated 
in 1937 by army officers who were dissatisfied with his antagonism toward Pan-Arabism 
and who sought to weaken the Iraqi-nationalist Sulaymman government. Following 
Sidqi’s assassination, seven senior Pan-Arabist army officers (all Sunni Arab by origin) 
not only caused the collapse of Sulaymann’s government, but also cemented the 
ascendancy of the army as a key player in Iraqi politics. Sharing a pan-Arab view of Iraq’s 
identity, and in seeking to maintain closer ties with regional Arab allies, the group of seven 
officers intervened in the electoral process by approving the election of cabinet members 
and intervening in the affairs of parliament if policy issues contravened their ideological 
ambitions for governing Iraq.383  
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The permeation of ideational factors such as pan-Arabism, rising anti-British 
sentiments, the ensuing Palestinian problem, and the intrusion of the army in politics and 
the administration of the state set the stage for the 1941 coup.384 The coup was led by 
Rashid ‘Ali al-Kailani whose pro-axis and fascist tendencies and support for Hitler pinned 
him against the pro-British government of Nuri al-Sa‘id. British intervention in Iraq 
through the King and Nuri in an attempt to subvert all pro-axis elements fuelled anti-
British and, by extension, anti-monarchy sentiments held by Arab nationalists like Kailani 
and some of the aforementioned seven officers who mounted the assault on Sidqi. As 
noted by Tripp, this coup was significant as it attempted to overthrow the entire institution 
of the monarchy rather than replace one prime minister with another, as had been the case 
with the 1936 coup.385 The brief, albeit, momentous al-Kailani government was forcefully 
removed by direct British military intervention, which would later sow the seeds of 
discontent among young military officers who perceived this intervention as the 
continuation of imperial and colonial domination of Iraq and its sovereignty.    
The fragility of Iraq’s institutional configuration under the Mandate was reflected 
in the inability of ruling elites to govern Iraq under the monarchy, which culminated in its 
collapse following the 1958 coup. As a result of both the 1936 and 1941 coups, the 
monarchy, through the re-election of Nuri al-Sa‘id and his Constitutional Union Party in 
1954 instituted policies that would not only fuel the events of 1958 but that also set the 
foundation for authoritarian governance. The coups also produced diametrically opposite 
responses from the state as monarchical elites sought to centralize and maintain their grip 
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on power in response to threats to their stability. Between1954-1958, Nuri’s government 
banned and disbanded all political parties, societies, and clubs in an effort to consolidate 
power and minimize dissonance, it revoked the license of an estimated 130 newspapers 
and magazines in Baghdad, twenty in Mosul, seven in Basra, and thirteen others 
throughout Iraq.386 As noted by Dawisha,  
From now until the end of the monarchical era, the state under the stern supervision of Nuri, the 
Regent, and the other members of the ruling elite would intrude in all societal matters with next to 
no regard for civil liberties and political representation. Any democratic pretense had by now 
completely disappeared. The stringent control of the electoral process remained utterly unchecked 
throughout the last fours years of the monarchy’s life.387 
 
Thus, a combination of factors rooted in the growing dissatisfaction with the monarchy 
and its authoritarian governance during its last decade, the rise of pan-Arab sentiments as 
a regional trend particularly following the Suez Crisis, and the subsequent rise of the Iraqi 
Free Officers—a heterogeneous group comprising mostly, though not exclusively, of 
Sunni Arab officers who had graduated from the Iraqi Military Academy in the 1930s who 
were bound by their disdain for the status quo and imperialism, all culminated in the 
toppling of the monarchy and the emergence of the Iraqi republic on July 14 1958.388 
Effectively, these coups congealed the position of the army and military as the 
centre of power in society by transforming the pattern of governance under the 
monarchical and Ba‘thist eras. The permeation of the military in government cemented 
the despotic power of the state and its ability to consolidate this ethnically fragmented 
society. Increasing nationalist and anti-British sentiments from the officer corps combined 
with the amplification of the army’s force and size propelled officers to seek Pan-Arab 
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regional unification. Above all, the institutional transformation of the state from a 
constitutional monarchy following 1958 influenced how the newly established republic 
consolidated power and dealt with its increasingly divided society. One factor remained 
unchanged—the pervasiveness of the military and the army as a proprietor of the state 
would continue to define its governing trajectory from 1958-2003 alongside the 
dominance of the Sunni-Arab minority in governing the state.  
Here we observe that exclusionary early institutional design combined with the 
influence of ideational factors such as Arab nationalism most notably among Sunni-Arab 
elites, as well as the growing power of the army in governing the state manipulated the 
dynamics of control as elites imposed and normalized these strategies within the state’s 
institutions. The presence and effects of these mechanisms framed much of the ethnic 
resistance that emerged against the state in the monarchical era, most notably among 
Kurds and other minorities.389  
Ethnic Reponses to the Emergent State  
 
The institutional constraints imposed during the state formation and statebuilding period 
produced various responses from groups excluded from the centres of power. Early on, 
questions emerged regarding the purpose and scope of Iraq’s nascent institutional 
configuration. In many ways, the Mandatory period, from 1920-1932, defined and 
solidified the structural and institutional configuration of the state that emerged in 1932 
by providing the institutional opportunity structure by which future ruling elites came to 
govern the state. Issues relating to the institutional incorporation of Iraq’s various ethno-
																																																								




religious groups defined much of the country’s political unrest in its prelude to 
independence. The lack of institutional incorporation stemming from early institutional 
constraints generated two outcomes. First, it produced equally opposing responses to 
Sunni-Arab domination of the state. Second, this period fostered the emergence of 
authoritarian governance as ruling elites sought to maintain this governing pattern at the 
expensive of more inclusive and accommodative approaches rooted in the integration of 
non-Sunni Arab ethnic elites.     
Shortly prior to independence, King Faysal lamented about the permeation of tribal, 
ethnic and sectarian divisions among the Sunni, Shi’i, Kurds, and non-Muslim 
communities in a letter dated August 15 1932.390 While the state attempted to consolidate 
its newly established sovereignty, group grievances posed a cumbersome dilemma for 
governing and consolidating the state.  In a petition addressed to the League of Nations in 
1932 by an organization called the Executive Committee of the Shia of Iraq listed the 
following demands: 
1. That the Shias should be given a fair share in the direction of the affairs of State and in 
the distribution of Government appointments; 
2. That a reasonable share of Government allocations for such purposes as improved 
communications and public health facilities should be allotted to the Shia provinces; 
3. That the proportion of Shia to Sunni among students sent abroad to complete their 
education at Government expense should correspond to the proportion of Shia to Sunni 
in the population as a whole; 
4. That the Shia farmer should be fairly treated in the distribution of lands.391 
 
																																																								
390 ʻAbd al-Razzāq Ḥasanī, Tārikh al-ʻIrāq al-Siyāsī al-Hadīth (A Political History of Modern Iraq) Vol. 1 
(Beirut), 9. 





Similarly, the Assyrians and Yazidis tabled a petition to the League of Nations shortly 
prior to Iraq’s independence requesting assurance and protection as minorities in 
independent Iraq. 392  The concerns of minority groups regarding their security and 
representation within the emergent state’s institutions became a major topic of debate both 
for Iraqi and British officials one year prior to Iraq’s independence. These issues were 
rightly accentuated by the aforementioned demands from the Assyrians and Yazidis but 
most notably from the country’s largest non-Arab ethnic group, the Kurds. Although 
various Iraqi cabinets included Kurdish deputies such as Jamil Baban, Hazim Beg, and 
Sa‘id Qazzaz, Kurdish demands for greater political, territorial, and cultural and linguistic 
rights remained largely unfulfilled prior to independence resulting in Kurdish protests to 
the League of Nations.393 Consequently, threats of rebellion by Kurdish leader Shaykh 
Mahmud and growing Kurdish demands for autonomy and separation from Baghdad 
posed critical challenges to the consolidation of the territorial, political, and institutional 
configuration of the new state.394 Moreover, the ethnic fractionalization of Iraq’s political 
arena stemming from the disinclination of ruling elites to cast a wider net by creating a 
more representative government determined how non-Arab Sunni groups perceived and 
negotiated their position vis-à-vis the state. Other pervasive issues that dominated the 
Mandate and Ottoman Iraq echoed throughout the monarchical era.  
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The issue of majority versus minority politics intensified ethnic responses to early 
institutional choices. Although Britain’s statebuilding project for Iraq was rooted in an 
attempt to create a functioning parliamentary democracy created in its own image to serve 
as a regional model, the institutional exclusion of key components of society including 
minority groups as well as the country’s majority Shi’is dominated the monarchical era. 
The consequence of this was that considering “their minority position, in economic and 
sectarian terms, as well as their authoritarian inclinations, this was not a promising basis 
for the national integration that was in theory intended to accompany the construction of 
the modern state.”395 Similarly, although the constitution engendered liberal-democratic 
ideals, it also posed critical constraints to democratic governance due to the broad and 
almost unhindered powers allotted to the King and the executive branch. Other 
institutional impediments resulting from a deep rural-urban divide and rigid electoral rules 
that stipulated that only income-earning and tax-paying males were eligible to vote further 
excluded large segments of the population from political participation.396 The outcome 
was the emergence of political parties that either supported or opposed the country’s 
constitution. Perhaps the most controversial legal instrument was Iraq’s treaty with Great 
Britain. Early on, grievances emerged among the Shi’i who perceived the treaty and the 
constitutional arrangements as an instrument of cementing Sunni domination over the new 
state.397 While the treaty effectively defined the relationship between the two states, it also 
limited the state’s governing capacity as it made the latter tied to Britain’s tutelage both 
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under the Mandate and after its independence. At its core, the treaty constituted an 
asymmetrical governing arrangement between the colonized and the colonial power.  
The Shi’i boycott of the treaty and the elections to the Constituent Assembly 
through a religious fatwa (legal judgement) in 1922 and the subsequent exile of the Shi’i 
‘ulama’ (religious scholars) in 1923 shaped ethnic relations in the 1920s. 398  While 
acquiescing to the new political order, the formation of the Shi’i political party al-Nahda 
(Awakening) nonetheless reflected that community’s discontent with the restrictive terms 
of the treaty and its preference for a Sunni government at the expense of the majority 
Shi‘is population.399 Moreover, intelligence reports also pointed to the formation of an 
anti-Sunni fringe party, Hisb ‘Al Taifi’ linked to the al-Nahda party comprising mostly of 
Shi’i sheikhs from lower-Tigris.400 These developments point to the inability of Iraq’s 
state institutions to accommodate and incorporate the country’s largest segment into its 
governing structures, which resulted in the intensification of sectarian sentiments among 
the country’s Shi’i population.401 Three classes of oppositional Shi‘i groups surfaced: the 
ulama, the sheikhs (tribal leaders), and the townspeople402 with the following set of 
grievances stemming from their dissatisfaction of institutional constraints:  
a) Non-representation in government and administration. 
b) Subjection of Shias to Sunni Shar’a courts in places where Shar’a courts for Shiahs do not 
exist. 
c) Teaching of Sunni doctrine to Shiah children in schools. 
d) The failing financial stability of Awqaf in spite of its large income from Shiah sources. 
e) Bribery and corruption amongst Sunni officials. 
f) Favouritism by high government officials in filling posts. 
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g) Partiality shown by the government in the closing of the Nahadha newspaper while allowing 
the Istiklal to continue. Also the killing of the circulation of the Nahadha by using the influence 
of officials of the administration.  
h) Land-grabbing by persons in office.403  
 
These objections produced four demands from prominent Shi’i religious and political 
figures404—namely, the distribution of half of ministerial and cabinet portfolios to Shi’is 
the rest to Arab Sunnis, Christians and Jews; equality in appointing officials; new elections 
free from government interference; and no conscription.405  
Fuelling sectarian discord was the association of Shi’i agitation and resistance with 
anti-Sunni propaganda. The lack of political incorporation and representation of Shi’is 
prompted their marginalization from key negotiations in the first couple of years of the 
Mandate, which defined their position within the newly established state. Prominent Iraqi 
historians such as ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani (a Shi’i Arab and Iraqi nationalist) noted the 
perils of government discrimination against the country’s Shi’i majority on forging 
national unity.406 As succinctly noted by Sluglett, “Throughout the mandate, in attempting 
to justify their frequently discriminatory policy towards the Shi’is, the Iraqi government 
argued that until Iraq became ‘independent’ the Shi’is had had no voice at all in politics, 
no separate courts and no publicly financed educational institutions.” 407  Similarly, 
Dawisha attributes three factors that limited their political incorporation—their lack of 
training and education; Shi’i disinclination from serving under a Sunni-minority 
government spearheaded by a Christian colonial power (Britain); lastly, the reluctance and 
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distain of Shi‘is by Sunni ruling elites—sentiments also espoused by Sunni-Ottoman co-
religionists.408  
The justification for the exclusion of the Shi’i majority and ethnic minorities from 
key positions and governing institutions maintained and reproduced preceding Ottoman 
exclusionary patterns of governing this highly divided society. British perceptions of 
Iraq’s sectarian divisions is captured in a dispatch by the British Ambassador to Iraq, Sir 
Henry Mack in quoting one of Britain’s most notable diplomat and spy, Gertrude Bell, 
The Sunni element in the Iraq, though small, enjoys a social and political importance 
incommensurate with its size. It consists mainly of great landowners such as the Sa’adun and the 
houses of the Naqibs of Baghdad and Basra, and of wealthy merchants inhabiting the towns and 
holding estates along the rivers. With the exception of the Sa’adun, the Sunnis of the Iraq are mostly 
town dwellers. Since the country has been under the Sunni Government of the Turks, Shiaism has 
had no political status, Shia religious bequests have not had legal recognition, nor has Shia religious 
law, which differs from that of the Sunnis, been included in the Ottoman Code. Partly it may be 
because of the unquestion-ed nature of the Sunni ascendancy, there has never been jealousy or 
bitterness between the two branches of Islam in the Iraq, and whatever changes the future may 
bring it should be the first care of the rulers of the country to preserve that fortunate condition.409 
 
While the imposition of Sunni-Arab rule in the emergent state did not resonate well with 
the country’s majority Shi’i and prominent minority groups, it also reflected deeper and 
more systematic ways in which colonial administrators intensified and manipulated ethnic 
divisions to serve imperial ends.   
Confounding the institutional administration of the state was Britain’s policy 
toward other ethno-religious communities that differed markedly depending on the extent 
in which they could fit into the socio-economic and political organization of the state. 
Iraq’s four prominent ethno-religious minorities consisted of Kurds, Assyrians, Jews, and 
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Yazidis.410 The Kurdish question continued to loom over the nascent state. Although the 
Kurds had served alongside the Arabs in Iraq’s first military force under the British-
instituted Arab and Kurdish Levy and Gendarmerie of 1920411 later abolished in 1925, the 
Kurds were never fully incorporated into the state as exemplified by their absence from 
initial cabinet and ministerial positions. Promised autonomy under Article 62 of the Treaty 
of Sèvres in 1920, later nullified under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the Kurds 
remained reticent of a centralized Arab government. 412  Subsequent demands for 
autonomy, political and territorial concessions, and a growing separatist movement meant 
that “Kurdish areas were never really integrated politically or culturally into the Iraqi 
state.”413 Thus, a combination of institutional restraints and their institutional exclusion 
as the country’s largest ethnic minority shaped Kurdish resistance throughout Iraq’s 
political history. Likewise, Assyrian Christians had replaced much of the Arab and 
Kurdish Levy corps, which caused resentment among the Kurds and Iraqi Arab 
nationalists who viewed the Assyrians as instruments of Christian and British imperial 
domination.414 The 1925 League of Nations Boundary Commission had, akin to its policy 
toward Kurdish autonomous demands, pressed for territorial autonomy for the Assyrians 
bordering the northern regions of Iraq and south-eastern Turkey.415 Petitions by Assyrian, 
Kurdish, Yazidi, and Turkmen leaders to the League of Nations requesting special 
international protection from the Arab government were made one year prior to Iraq’s 
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independence.416 Consequently, neither the Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen nor Yazidis were 
fully integrated and institutionally incorporated in the emergent state.  
Conscription became another divisive issue for various ethno-religious groups. 
Although the creation of a national army was determined early on into the Mandate, 
recruitment remained voluntary. 417  While Sunni-Arab ex-Ottoman officers viewed 
conscription as an effective policy for securing Iraq’s statehood and independence and as 
a mechanism for consolidating a divided society, its underlying value was the 
centralization of power by the ruling elites and the “determination of the centre to 
dominate the provinces needed to be backed up at least by the threat of a superior 
force.”418  However, the creation of a centralized army, headed largely by urbanized 
Sunni-Arab ex-Ottoman officers incited dissatisfaction from the country’s Shi’i tribes, 
Kurds, and Yazidis as it represented the domination of Sunni-Arabs as well as the town 
over countryside.419 For the Shi’i, talks of military conscription fuelled their grievances 
as many feared their disproportionate representation in the military.420 Further, Kurdish 
and Shi’i tribal leaders alike viewed conscription as an impetus of centralization and 
relegating the power of tribal autonomy, which permeated much of the socio-economic 
and political structure of society in the northern region where Kurds dominated and the 
Shi’i dominated south.421  As will be discussed in the proceeding sections, although 
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Parliament failed to pass a conscription bill in 1928, the army would play a pivotal role in 
statebuilding post-independence, particularly with the massacre of Assyrian Christians in 
1933 and the subsequent passing of the conscription bill in 1934.  
 
Institutional Constraints and Oppositional Political Parties  
 
Although the government attempted to limit political dissidence and opposition groups, 
various political parties emerged that contested the power of the monarchy and British 
imperialism. The parties were as much a reflection of the socio-economic and political 
dynamics of the time as they were of the personalities and elites who had formed them. 
The earliest of such parties were the Watani (Patriotic) and the al-Nahda (Awakening) 
parties created in 1922 in response to the rigid and delimiting terms of the first Anglo-
Iraqi treaty.422 However, no other party posed a greater threat both under the monarchy 
and the republic than the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).  
Gaining ground first in Basra, the ICP was formed in 1935 as the Association 
Against Imperialism and gained popularity in 1927 through its main proponent, Petros 
Vasili-an Assyrian communist intellectual.423 The ideological foundation of the Party 
drew support from Iraq’s diverse ethnic and religious groups discontent with the growing 
socio-economic disparity between ruling elites and society.424 The subsequent rise in oil 
revenues, the ascendancy of the ruling landed elites combined with growing education and 
literacy rates fuelled citizens’ dissatisfaction with the country’s poverty and wealth 
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disparity.425 The 1954 Associations Ordinance was also largely an attempt to limit the 
growing power of the communist party throughout Iraq. This growing threat prompted the 
Ministry of Interior to promulgate an ordinance denationalizing communists and “other 
subversive elements in the country.”426 
The subsequent formation of the Hizb al-Ikha al-Watani (The Patriotic 
Brotherhood Party) in 1931 was in response to Iraq’s growing economic crisis prior to 
independence in 1932.427 Similarly, both al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (the National 
Democratic Party-NDP) and the Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) emerged as 
contending forces against the government in the 1930s. Whereas the former was primarily 
concerned with Iraq’s domestic environment, the latter encompassed elites sympathetic to 
pan-Arabism and critical of parliament and British influence in Iraq and the Middle 
East.428 As an ethnic party, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was formed in 1946 by 
Kurdish intellectuals influenced by Marxism and closely allied with Shaykh Mahmud who 
sought to create a semi-autonomous Kurdish democratic state in Iraq consisting of the four 
northern provinces of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniyya, with special autonomous 
administrative and governing powers.429  
Similarly, the creation of the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Dusturi (the Constitutional Union 
Party-CUP) by Nuri al-Sa‘id in 1949 epitomized the relationship between ruling elites and 
political parties. Nuri—a contentious figure in Iraqi politics under the monarchy, founded 
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the party in order to exert greater influence in parliament and extend his system of 
patronage to his political allies. 430  Reaction to Nuri’s growing authoritarian power 
resulted in the formation of political parties to counteract this trend. This is exemplified 
by the creation of the Ba‘th (Renaissance) Party in 1949431 and United National Front in 
February 1957 consisting of the Istiqlal Party, the NDP, the ICP, and the emerging Ba‘th 
Party.432The Hizb al-Umma al-Ishtiraki (The Socialist People’s Party) and the United 
Popular Front were also formed in response to Nuri’s perennial influence in parliament 
and his attempts to alter the electoral law so as to limit the power of the opposition.433  In 
1954, four political parties won substantial seats in parliament, which, in theory, posed 
limitations on the power of the king and the executive: the CUP 54 seats, Popular Socialist 
Party 21 seats, National Front 10 seats, United Popular Front 3 seats, with 44 seats allotted 
to Independent Members.434  
We observe that political parties under the Mandate and the monarchy emerged as 
a response to the institutional constraints imposed by ruling elites and sought to 
disaggregate power from parliamentary ruling elites between 1930-1958. These 
constraints not only impeded civil society and bolstered the despotic power of the state, 
but also came to reflect a growing governing trend which viewed institutions as 
instruments of exclusion and control over the state rather than as tools for incorporating 
and co-opting Iraq’s fragments into a unifying political sphere. Further, the construction 
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of exclusionary institutions provided the modus operandi by which ruling elites 




In this chapter, I have demonstrated that expedient statebuilding under Mandatory Iraq 
failed to devise institutional mechanisms that could reconcile the divergent interests of 
Iraq’s fragments through institutionalized channels resulting in the crystallization and 
reproduction of identity politics as marginalized groups saw themselves outside the state. 
This, in turn, set the path for successive ruling elites as they reconfigured the country’s 
institutions to accommodate a narrow set of ideologies, goals, and interests. Concomitant 
with other political struggles that emerged since state formation, this path dependent 
development reproduced and locked-in exclusion and authoritarianism as mechanisms 
employed by elites to sustain their ownership of the state. Moreover, while actors and 
dynamics of reproduction have changed overtime, these zero-sum strategies adopted by 
successive actors for governing this highly divided society have remained constantly 
rooted in the deployment of these mechanisms overtime and have thus become the binding 
norms that characterize Iraq’s institutional design.  
This is observable in the fragility of democratic institutions at the time of state 
formation and subsequent statebuilding between 1920-1958. An analysis of the parliament, 
cabinet, the behaviour of ruling elites and their competing ideologies, and the growing 
role of the army in governance reflected the expedient way in which institutions were 




elites over a heterogeneous state and society. Toward the end of the monarchical era, 
British diplomats had grown circumspect of Iraq’s precarious political environment and 
their orientalising perceptions of the country noting that “it may also well be true, as many 
assert, that oriental countries are happier under strong, authoritarian government than 
under a form of parliamentary democracy which does not work.”435  
During this initial critical juncture, the state underwent ‘institutional exhaustion’ 
which culminated in the gradual breakdown of the institutional configuration created 
under the state formation and statebuilding schema of Mandatory Iraq.436 This was largely 
a consequence of the irreconcilability of governing elites that resulted in their incapacity 
to consolidate the state with its fragmented society complicated by the domination of 
Sunni-Arabs in state institutions.437 Moreover, the inability of the state and its Sunni-Arab 
elites to forge a national civic identity that could bind its fragments is symptomatic of its 
artificial creation, which lacked  
common myths of ancestral territory to rely on or common historical memories to appeal to. There 
was no single past to be reappropriate [sic] by the different groups forming Iraq’s population, nor 
a widespread yearning for collective political redemption. Each group, even when subscribing to 
the idea of an Iraqi state, retained distinct collective memories and a distinct visions of the nation’s 
collective future. This is why the process of national formation at its very beginning could hardly 
pass the litmus test of a wide-scale popular response to the appeals of a national leadership.438 
 
Juxtaposing ethnic conflict as part and parcel of this early initial institutional development 
aids in contextualizing and reconceptualising the mobilizing conditions that affected and 
dictated early modes of ethno-religious discord in Iraq. Here we find that the initial 
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institutional design created under the Mandate, which favoured the Sunni-Arab minority 
elite439 , set the path by which subsequent actors and elites reconfigured the state’s 
institutions to serve limited elite interests manifested in both the ideational and structural 
configuration of the state. As will be demonstrated in the proceeding chapter, the 
republican era characterized most infamously by Ba‘thist rule, replicated these 
















439 It is imperative to note, although Sunni-Arabs dominated the state until its collapse in 2003, this group 
was an ideologically and politically diverse most notably divided along those favouring the monarchy 







Cementing Authoritarianism: Institutions, Exclusion, and Ethnic 
Discord under B‘athist Iraq 
 
 
“Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past.”  
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four in George Orwell: the Complete Novels (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 2001).  
 
 
“In viewing and writing history we have to adopt a method which is expressive of our theory and the 
particularity of our ideology. This requirement does not arise from a personal desire to distinguish 
ourselves from prevalent political trends. It is, rather, a systematic need to define an approach to history in 
a revolutionary and scientific way. This approach will ensure an interpretation, understanding and 
presentation of events according to the required revolutionary conception and the particularity of our 
Party’s theory.” 
Saddam Hussein, “On Writing History,” On History, Heritage and Religion (Baghdad: Translation & 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981), 9. 
 
“And as the people have been used to, and as their trust set in the right place entrusting the B’ath party, 
and their son and leader Saddam Hussein, the conscience of the people was driven in to recognize what's 
best for the people, and what represents their aspirations.” 
Preamble, 1990 Interim Iraqi Constitution 
 
“Society shall confirm higher social harmony values by preventing the promotion of sectarian, racist, 
regional, or anti-Arabian approaches.” 





On the eve of July 14 1958, the Free Officers—a group of high-ranking military officers—
staged a military coup resulting in the overthrow of Iraq’s monarchy. The purpose was to 
expel and cleanse the country of what they perceived to be the last and the most influential 
bastion of British imperialism in Iraq.440 While this endogenous critical juncture between 
																																																								




1958-1968 saw an attempt by ruling elites to deviate from the increasingly authoritarian 
state under the monarchy by opening the political arena for new forms of contestation, 
emerging ruling elites replicated authoritarian patterns of governance. These precluded 
the establishment of a democratic alternative path that could “lead to the establishment of 
institutions that generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes.”441 Consequently, 
the Ba’thist capturing of the state from 1968-2003 halted any democratic opening and 
eliminated regime contestation from opposition groups, most notably, the Communists. 
The outcome was new forms of contestation from Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities 
as they attempted to negotiate their position in the emergent republic. Moreover, 
increasing institutional constraints under single-party autocratic rule culminating in 
Saddam Hussein’s usurpation of power in 1979 further cemented group grievances against 
the state.  
This chapter explains how and why the country’s institutional landscape was 
transformed during this second critical juncture and why the transformation of the political 
field produced new forms of ethnic resistance at the societal level. The emphasis on 
institutions is relevant as an institutionalist framework provides us with the “historical 
context within which the dynamics of ethnic boundary making unfolds.”442 I contend that 
the imposition of a monolithic pan-Arabist ideology as permeated by the B‘ath Party and 
its institutionalization within the state’s governing structures became mechanisms for 
controlling and governing a divided society. Maintaining this ideology required the 
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creation of institutional apparatuses that inculcated mechanisms of control and exclusion 
to proscribe ethno-sectarian attachments, unify a divided society, and centralize power to 
foster social cohesion and complacency to limit regime contestation. Thus, institutions 
during this period became increasingly embedded in the regime itself in order to fulfil the 
aforementioned goals. Moreover, the types of institutions that emerged, and the cooptation 
of preceding ones, enabled the regime to exert its power and ideology. Sustaining the 
regime’s grip on power required the deep centralization of the state’s governing 
institutions and the diffusion of the coercive machinery in order to penetrate all facets.  
By framing the processes that affected the state’s institutional transformation 
under the republic, I seek to demonstrate the proclivity of authoritarian regimes to 
replicate preceding governing patterns. The collapse of the monarchy altered the power 
dynamics among Iraq’s ruling elites. While we observe a replication of the strategies of 
exclusion and authoritarianism that marked the monarchical era, the permeation of the 
regime in society made the Ba’th party more successful in suppressing dissidence which 
fuelled resistance from ethnic groups against the state. The structural-institutional 
constraints imposed by the Party and its pan-Arabist ideology affected the strategies of 
ethnic groups in two ways. First, the rigidity and lack of independent spheres of existence 
between regime and society incentivized ethnic attachments as mobilizing markers of 
dissent. Second, ethnic elites adopted new strategies of resistance to contest the state. 
While Ba‘thist ideology was malleable and was reinterpreted according to regime 
preferences, its ideological dominance as the state’s narrative and its institutionalization 




subverted civic engagement by limiting, or, at times, obviating any sphere of existence 
outside the state and regime.  
 
Chapter Outline 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section examines the institutional and 
ideological factors and processes that resulted in the toppling of the Iraqi monarchy and 
the birth of the republic during the second critical juncture of Iraq’s political development 
between 1958-1968. The second section analyzes the institutional and ideological 
transformation of the state following the Ba’thist takeover in 1968 that culminated in 
Saddam Hussein’s usurpation of power from 1979-2003. Utilizing both material and 
ideological tools to achieve and sustain regime consolidation, we observe that state-
society relations were dictated by the regime’s penetration of the social, economic, and 
political spheres of existence as the state oscillated between totalitarian and authoritarian 
governance to maintain Sunni-Arab dominance of the state over a deeply divided society. 
The last section examines the Ba’thist state’s tactics for governing Iraq as a fragmented 
state and the ethnic responses to the regime’s exclusionary and authoritarian governance 
until the latter’s toppling in 2003. 
From Monarchy to Republic: Elites, Institutions, and the State  
Reconfiguring the New Order 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the tension between governing elites, army 
officers, and ethno-religious groups contributed to the linear progression of discord 




institutional barriers purposive of suppressing dissidence under a highly centralized 
monarchical regime, as exemplified by the Association Law, proscribed and heavily 
regulated civic engagement. Thus, institutions and their control became the impetus by 
which the ruling elite maintained their power in the nascent state. While some institutions 
were transposed to serve new goals, they also sought to abolish the main institutions of 
the monarchy and create new institutions and governing structures through official 
purges.443 In addition, the growing power of the Free Officers secured their position as 
the primary agents of the state. Emerging in the 1950s, the Free Officers were an elite 
group within the armed forces consisting primarily of Sunni-Arabs from the middle and 
lower strata of Iraqi society who would later form the future regime under the Ba’thist 
era.444  
The tumultuous trajectory of governing Iraq during the last decade of the 
monarchy made the army the primary contending institution by implementing two 
outcomes. First, to abolish what the Free Officers saw as an illegitimate monarchy and an 
extension of British imperial interests in the country and the region.  Second, to guarantee 
and safeguard Iraq’s position in an emerging unified regional order through Pan-
Arabism.445 This last ideological component played a crucial role in how an elite group 
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of primarily Sunni-Arab army officers saw the future of Iraq in a more integrated 
regionalized state system unified by a common Arab identity. Consequently, the 
imposition of an overarching identity as espoused by Pan-Arabism bolstered resistance 
from non-Arabs, particularly the Kurds against the state. Divulging the causal mechanisms 
underpinning this critical juncture requires a systematic analysis of how and why 
institutions were transformed and how ethnic groups responded to the emergent state.  
Multiple factors led to rising discontent with the Iraqi monarchy that culminated 
in the 1958 coup that resulted in its demise. The inefficacy of institutions devised under 
British aegis was reflected in the composition of cabinet and parliament. Between 1920-
1958, 177 different individuals held fifty-nine cabinets consisting of 645 positions.446 As 
the most authoritative body in the country, parliament became a playing field by which 
predominantly Sunni-Arab cabinet members and ruling elites exerted their influence. The 
violent suppression of Iraqi Communist Party leaders and opposition movements in 1948 
and 1949 also set the barometer by which successive ruling elites dealt with political 
dissidence.447 Thus, the trajectory of institutional development in the latter part of the 
monarchy produced push and pull factors that produced new forms of resistance. The 
monarchy’s lack of legitimacy affected its capacity to “penetrate society, regulate social 
relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”448 
As succinctly noted by Dawisha, the monarchy under al-Sa‘id left little to no regard for 
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“civil liberties and political representation. Any democratic pretence had by now 
completely disappeared. The stringent control of the electoral process remained utterly 
unchecked throughout the last four years of the monarchy’s life.449 Newspapers and 
magazines espousing Pan-Arabist or Marxist-communist leanings were either driven 
underground or written in exile during the last few years of the monarchy.450  
The power of the army was solidified on July 14 1958 when a prominent and 
primarily Sunni-Arab Free Officer Corp led by Brigadier ‘Abdul-Karim Qasim (the only 
leading officer with a mixed Arab, Kurd, Sunni and Shi’i lineage) and Colonel ‘Abd al-
Salam ‘Arif marched into Baghdad and succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy and 
instituted a republican system based on four justifications:  
a) The elimination of the preceding dictatorial regime and the establishment of an eternal 
Iraqi republic; 
b) To secure and foster the fully unity of Iraq; 
c)  To secure the national interests of the country through rule of law, unity, and 
cooperation; 
d) To be wary of all malicious and offensive individuals and traitors in order to maintain 
the unity of the people.451   
 
With the exception of Qasim whose mother was an Arabized Faili Kurd and father a 
Sunni-Arab and two Shi’i Arab officers, Jai Taleb and Muhsin Husain al-Habib, 9 out of 
the 12 members of the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers who led the coup were 
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Sunni-Arabs.452 The attempt to diverge from preceding governing tactics that saw the 
exclusion of Shi’is and minority groups seemed less likely considering that Sunni-Arabs 
were disproportionally represented in both the Republic’s first Commanders’ Council of 
1958, the Sovereignty Council, and Qasim’s first cabinet.453 The coup resulted in the 
purging of the ruling elites, including King Faisal II, and the brutal death and mutilations 
of the King’s regent, ‘Abd al-Ilha and the prime minister, Nuri al-Sa‘id. The linear 
digression of the monarchy, growing authoritarianism, persistent economic stagnation, an 
ineffective parliament, corruption, and violent suppression of dissidence fuelled people’s 
discontent.454  The elites of the revolution attempted to overhaul preceding governing 
structures and institutions in an effort to commence on a clean slate as exemplified by the 
following notice issued in the Iraqi Gazette: 
We would like to invite your kind attention to the fact that all the issues of “IRAQ GOVERNMENT 
GAZETTE” from No. 49 of 1955 up to 14th July, 1958, have been cancelled. Now we have the 
pleasure to put up before you the First Issue of “THE WEEKLY GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF IRAQ” after the peaceful and miraculous “REVOLUTION” of Iraq on 14th July, 1958, which 
is one of the greatest feats of present time.455  
 
To mark the abdication of the monarchical era, the Presidential Council issued Ordinance 
No. 23 of 1958 confiscating and centralizing all assets held by the “ex-dynasty” of 
Hashemite rule in Iraq.456  
The state’s institutional configuration changed to accommodate the new 
republican order. This included reinstating previously abolished laws and the creation of 
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new ones to supplant those repealed following the revolution, including a new 
constitution.457 The 1958 constitution proclaimed Iraq a republic and an integral part of 
the Arab Nation where Arabs and Kurds are “considered partners in this Nation and their 
national rights within the unity of Iraq are recognized.”458 It also guaranteed equality 
under the law and freedom from discrimination based on race, origin, language, religion 
or belief, and freedom of thought and expression.459 Other progressive laws included Law 
No. 9 that created the Interdict Reformatory Institutions for Women aimed to provide 
economic, educational, and social support for former prostitutes, and Law No. 10 for the 
Care of the Disabled Institutions promulgated measures for providing the necessary aid 
for persons with disabilities in Iraq.460 Similarly, the Personal Status Law of 1959 was 
hailed as one of the most progressive of its kind in the region in the area of women’s rights, 
marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.461 Notwithstanding nominal progress 
made during this transformative period with the aforementioned laws, we observe the 
institutionalization of an emergent authoritarian state with the centralization of power by 
the ruling elites. This is reflected in the tripartite presidential council that consisted of a 
president, prime minister, and deputy prime minister.462 By 1959, the new government 
consisted of an unelected three-member Sovereignty Council (executive branch), an 
unelected Council of Ministers (legislative branch), and 18 ministries.463 The Senate and 
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Chamber of Deputies (the only elected body in parliament) of the monarchical era were 
abolished. Other laws were aimed to bolster the socio-economic development of the new 
republic.  
These developments signified two shifts in the governing pattern of the emergent 
republic. First, abrupt changes sustained the authoritarian order through purges and the 
creation of new laws and regulations to serve the interests of the new ruling elite and their 
competing ideologies, which later also shaped intra-regime divisions under Ba’thist rule. 
Second, it coalesced the power of the armed forces in governing the state. These critical 
developments determined how Iraq’s segments perceived their position in the new 
republic and set a path dependent trend in how the B‘ath regime would later govern the 
state until its collapse in 2003. Defining and controlling the nascent republic required the 
institutionalization of authoritarian governance in order to legitimize the revolution and 
the militarization of the state by the ruling army elite.  
Emergent Authoritarianism: Laws, Regulations, and Purges 
 
The undemocratic transformation of the state from the monarchy to the republic fortified 
authoritarian rule by the army officers as the guardians of the state and the revolution. To 
mark this transformation, parliament was abolished and replaced with a sovereignty 
council, akin to an executive council, initially representative of Iraq’s three main ethnic 
groups: Muhammad Mahdi Kubba, a Shi’i, Khalid al-Naqshbandi, a Kurd, and Najib al-
Rubai’i, a Sunni Arab officer.464 Although political parties proscribed under the monarchy 
such as the National Democratic Party, the Istiqlal Party, and the B‘ath party were briefly 
																																																								




reinstated and were represented in the newly established cabinet in an attempt to 
consolidate oppositional groups465, the centralization and consolidation of power by army 
officials beginning with Qasim as the republic’s first prime minister, chief for the national 
Armed forces, and acting minister of defence, and Arif as Deputy Prime Minister, 
Assistant Commander in-chief, and acting minister of interior effectively cemented the 
role of the military in politics in Iraq for decades to come. Likewise, while the initial 
opening in the political space during this critical juncture was marked by attempts to 
govern inclusively by allotting seats to various members of Iraq’s ethnic and religious 
communities in the cabinet,466 the constraints imposed by the army officers militarized 
the state during the first year of the coup as reflected in the first laws instituted during this 
transformative period. For example, Law No. 1 of 1958 enabled the unelected cabinet and 
council of ministers to purge the judicial system of any judges they perceived to be a threat 
to “public interest”467 and the Purge Law No. 2 effectively cleansed preceding governing 
elites and all officials suspected of posing a danger to the “general interest”468 of the 
regime. Similarly, to minimize and abolish all dissidence, the Sovereignty Council issued 
Law No. 7 proscribing any actions perceived by the regime to post a threat to the 
revolution or the revolutionaries.469 The Purge Law, for instance, would be revised to 
reflect new forms of exclusion until the collapse of the state in 2003.  
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Although the ambiguity of the constitution regarding the nature of Iraq’s executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches was symptomatic of the imprecise nature of the 
revolution and its architects, one thing remained clear: the ubiquitous role of the military 
and the armed forces in the new republic. Whereas the structure of government under the 
monarchy remained civilian, the post-revolutionary governing system grew more 
authoritarian in nature in two ways. First, it became heavily centralized around two 
unelected institutions, the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers. Second, the 
monopolization and usurpation of power by victorious army officers following the 
revolution cemented the militarization of the state and its governing institutions. Moreover, 
the control of key executive and military institutions by Qasim and Arif effectively 
institutionalized the amalgamation of the military and the executive branch of government, 
which “left little doubt about where real power lay.” 470   The emerging elite’s 
consolidation of power also required the centralization of the country’s provincial and 
municipal governing institutions around Baghdad implemented through two key 
institutional mechanisms. First, the 1958 Amendment of the Municipal Administration 
Law of 1931 gave the Council of Ministers the power to dissolve any municipal council 
it perceived to pose a ambiguous threat to public interest.471 Second, Law No. 14 of 1958 
called for the dissolution of the administrative councils that were enshrined in the 1925 
constitution that enabled various ethno-religious communities, like Jews and Christians, 
to establish provincial communal councils,472  and could only be reinstated with the 
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approval of the Council of Ministers. We observe that during the first decade of this 
critical juncture the country’s institutional reconfiguration required abolishing and 
redirecting old institutions to serve new purposes. The militarized administration of the 
bureaucratic and administrative branches of government solidified the military as the 
guardian of the state’s security and survival until the collapse of the Ba’thist state in 2003.  
Two ideological factors complicated Qasim’s rule: pan-Arabism and Iraqi 
nationalism. While Arif sympathized with national and regional pan-Arabists, Qasim 
focused on prioritizing Iraqi national interests and Iraqi nationalism. These diametrically 
opposed views not only affected how the incumbent ruling elites framed these diverging 
ideologies to accommodate their political goals but also how Iraq’s ethno-religious groups 
responded to their imposition. Qasim’s formation of the Ministry of Guidance and a new 
Directorate of Folklore attempted to integrate and co-opt leftist intellectuals and 
communists (who propagated Iraqi nationalism) to mitigate pan-Arabist threats. 473 
Placing emphasis on shared “cultural commodities” such as food, rituals, sports among 
other leisurely activities resonated well particularly with ethnic groups like the Kurds who 
“related more to Iraq as symbolized through its ancient civilizations than to pan-Arabist 
ideology, according to which Iraq was merely a region (qutr) of a larger Pan-Arab state 
dominated by Sunni Arabs.” 474  The consequences stemming from these competing 
ideologies during the first few years of the republic were instrumental in generating 
varying forms of resistance among Iraq’s ethno-religious groups.  
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The various push and pull factors effectively dichotomized Iraq’s political sphere 
into two competing camps: Qasim, the leftists, and communists who enjoyed the support 
of Iraq’s various ethnic and religious groups, particularly the Shi’i, Kurds, Assyrians and 
Yazidis on the one hand, and Pan-Arabist including Arif, the Ba’thist s and various 
prominent Arab tribes who resented the communists, on the other. While the Shi‘i 
majority perceived Pan-Arabism as a predominantly Sunni-Arab project,475 other ethno-
religious communities similarly remained circumspect of the socio-cultural homogeneity 
it espoused and “desired no change in the existing distribution of social power.”476 The 
tension between these two ideational spheres were manifested in the Pan-Arabist rebellion 
in Mosul in March 1959, as noted by Batatu, 
The events of March at Mosul illumined with a flaming glare the complexity of the conflicts that 
agitated Iraq and disclosed its various social forces in their essential nature and in the genuine line-
up of their life interests. For four days and four nights Kurds and Yazidis stood against Arabs; 
Assyrian and Aramean Christians against Arab Moslems; the Arab tribe of Albu Mutaiwit against 
the Arab tribe of Shammar; the Kurdish tribe of al-Gargariyyah against Arab Albu Mutaiwit…It 
seemed as if all social cement dissolved and all political authority vanished.477 
 
While Qasim’s suppression of the Ba‘thists following the Mosul revolt and their attempted 
coup in October 1959 neutralized a key oppositional force, it contradicted his promise of 
political reform and justified subsequent Ba‘thist efforts to recapture the state a decade 
later. The difficulty in applying political reforms stemmed from the inability of incumbent 
governing elites to deviate from the authoritarian path set at the time of state formation 
and the reliance on coercion as a mechanism for governing and consolidating a divided 
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society. I posit that state capture through coercion cemented asymmetrical power relations 
between the state’s ruling elites and a deeply divided society.   
Perhaps due to his mixed lineage (a Shi’i Kurd mother and Sunni-Arab father) 
Qasim’s efforts to appease and integrate Iraq’s Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, and the Shi’i 
ulama as a segment of the Shi’is of Iraq within the newly formed republic minimized 
ethnic fragmentation for a short period of time. 478  His response to pan-Arabists is 
precisely captured in a major speech noting that “The Iraqi people consist of brotherly 
nationalities which have amalgamated in order to defend the existence of the eternal Iraqi 
Republic. [This is] why we always declare ‘long live true Iraqi unity’, for in it lies our 
strength.”479 Others attempts at fostering national cohesion and Iraqi identity over Pan-
Arabism included the incorporation of ancient and pre-Islamic, pre-Arab historical 
symbols as exemplified by the adoption of the Akkadian eight-pointed star of Ishtar 
(ancient Assyrian goddess) and the ancient Mesopotamian sun God Shamash into Iraq’s 
national flag. 480  Similarly, his socio-economic policies included increases in oil 
production, the construction of public housing for Iraq’s poor, improvements in the 
educational system, healthcare and labour unions, and initiative to improve the standard 
of living for the poor.481  
Contestation and Suppression under the Qasim Republic 
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As with ruling elites under the monarchy, Qasim’s short-lived tenure as the guarantor of 
Iraq’s first revolution was fraught with attempts to consolidate power, eliminate 
opposition, and contain, through authoritarian and exclusionary means, increasing threats 
from contending societal forces. To counter mounting perceptions of authoritarianism, 
Qasim briefly re-established the formation of political parties in 1960 by granting licenses 
to previously excluded parties such as the National Democratic Party, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party, and the al-Hizb al-Islami (Islamic Party). 482  While a window of 
accommodation emerged during the initial rupture, perceived threats from these 
democratic openings were quickly neutralized by drastically reducing, or in some cases, 
obviating their presence from the national political arena. The elimination through legal 
means of perceived threats resulted in the suppression of pluralism in the emergent 
republic. This superficial opening in the political space was short-lived as political parties 
began challenging the regime, which resulted in Qasim’s suppression of contending 
political forces such as communists, pan-Arabists, and Islamists post-1958.   
Although constituting a key oppositional group, Qasim’s initial success rested with 
the military alliance forged with the ICP under the United National Front in early 1958.483 
Ideologically, the ICP and Qasim aligned in their orientation toward Iraqi nationalism that 
directly contradicted the ideological orientation of the Ba’thists.484 However, the party 
posed a tangible threat to the survival of the emergent regime as it enjoyed broad support 
from Iraq’s ethno-religious groups. Moreover, the ICP’s demands for more representation 
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in the post-monarchical parliament and cabinet and their popularity and growing 
membership across Iraq posed a threat to Qasim.485 Consequently, Qasim turned against 
the party by banning its associations, youth and women’s groups, the party’s newspapers, 
and systematically targeting party members and communist sympathizers across Iraq in 
an attempt to consolidate his powerbase.486  
Ideological divergence shaped the type and nature of opposition groups in Iraq 
under Qasim’s republic. In particular, the growing ideological rift between Qasim, the 
communists and pan-Arabists determined the state’s developmental trajectory. Whereas 
Sunni Arabs welcomed pan-Arabism and the creation of a unified Arab Republic out of 
contiguous regional states as it would alleviate their minority status in Iraq and secure 
their broader national and geopolitical interests, the Kurds and other ethno-linguistic 
minorities, many of whom constituted the ICP’s membership base, adamantly opposed 
pan-Arabism and saw it as a threat to their cultural survival. Likewise, the Shi’is, although 
ethnically and linguistically Arab, not only equated pan-Arabism with Sunnism487, but 
also feared that a pan-Arab union involving Iraq would relegate their status from a 
majority to a minority, and thusly advocated Iraqi nationalism instead.488 Likewise, by 
late 1960, the Islamic Party saw its members arrested and its newspapers shut down due 
to its criticism of the government. As with the preceding monarchical regime, the threat 
and growing influence of opposition political parties in their ability to challenge the 
government made them a target under Qasim’s rule. 
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These policies produced two outcomes: first, they solidified the power of the state 
and its security sector over Iraq’s socio-political arena; second, they diminished the 
governing capacity of the electorate and opposition groups from the political arena, which 
cemented authoritarianism within the state’s governing institutions. As with the preceding 
monarchical regime, Qasim’s failed statebuilding and the failure to devise inclusive and 
accommodative institutions could reconcile Kurdish, Assyrian, Ba’thist and pan-Arabist 
demands affected his tenure and survival as a revolutionary leader.  
Fuelled by the centralization of the state around Baghdad and by broken promises 
to implement a comprehensive autonomy agreement as enshrined in the post-1958 
constitution and Qasim’s rejection of a Kurdish memorandum on autonomy, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani launched a revolt against the 
regime in 1961.489 The Kurds saw Qasim’s centralization policies in the name of state 
sovereignty as a threat to the quasi-territorial independence they had enjoyed since the 
Ottoman era.490 Likewise, the exclusion of the Ba’thists from the political arena resulted 
in their mobilization through clandestine Ba’thist networks that began to consolidate and 
mobilize into a formidable force under the guidance of ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di in 1962. Ba’thist 
tactics included eliminating the Ba’thist main opposition, the leftists and communists, and 
bolstering the party’s organizational structure by expanding its network of operations and 
support throughout the country. 491  While some opposition parties were heavily 
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suppressed, such as the Communist Party which was almost eliminated by the 1990s, 
many continued to operate underground or in exile. 
Wider regional developments such as Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir’s growing quest for 
Arab solidarity affected the post-1958 domestic governing trajectory particularly as it 
pinned Qasim, a proponent of Iraqi nationalism, against Iraqi pan-Arabist and Ba’thist 
officers influenced by Nasir’s ambitions for a unified regional order. Qasim’s government 
perceived such unity as destabilizing for the domestic security of regional states and in 
violation of Iraq’s state sovereignty.492 Contrarily, Iraqi Ba’thist members sympathetic to 
and receptive of Nasir’s vision posed one of the most formidable challenges to Qasim’s 
government, and would continue to do so until its successful capturing of the state in 1968. 
This is evidenced by the dichotomization of political parties following the revolution into 
the pan-Arabist camp such as the Istiqlal and the B‘ath parties versus the ICP and the 
National Democratic Party (NDP)— both of which enjoyed cross-communal support from 
Iraq’s Shi’is, Kurds, Assyrians, and other minorities, served to bolster societal divisions 
and national fragmentation.493 These forms of contention did not “lead to the setting of 
new parameters for a supra-communal society, in which the predominance of the Sunnis 
could be shattered or challenged.”494  
Complicating matters was Qasim’s perceptions of who owned the state and the 
revolution. His cult of personality, similar to that of Nuri al-Said under the monarchy, 
inculcated a façade of the fragile nature of the institutional and governing capacity of the 
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state. This not only tied the process of statebuilding to a single individual, but also created 
a path dependent trend in how successive ruling elites would come to perceive and govern 
their state. Moreover, Qasim’s attempt to create a unified compound nation did not reflect 
the organizational and institutional capacity of the state to accommodate ethno-religious 
groups. Another critical consequence of the 1958 revolution was the mechanization of the 
armed forces rather than mass social movements and civil society groups as the guardians 
of the state. In doing so, the revolution set the path by which future leaders came to 
determine and justify the militarization of the state and the state’s security apparatuses to 
govern a pluralistic society.  
Institutions and Ba‘thist Ascendency in the Second Republic  
 
On February 8 1963 Ba’thist s and Arab nationalists officers succeeded in assassinating 
Qasim.495 The purpose was two fold: to overthrow what they perceived to be a key 
obstacle to achieving Pan-Arab unity and to quell the Iraqi communist movement— the 
most popular and unifying force in Iraq’s political history that cut-across ethnic and 
religious cleavages. 496  The struggle between Qasim’s Iraqi nationalism versus pan-
Arabism was a key ideological factor for the Ba’thist s and Pan-Arabists who succeeded 
in toppling his regime.497  Qasim’s failure to create representative institutions and a 
political agenda that could accommodate pluralism was impeded by his militarization of 
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the state that reproduced exclusionary and authoritarian governing structures.498  The 
institutions that emerged in post-Qasim’s republic demarcated a shift in the level of 
government entrenchment in the political and socio-economic affairs of the state. The 
formative five years of the second republic from 1963-1968 began the process of hyper-
state centralization in order to consolidate power and co-opt dissident groups. Thus, when 
the Ba’thist s seized full control in 1968, the Party became the centre of gravity for 
managing all of Iraq’s affairs.  
 During this time, we see both the abrupt and incremental transformation of 
governing institutions to reflect the ideological shift of the ruling elites. A provisional 
constitution was drafted on April 19 1964 that declared Iraq a democratic socialist state 
“deriving her democracy and socialism from the Arab Heritage and the Islamic spirit” and 
that the Iraqi people are part of the Arab Nation seeking “comprehensive Arab unity which 
the government is bound to achieve as soon as possible, starting thus from the union with 
the United Arab Republic.”499 The constitution granted the president exclusive rights to 
appoint the prime minister, approve laws, regulations, and cabinet decisions, appoint civil 
officers and judges.500 Although Article 62 granted the parliament full legislative powers, 
articles 69 and 98 made it subservient to the president. As a new institution, the National 
Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC)—what would later become the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) under Saddam Hussein’s reign, was also created 
as the leading organ of the revolution by twelve Ba’thists and four Arab nationalist officers, 
																																																								
498 Sluglett and Sluglett, 77.  
499 Weekly Qazette of the Republic of Iraq, “Interim Constitution of Iraq,” 20 May 1964.  




with ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif as president and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as vice-president and 
Prime Minister (who would later become the president of Iraq prior to Saddam Hussein) 
following Qasim’s assassination. 501  Sunni-Arabs, comprising 66.7 percent, were 
overwhelmingly represented in the NCRC between February-November 1963, with 
27.8% Shi’i Arabs, 5.5% Kurds (mostly Arabized Faili Kurds), and no representation for 
smaller ethnic and religious minorities such as the Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidis or 
Shabaks.502 The NCRC became the supreme commanding institution of the armed forces, 
the police, and the national guard with the legislative powers to declare war or peace, 
appoint and dismiss cabinets and civil and military officials, and was allotted the “right of 
supervision over the affairs of the Iraq Republic so as to ensure the defence of the 
Revolution and the fulfilment of its goals.”503  
As outlined in Appendix A, while new laws were created, old ones were amended 
to accommodate the authoritarian shift of the state. This pattern of institutional layering 
illustrates the processes that dictated the reconfiguration of the state during each critical 
juncture. For example, both the Government Purge Law and the Judicial Purge Law 
created by Qasim in 1958 were amended to grant the NCRC unmitigated powers for 
approving and selecting incumbents.504 Similarly, the incorporation of higher education 
into the domain of the NCRC drastically limited the communists and leftists’ social base 
																																																								
501 Tripp, 171. 
502 Batatu (1978), Table 55-1, pp. 1004-1007 and 52-2, pp. 1008.  
503 The Weekly Qazette of the Republic of Iraq, “Law No. 25 of 1963, the National Council of the 
Revolutionary Command,” 3 July 1963, pp. 623. Similarly, Notification No. 15 empowered the NCRC 
with the “higher authorities in the Republic of Iraq including the juristical [sic] powers and the authority 
of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to elect the President of the Republic and the formation 
of the Government.” The Weekly Qazette of the Republic of Iraq, February 27 1963, pp. 185.    




while encapsulating colleges and universities within the Party’s domain.505 As the main 
unifying force,506 the Iraq Communist Party became a target by the Ba’thists within a few 
weeks following the coup.507 Eliminating the ICP meant abolishing the only party that 
could contest Ba’thist power and the only party that cut-across ethnic and religious 
lines.508 Thus, the homogenization of society began with the institutionalization of Pan-
Arabism as the ideological impetus for the creation and justification of single-party rule 
that emerged post-1968.   
1958-1968 was a critical decade for Iraq’s social and political transformation that 
created novels ways for governing this highly divided society. Two factors determined the 
state’s institutional transformation during this endogenous critical juncture. First, the 
institutionalization of an unelected and unaccountable military executive council as the 
principal governing body cemented authoritarian rule and later paved the way for the 
totalitarian one-party state that emerged under Saddam Hussein. Second, the conversion 
of old institutions to accommodate a deeper shift toward authoritarian governance that 
enabled incumbent autocrats to create “institutional trenches” through a heavily 
centralized executive branch to secure their survival during these transformative 
periods.509 Consequently, the constraints imposed by this authoritarian trajectory shaped 
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resistance against the state from Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities. Most notably, 
key political and military positions were assigned to Sunni-Arabs and the Shi’is were 
deliberately marginalized from key governing positions, were allotted inconsiderable 
positions in his first cabinet, and endured “disproportionate share of imprisonment, torture, 
and job loss in the ‘Aref era.”510 Similarly, ‘Aref’s reluctance to incorporate the Kurds 
within governing structures and his consistent failure to implement Kurdish cultural and 
institutional aspirations cemented their exclusion from the state.511 This led to Kurdish 
rebellions and government-sponsored counter offensives throughout the 1960s. 
Furthermore, mounting animosity with the state from Kurdish, Shi’i, and Sunnis who fell 
outside ‘Aref’s tribal rooted in his open reliance on kinship and tribal ties, his inclination 
toward pan-Arab unity, and his reliance on the state’s main security apparatus, the 
Republican Guard to solidify this powerbase.512 Another outcome of the 1963 coup was 
the infiltration of a handful of army officers from Tikrit (Saddam’s birthplace and a Sunni-
Arab stronghold in Iraq) within the governing institutions of the state, which was reflected 
in the heads of key institutions.513 The pattern that emerged locked actors in the same 
repetitive processes of reinstating authoritarian rule, albeit it for diverging purposes. This 
path dependence of the state’s institutional configuration and reconfiguration during times 
of political transition indicate the inability of governing elites to diverge from the 
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authoritarian structures imposed by their predecessors. The militarization of the executive 
branch of government became the institutional norm following the 1958 coup.  
The reliance on the military was a path set by the state’s colonial architects through 
the use of the RAF (the Royal Air Force) to contain rebellion and consolidate a divided 
state during the initial period of state formation. Subsequent leaders, both under the 
monarchy and the republic, saw the military and the coercive power of the state as the 
primary means for governing Iraq. Thus, Iraq’s political and institutional development 
became a zero-sum game of winners and losers enmeshed with exclusionary and 
authoritarian governing patterns in order to control the state. The manifestation of 
authoritarian rule during the last decades of the monarchy would resurface, particularly 
given the more restrictive and chauvinistic Pan-Arab nationalism espoused by the 
Ba’thists.514 The processes that unfolded prior to the Ba’thist takeover in 1968 paved the 
way for the institutionalization of single-party rule and Saddam’s eventual consolidation 
of power in 1979. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) would become the 
principal policy and military governing institution in the country until the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003. Stemming from the need to contain domestic threats emanating 
from Iraq’s socio-cultural and geographic divisions (the rebellious Kurds in the north and 
the Shi’is to the south), the Ba’th regime sought to concentrate power as a means for 
consolidating an increasingly divided political and social field.515  
The institutions that emerged post-1958 became entangled in varying ideological 
dichotomies that pinned the interests of the Iraqi people against their ruling elites who 
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sought to monopolize power through military means. Hence, “political institutions, such 
as political parties and parliaments, were viewed as a hindrance to the direct link between 
the leader and the people.”516  Fuelling the resistance of non-Sunni Arab ethnic and 
religious groups was the overwhelming representation of Sunni Arabs in the B‘ath Party, 
which was reflected in the membership breakdown of the Party’s command in Iraq 
between 1952-1970. Out of 47 members, 29 or 61% were Sunni-Arabs, 15 were Shi’i 
Arabs (31%), 1 Assyrian Christian, and two members were of mixed Sunni-Shi’i 
backgrounds.517 Sunni-Arabs also dominated the Party’s membership across the Middle 
East, and would continue to do so as reflected in Table 6 below:518  
Table 6: Ethnic Breakdown of B‘ath National Command, 1954-1970 
 
Religious Designation Members Total Percentage  
Sunni Arabs 22 49% 
Shi’i Arabs 10 22% 
Christians 5 11% 
Alawis  4  8% 
Druz 3 6% 
Zaidi 1 2% 
Source: Batatu (1978), 1224-1229. 
 
As with their predecessors under the monarchy and the Qasim era, a handful of Iraqi 
governing elites both exerted and recycled their positions within the governing institutions 
of the state. Thus, while the country experienced both domestic and exogenous shocks, 
ruling elites simply adapted rather than drastically altered their governing techniques to 
account for changing dynamics.  
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 The permeation of a select few Sunni-Arab elites was reflected in their shuffling 
of executive posts in order to both maintain Sunni-Arab ownership of the state and its 
ideological leaning as a key regional player for sustaining pan-Arabism. 519  Military 
officers deposing each other through military coups became the pattern by which 
successive leaders governed the state. Hassan al-Bakr, a Ba’thist military officer and 
relative of Saddam Hussein, and a person active in politics since the 1950s and 
instrumental in the 1963 coup, succeeded in overthrowing the ‘Aref brothers in 1968. Both 
Bakr and Saddam and their allies had conspired in the materialization of the coup a year 
prior by infiltrating and seeking allies in key governing institutions such as the Republican 
Guard and military intelligence.520 Eventually, Saddam succeeded in nudging Bakr aside 
and assumed office in 1979-2003. What emerged was a regime composed of a group of 
elites “of extended families, clans and tribal networks from the provincial Sunni Arab 
north-west of Iraq” who used these links and networks to institute authoritarian rule 
through exclusionary means.521 In effect, the second critical juncture of Iraq’s political 
history ended with the Ba‘thist takeover and the institutionalization of single-party 
autocratic rule in 1968. The Ba’thists and pan-Arabists played a critical role that mobilized 
the sources of change that led to the toppling of the monarchy in 1958. By 1968, they had 
mobilized and organized themselves into a contending force against all other political 
factions in Iraq that ensured their eventual survival until the collapse of the state in 2003.   
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Institutions and Single Party Rule: Cementing Autocratic Rule in Iraq, 
1968-2003  
Ba‘thist Ideology: Explaining the Permeation of the Party and Regime  
 
The Ba‘thist takeover of 1968 solidified the party’s accession in Iraq and altered the state’s 
institutional configuration to accommodate the party’s ideological base. This period 
effectively terminated the critical juncture that was opened in 1958 as the emergent regime 
encapsulated both state and society for decades to come as the party’s ideology reoriented 
the state-society relations following Saddam’s accession to power in 1979. The principles 
of liberty and socialism coupled with the party’s slogan “One Arab Nation, with One 
Eternal Message” became a remedial framework for structuring and uniting a fragmented 
state by limiting contestation. The consolidation of the army facilitated the suppression of 
key oppositional forces that drew wide support from other segments of society, namely 
the Iraqi Communist Party and the various Kurdish parties, like the KDP.522 As will be 
demonstrated in the proceeding sections, pan-Arabism was diffused through key 
authoritarian institutions, namely, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the armed 
forces, and the education system along with other key offices of the state. The state that 
emerged post 1968 was one ruled by executive decrees and where the state’s security 
apparatuses sustained the party and regime. The initial permeation of pan-Arabism within 
the party and regime and its institutional diffusion in the state’s governing structures 
became a key mechanism for consolidating and capturing a divided society.  
																																																								




I argue that pan-Arabism—the ideological foundation of the B‘ath Party, united a 
group of ruling elites under a monolithic regime structure. Moreover, the dominance of 
Sunni Arabs in the emergent republic diverged little from the monarchy; thus, while elite 
interests, ideologies, and governing dynamics differed, the replication of the community’s 
ownership of the state meant there was little divergence from the time of state formation. 
Likewise, Saddam’s reliance on a tightly knit familial patronage system and Sunni-Arab 
state tribalism sustained the Ba‘th’s socio-economic and political survival.523 Regime 
here refers to “repeated, strong interactions among major political actors including a 
government.”524 While true that Saddam Hussein repressed many Sunni Arabs that fell 
outside his patronage system and those sympathetic to the ICP, the dominance of Sunni-
Arab ruling elites nevertheless dictated these interactions following 1968 particularly as 
fourteen members of the RCC between July 1968 and September 1977 were Sunni, all 
except one Arabized Kurd were Sunni-Arab, and six were from Tikrit (Saddam’s 
hometown).525 The party determined and defined state policies through its institutions and 
attempted to penetrate society to minimize opposition and coerce complacency and 
legitimacy. One way the party did this was by sanctioning ideological expositions in the 
forms of newspapers and magazines to party members and non-members, as well as 
through information disseminated to the public by radio, television, and a heavily censored 
press.526 Conceptualizing this amalgamated relationship between the regime and party 
rests with the assumption that in the case of Iraq, the B‘ath Party was an instrument of the 
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regime; i.e. the party was embedded in the regime itself since it dictated prevailing 
relations among party members and all political actors.527 While Iraq underwent both 
internal and exogenous shocks to its statebuilding process since its creation, we see a 
pattern emerge in how ruling elites created and defined the parameters of state-society 
relations and exercised ethnic control through the institutions of the state. 
Adopting Geddes classification of authoritarian regimes, I posit the B‘ath under 
Saddam was a synthesis of single-party and personalistic rule. Whereas the single-party 
regime ensures that “access to political office and control over policy are dominated by 
one party,” the personalistic regime institutionalizes control of an individual leader by 
making sure that “access to office and the fruits of the office depends much more on the 
discretion of an individual leader” and where “neither the military nor the party exercises 
independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler.”528  The 
stability of personalistic and single-party regimes is predicated on their resistance to 
internal splits except under extreme economic conditions that “disrupt the material 
underpinnings of the regime loyalty” and the resilience of the latter is often only 
challenged by external/exogenous factors rather than internal/endogenous splits.529 The 
amalgamation of Ba’thist ideology with the regime created the ideational and material 
basis for Saddam’s durability. I posit that the ideology became a social regime 
characterized by a “set of rules stipulating expected behavior and ‘ruling out’ behavior 
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deemed to be undesirable.”530 As will be demonstrated, state institutions became the 
mechanisms for creating and diffusing Ba‘thist ideology according to Saddam Hussein, 
concocted and operationalized through autocratic single-party rule in order to both sustain 
ethnic dominance that prevented the accommodation of multi-ethnic demands of a highly 
divided state and society. This causal relationship is demonstrated below: 
	








Moreover, the capacity for ruling elites to succeed in disseminating the party’s ideology 
rested with the level and degree of state bureaucratization of governing institutions, 
characterized as follows: 
(a) expansion in public bodies of the sort that can be measured by increases in the numbers of 
administrative units and personnel as well as the rise in public expenditure, including in particularly, 
wages and salaries; and (b) an orientation whereby the administrative and technical dominate over 




530 Streeck and Thelen (2005), 12-13. 
531 Nazih Ayubi, “Arab Bureaucracies: Expanding Size, Changing Roles,” in The Arab State, ed., 







The expansion of Iraq’s bureaucratic institutions can be traced to two processes we see in 
other regional states. First, economic growth resulting from rents and oil production 
required more human capital to sustain the administrative capacity of the state combined 
with an entrenched civil service sector and an expansive military. Second, as will be 
demonstrated, the penetration and centralization of governing institutions was embedded 
in Ba’thist ideology in order to control society. 532  The latter point is critical for 
understanding the forms of resistance that emerged from ethnic and religious groups 
targeted by the state. While Ba‘thist ideology was mutable and changed over time and 
during varying conjunctures as evidenced through the deployment of discursive language 
that encapsulated society with the regime, 533  the normative value attached to state 
institutions became the instruments by which this ideology could be manifested and 
propagated and where the regime defined “rule makers and rule takers.”534  
The coercive apparatuses of the state became institutional mechanisms by which 
the single-party autocratic regime sustained its grip on power in order to “control both the 
military and their rivals within the ruling elite” and to “mobilize and supervise the 
masses.” 535  The permeation of these mechanisms as governing tools hindered any 
prospects for multi-ethnic accommodation under the Ba‘thist period as the state became 
heavily centralized around the party and the regime. Moreover, the B‘ath party’s scope 
and level of centralization based on coercion and terror manifested through a pervasive 
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security system particularly under Saddam Hussein sustained its institutional survival. 
Scope here refers to the “size of the party’s infrastructure, or the degree to which it 
penetrates the national territory and society” while cohesion denotes the “incumbents’ 
ability to secure the cooperation of partisan allies within the government, in the legislature, 
and at the local or regional level.”536 The robustness of the latter is dependent on the extent 
of nonmaterial ties such as a shared ethnicity or ideology particularly if the party in power 
emerged as a result of a successful revolution.537 Overseeing the survival of the state and 
its order was a strong leader or “Great Patron” (Saddam Hussein) who guaranteed its 
stability, usually through centralization as a means of consolidating power.538 Effectively, 
Saddam’s personalistic regime meshed the party with the individual, which reinforced his 
capacity to control society.  
Explaining the relationship between state institutions and ethnic conflict in Iraq 
under the B‘ath period is pertinent to the study of how actors behaved and the choices they 
made that helps us “understand the political constraints and inducements that shape 
behavior and outcomes.”539 Two interdependent processes began to unfold during this 
critical time period. First, the institutionalization of authoritarianism sustained the tribal 
dominance of predominantly Sunni-Arabs in governing a divided society; second, this 
produced resistance among Iraq’s other ethnic and religious groups, including the Shi’is, 
Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen, Shabacks, and Yazidis. Here I posit that ethnic responses to 
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Saddam’s regime and the B‘ath party were conditioned by the institutional constraints the 
party imposed on society in order to create cohesion and control. The exclusionary and 
growing authoritarian nature of the state as manifested in the subservience of state 
institutions to the regime limited the latter’s contestation which ultimately fuelled ethnic 
discord as groups were unable to challenge the state’s coercive power.  
Restructuring the State under the Ba’th 
 
Structuring Iraq following the Ba‘thist takeover altered the modes and forms of 
authoritarianism and exclusion. Placing institutions at the centre of analysis under this 
time period vis-à-vis ethnic conflict in Iraq can explain “the formation and reproduction 
of opposition identities” and how opposing the regime can “redefine a group’s identity 
and conception of appropriate behavior.”540 The party and regime thus became institutions 
for controlling Iraq as a divided society. The revolution’s purposes and aims is best 
captured by Tarq Aziz, Iraq’s Vice-President until 2003: 
Revolution is one of the hardest and most complex historical processes which man can undertake 
either as an individual or as a group…This is because the process involves the transformation of 
the individual intellectually, behaviourably [sic] and ethically and the drastic transformation of 
society economically, politically, culturally, socially and militarily.541  
 
Sustaining the systematic overhaul following the Ba’thist capturing of the state was the 
control of non-Ba‘thist political forces and the neutralization of all opposing political and 
military elements as outlined in the Eighth Regional Congress of the B‘ath Party in 
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1974.542 Operationally, this was executed by replacing all bureaucratic and governing 
institutions, including the Cabinet and the RCC with party members and regime 
sympathizers in order to control state and society.543 Law No. 142 of 1974 officially 
implemented the findings of the report within its governing institutions, including 
ministries, departments of state, state establishments, organizations and all governing 
bodies as the leading guiding principles of the regime in order to ensure cohesion and 
compliance with the governing principles of the party.544 I explain the impact of this 
transformation on Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities by framing it within the 
institutional mechanisms and process that sustained the autocratic state that emerged post-
1968. This both explains authoritarian durability and illuminates the processes that led up 
to its maturation. It likewise requires an analysis of how the regime and its institutions 
managed Iraq’s ethnic and religious pluralism.  
Although the initial Ba’thist takeover instituted authoritarian governance in order 
to legitimize and solidify the regime’s control of the state, I posit that the state following 
Saddam Hussein’s usurpation of power oscillated between various levels of totalitarian 
and authoritarian rule. Between 1979-1991 (at the height of Hussein’s power 
consolidation) we observe that the state became more totalitarian in character due to the 
presence of three interlinked factors characterized by Linz as a) the monopolization of 
power—or monism, that absorbs, either through the destruction or weakening of pre-
existing institutions, organizations, and interest groups; b) the presence of an exclusive, 
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autonomous, and intellectually elaborate ideology “with which the ruling group or leader, 
and the party serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or 
manipulate to legitimize them”; c) “Citizen participation in and active mobilization for 
political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channelled 
through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups.”545 The classification of 
the B‘ath regime as totalitarian rests with the presence and permeation of “an ideology, a 
single mass party and other mobilizational organizations, and concentrated power in an 
individual and his collaborators or a small group that is not accountable to any large 
constituency and cannot be dislodged from power by institutionalized, peaceful means”546  
Furthermore, the entrenchment of pan-Arabism helped articulate a new ideological 
foundation for the regime one that was “derived by and for the party rather than any other 
social or political structures.”547 This was reflected in its constitution which declared the 
party a “national revolutionary popular movement struggling for Arab unity, freedom and 
socialism” united under the three principles of “unity and freedom of the Arab nation; the 
personality of the Arab nation; and the message of the Arab nation.”548 Similarly, Article 
28 of the 1970 constitution elucidated the importance of education in fostering Arab unity 
against capitalism, Zionism and colonialism.549 The party was in many ways akin to Big 
Brother’s Party in Nineteen Eighty Four in that the regime sought to absorb the individual 
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into the party and its revolutionary principles and that individual relations in the party 
were “based on principles and subjectivity on all party levels, ranks, plans and activities, 
where the party replaces the individual and the interest of the party replaces the personal 
interests.”550  
Thus, the party became an organization that structured society along a new 
political culture based on Ba’thist principles. This produced two outcomes. First, the 
party’s infiltration of the state’s bureaucratic and governing institutions made it 
impossible to have any other allegiance than to the B‘ath party since party membership 
was mandatory for government employees (which constituted the largest work force in 
Iraq) and the party’s influence over governmental decisions at both lower and upper levels 
through a methodical surveillance system that monitored the activities of all government 
departments.551 Second, the cooptation of elites, use of violence, state penetration in 
society, and the militarization of the state sustained the regime’s survival. The operating 
structure of the party facilitated the regime’s control of the various sectors of the state as 
demonstrated below: 
Figure 11: Operating Structure of the Arab Socialist B‘ath Party in Iraq 
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Source: Adapted from Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1984), 84. 
 
The diffusion of the party in society ensured loyalty by minimizing and eliminating 
dissidence. At the upper echelon of the party was the Regional Command Council (RCC) 
(qutr), which determined the party’s policy. Although four countries—Syria, Iraq, 
Lebanon, and Jordan obtained this regional status, the only successful states that adopted 
its ideology were Iraq and Syria. However, both states would later contravene the Party’s 
aim to institute pan-Arabism as the solution to ethnic fractionalization as both the Assad 
regime in Syria and the Saddam’s regime in Iraq relied on tribal and sectarian powerbases 
to maintain their control of the state.552 Beneath the RCC was the branch (far’)— Iraq had 
twenty-one branches (usually allotted based on the country’s provinces), which required 
the presence of a minimum of two sections. A section (shu’ba) consisted of a minimum 
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of two divisions (firqa) and each division consisted of a minimum of two and maximum 
of seven cells (khaliya or halqa).553 The cell level was arguably the most important for 
diffusing the party’s “ideological militants” through its popular organization, which 
enabled the party to mobilize mass support and penetrate towns, villages, factories, army 
units and government offices in order to implement Ba’thist policy as a form of political 
control. 554  As reflected in Index B in the Appendix, the party and regime heavily 
centralized all state departments and social, economic, and educational organizations 
under its command. 
Membership in the party carried a similar multi-level hierarchical structure based 
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Source: Adapted from Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s B‘ath Party (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 46. 
 
The regional command council was later replaced by the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), which became the primarily executive and governing institution in the 
country until 2003 during which Iraq was effectively governed by decree. Sustaining the 
regime’s grip on power were Iraq’s multilayered intelligence sectors—namely, the Iraqi 
Intelligence Service, the Directorate of General Military Intelligence and the Directorate 
of General Security maintained and penetrate all aspects of society in order to sustain the 





















Source: U.S. Iraq Survey Group Comprehensive Report, Regime Strategic Intent, Vol. 1 (30 September 
2004), 73, 83. 
As demonstrated in Figure 14 below, the Special Security Organization of the 
Revolutionary Command Council was a key institution that facilitated and operationalized 
the regime and party’s rigid control of society and purged dissidents.  
Figure 14: Structure of the Special Security Organization (SSO) 
 
Source: U.S. Iraq Survey Group Comprehensive Report, Regime Strategic Intent, Vol. 1, 30 September 
2004, 89. 
 
Outlining the institutional structure of the regime illuminates the causal pathway by which 
the party and the regime devised institutional barriers that fostered exclusion through 
authoritarian means to minimize ethnic group mobilization against the state. Contradicting 
• Largest sector
• Domestic and international intelligence gatheringIraqi Intelligence 
Service
• Main military intelligence sector
• Gathered military capabilities of neighbouring countries and Kurdish 
forces within Iraq





• Intelligence gathering and prosecution of regime opposition groups and 
individuals 
• Focused on minority oppositional groups, namely Iranians, Turkomen, 
and Kurds 




























B’thist pan-Arab secular ideology, Saddam’s reliance on his patronage and clan network, 
which was primarily Sunni-Arab and Tikriti catapulted that minority to key governing 
institutions as a strategy for cementing his powerbase and consolidating his rule.  
The regime was structured around this party hierarchy in a highly centralized and 
muddled institutional arrangement. In reviewing the 1990 interim constitution, we find 
that the executive branch led by the president exercised unlimited powers in administering 
the state as noted in Figure 15: 




Source: 1990 Interim Constitution, Section Four, Chapter One on Instittuions of the Republic of Iraq.  
 
The executive branch of government consisted of the president (also the chairman of the 
RCC), who was elected to head the RCC for a renewable eight-year term by a direct public 
ballot, and ruled by decree that overruled the legislative decisions of the elected members 
of government.555 The second most critical branches of the executive were the council of 
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ministers (al-majlis al-wizara’) and the prime minister who implemented the president’s 
policies, drafted the state’s budget, and executed presidential decrees. Likewise, the 
consultative council (al-majlis al-shura)—comprised of fifty members, twenty-five 
appointed by the President and twenty-five elected by a direct secret public ballot, 
consulted the president on matters relating to the political, social, economic, and cultural 
affairs of the country. 556  The National Council/Assembly (al-majlis al-watani) was 
formally the legislative branch of government consisting of 250 publically elected 
members for a term not exceeding four years. The first election of the National Council 
took place in June 1980 following failed promises to hold an election since the Ba’thist 
takeover in 1968.  
The elimination of accommodative governance and the maturation of Ba‘thist 
single party rule were calculated attempts by the “political elite to organize and to 
legitimate rule by one social force over another in a deeply fragmented society.”557 In a 
fragmented society, this bifurcation was principally along ethnic and religious lines that 
made the imposition of a monolithic ideology necessary in order to control, legitimize, 
and organize society.558 The dominance of Sunni-Arabs replicated the pattern of ethnic 
domination from the monarchical period. The power of Saddam’s Tikriti tribal networks 
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is summed by Batatu in noting “Their [the Tikritis] role continues to be so critical that it 
would not be going too far to say that the Tikritis rule through the Ba‘th party, rather than 
the Ba‘th party through the Tikritis.”559 For Saddam, neo-tribalism constituted a social 
structure and political entity that guaranteed regime loyalty.560 While the revolution that 
resulted in the collapse of the monarchy in 1958 produced nuanced forms of political 
contestation, we nevertheless observe a path dependency that reproduced Sunni-Arab 
control of the state since the time of state formation until state collapse in 2003. Thus, 
while the state in 1968 experienced institutional transformation to accommodate an 
emerging regime, elites replicated preceding patterns of ethnic re-dominance infused with 
the ideological and organizational apparatuses of single-party Ba‘thist rule defined by an 
exclusionary ideology as an impetus for managing Iraq as a divided society. Most notably, 
Saddam’s reliance on tribal networks led to the ethnification and politicization of Sunni-
Arab tribal dominance, which altered and coagulated people’s perceptions of who owned 
the state and powerbase.561 Consequently, the calculated selection of segments of the 
population shaped the type of regime that emerged, the selection of incumbents, and their 
incorporation in the political arena.562  
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Regime Consolidation, Exclusion, and Ethnic Mobilization 
Controlling a Divided Society 
As noted, the entrenchment of the party, its ideology, the armed forces and security 
apparatuses as mechanisms of control particularly since 1979 sustained the regime’s 
institutional grip on power. The regime went to great lengths to use institutions to 
proscribe, among other things, ethnic mobilization. Multiple factors determined Saddam’s 
initial totalitarian structuring of the state. Both the RCC (majlis qiyadat al-thawra) and its 
highest court, the Revolutionary Court (mahkamat al-thawra) became the country’s 
highest and most authoritative institutions until the collapse of the regime in 2003.563 
Furthermore, the degree of state penetration in society through its coercive apparatuses 
and its inclination toward war-making to quell dissidence coalesced the regime’s grip on 
power. 564  A shift in the country’s political, social, and economic institutional 
transformation aids in demonstrating how the state dealt with its divided society.  
An examination of the country’s 1990 draft constitution (the last constitutional 
document prior to regime collapse), demonstrates the permeation of the executive power 
of the RCC in all branches and institutions of government. First, as stipulated under Article 
152 (3), all members of the executive branches of government, including the vice 
president, council of state members, national council members, and those elected in the 
position of prime minister and his deputies or ministers must adhere to pan-Arabism and 
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socialism and the objectives of the July 17th revolution. Second, real legislative, executive, 
and judicial power (all members of the judiciary were appointed by Saddam) lay in the 
RCC and its control of parliament and the state’s governing institutions.565 Articles 117 
and 130 allowed the president to dissolve all branches of government without due cause. 
Third, Article 172 proscribed amendments to the constitution that might challenge the 
unity of Iraq, its republican regime, its Arab origin, the official religion of the state (being 
Islam), and national holidays (which were primarily cantered around the Ba’thist 
revolution and takeover). Likewise, Article 170 gave the president the absolute authority 
to amend and change any laws in the constitution without a constitutional referendum. 
Lastly, the institutionalization of party membership in the governing councils and the 
armed forces as articulated in Article 59 secured the regime’s survival as the only 
contending force in the country. This was succinctly reflected in the 9th Regional Congress 
requiring chosen leaders be party members as they are “better qualified in terms of 
struggle and absolute faith in principles and people...the candidate’s desire to work 
meticulously to put into practice the Party’s principles from his own position in the Party, 
State and Society.”566 For Saddam, this ensured that the candidates were capable of 
paving “the Baathist way.” 567  Thus, the importance of Ba’thist ideology and its 
permeation in the armed forces and key governing institutions typified the totalitarian-
penetration model characterized by a highly centralized state under single party rule.568  
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 The institutional transformation of the state following the Ba’thist takeover of 
1968 effectively encapsulated society within the confines of the regime and the party. As 
demonstrated in Index B, the regime sustained grip on power rested largely with the 
institutional reconfiguration of the state to serve its ideological, political, and economic 
goals. During the second institutional transformation following the consolidation of 
Ba’thist rule during 1968-1984, we see a pattern of governance reflective of a totalitarian 
absorption of all aspects of society within the confines of the state. Likewise, the 
transformation of the country’s legal code and system to reflect the findings of the 8th and 
9th Regional Congresses demonstrated by the Ministry of Justice’s legal reform of 1979, 
was purposive of infusing and institutionalizing Ba’thist ideology “which is leading the 
Revolutionary Power, basing itself to a nationalist socialist and democratic theory…in 
carrying out a decisive and comprehensive change in the previous legislations and 
building up a modern State of Revolutionary Authority which endeavors to establish a 
harmonized socialist Society.” 569  The level of party entrenchment defined the 
restructuring of the state to accommodate the party’s exclusionary ideology through the 
creation of institutional barriers to subvert oppositional forces.  
 The presidential diwan (bureau of the RCC) and its administrative arm, the 
Secretariat and Consultative Office of the Council the RCC, became the most powerful 
and dominant policy-making institutions of the state. The creation of the National Council 
in 1971 with members appointed and administered by the RCC expanded executive 
powers and ensured uniformity in decision making. Similarly, the Office of Legal Affairs 
																																																								




of the RCC was created in 1972 with a mandate to ensure the compatibility of Iraq’s legal 
system with the aims of the revolution and Ba’thist ideology. Although the B‘ath party 
held its first election in 1980, the National Assembly Law which outlined the electoral 
procedures stipulated that candidates must be supporters of the July 17 Revolution and the 
party, and must have the approval of the Ministry of Interior.570 Although the revolutions 
of 1958, 1963, and 1968 all shifted the country’s institutional landscape, the continued 
amendment of the 1958 Purge Law until the collapse of the state in 2003 enabled the 
incumbent ruling elite to maintain their grip on power through institutional layering.  
The social and economic transformation of the state also reflected the regime’s 
highly centralized rule. Although the dependence on oil as the primary income-generating 
commodity was solidified in 1950s571, the Ba’thist consolidation of the rentier state 
sustained the regime’s survival particularly with the establishment of the Iraqi National 
Oil Company (IPC) in 1968. Laws and regulations were promulgated to reflect the 
regime’s saturation in the economic sector. This is exemplified by Regulation 47 of 1972 
and Law 89 of 1978 for the National Development Plan both of which institutionalized an 
economic system and policy based on socialist principles of economic centralization.572 
The reorientation of the country’s economic sector along socialist and highly centralized 
lines was a policy priority of Ba’thist ideology as delineated in both the 8th and 9th 
Regional Congresses. Socialization of the economic sector rose to 88 percent in 1977, up 
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from 31 percent in 1968, less than a decade prior.573 Thus, nationalization of the means 
of production in accordance with Ba’thist socialist principles encapsulated the economic 
sector and sustained the regime’s survival.   
On a societal level, the regime and the party sought to penetrate all aspects of 
society by absorbing educational and civil society organizations within the state. Ba‘thist 
state penetration extended to elementary and higher education. In the case of the former, 
Regulation 11 for the administration of Kindergarten of 1979 mandated the indoctrination 
of elementary school students with Ba‘thist principles and the Party’s objectives in order 
to “cultivate the spirit of the revolution and homeland inside the children.”574 Similarly, 
almost all institutions of higher learning were established and administered by the state 
through the Supreme Council for Universities, established in 1969. The permeation and 
institutionalization of Ba‘thist ideology reached its zenith in the 1980s and 1990s and 
became imbued in Saddam’s personality cult as exemplified by the formation of jil 
Saddam (Saddam’s generation) as an informal network that sought to ensure the party’s 
influence in almost all spheres of existence, but most importantly, the youth.575  As 
outlined in Index C, all trade and professional unions, including the Student Union of 1968, 
Sports Union of 1971, the Federation for Iraqi Women of 1974, Teacher’s Union of 1980, 
and the General Federation of Literates and Writers in Iraq of 1983 were all created by the 
regime under orders from the RCC to co-opt, control, and subvert civic engagement. 
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Likewise, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of 1980 was tasked with 
implementing Ba‘thist policies within the socio-economic sectors.576  
Similarly, the suppression of freedom of speech and association severely 
hampered civil society. Law No. 45 of 1971 issued by the RCC created the Office of 
Propaganda and Advertisement administered by the Ministry of Information for the 
purpose of disseminating state-sanctioned propaganda and advertisements through 
newspapers, television, cinema, wall plasters, and handbooks. In 1983 the RCC created 
the Ministry of Culture and Information mandated to promote Ba’thist ideology in order 
to “deepen and emphasize the ideology and principles of the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party in 
Iraq and the Arab Homeland.”577 The regime also instituted measures to censor freedom 
of the press. Law No. 64 of 1974 pertaining to the censorship of classified materials and 
films was implemented to specifically control and prohibit materials that propagated 
atheism, sectarianism, alcoholism, gambling, crime, and perceived threats to state security. 
In addition, the Department of Censorship in 1984 became the regime’s mechanism for 
monitoring and censoring the press. A key method by which Saddam was able to maintain 
this level of coercion and cooperation at the institutional level was through a tightly 
controlled system of patronage and payments made to military officers and civil society 
elites throughout the country to ensure loyalty.578   
																																																								
576 NDU, CRRC, Saddam Hussein Collection, SH-RVCC-D-000-505_TF “Academy of Labor Education, 
Legislation No. 9,” 1987. 
577 Iraq Gazette, “Regulation No. 94-Ministry of Culture and Information,” 1983.  






Moreover, discursive language propagated during Saddam’s rule provided the 
ascriptive basis for how the regime responded to what it perceived to be conflicting ethnic 
and religious identities by assigning various references to groups perceived to be against 
the regime and Ba‘thist ideology. Words like sh‘ubiyyan (anti-Arabism or against Arab-
unity in reference to ethnic and religious groups), ta’ifiyya and Ja’fariyah(sectarianism, 
most notably in reference to the Shi’i community), and iqlimiyya (regionalism) in 
reference to anti-regionalism, or in Ba’thist terms, those who opposed regional Arab unity 
as espoused by Ba’thist ideology were used to label perceived enemies of the state and 
regime.579 In fact, the regime went to great lengths to proscribe these attachments in order 
to deter groups from ascribing to them. This is reflected in Article 22 (2) of the 1990 
constitution, which made specific references to all three words noting that “society shall 
aspire to foster higher social harmony and values by preventing the promotion of sectarian, 
racist, regional, or anti-Arabian sentiments.”580  Saddam often mediated the issue of 
sectarianism in his recorded discussions with his high-ranking officers as part of a test of 
psychological and intellectual capacity. In one conversation about sectarianism, Saddam 
declares that if a sectarian affiliation is fanatic it is not created based on a tangible historic, 
economic or social basis, but rather exists at the expense of loyalty that strengthens and 
unifies the nation and its people.581   
While acknowledging the existence of communal attributes, intolerance had to be 
prevented as it would “reject the relationship with Arab nationalism; therefore, when it 
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rejects the relationship or the common allegiance, which is one people, under one roof of 
one nation…it only comes at the expense of the general allegiance.”582 The vilification of 
the other through institutional and ideological tools justified the regime’s treatment of 
groups perceived to be lacking loyalty, unity, and allegiance to the regime and the state. 
The diffusion and permeation of Ba‘thist institutions in society particularly during the 
formative decade following their takeover in 1968 demonstrates the totalitarian 
reconfiguration of the state and its governing trajectory in creating and structuring state-
society relations.  
Sustaining the country’s shift toward totalitarian rule was Saddam’s cult of 
personality. Forms of cultural totalitarianism abound where schools and literary 
intellectuals became instruments of regime propaganda.583 By the 1980s, the Iraqi state 
became meshed with Saddam Hussein’s personalistic rule, as captured by the following 
song for children: 
  We are Iraq and its name is Saddam;  
  We are love and its name is Saddam; 
  We are a people and its name is Saddam; 
  We are the B‘ath and its name is Saddam.584 
 
This level of state penetration produced institutions that sustained Saddam’s autocratic 
single-party, as exemplified by RCC Decree 840 that imposed a life imprisonment 
sentence, the confiscation of property, and possibly the death penalty for anyone insulting 
the president, his deputy, the RCC, the Ba‘th Party, or members of the National 
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Assembly.585 The limitations imposed on candidate eligibility—including believing in the 
Ba’thist revolution and cause, which excluded communists, Shi’is, Kurds, Assyrians and 
other minority groups who were active opponents of the regime, institutionalized these 
structural barriers and prevented the incorporation of the country’s ethnic segments within 
the political process. 586  Successive elections became a façade of regime and party 
domination in state and society. In 1995, elections were held where Saddam, as the sole 
candidate for the presidency, won 99.96 percent of the more than 8 million votes, which 
was hailed as an “immortal day in the history of Arabism and Islam.”587  Similarly, 
Saddam, again the sole candidate, won 100 percent of an estimated 11 million votes cast 
in a 2002 referendum on extending his rule for another seven years.588  
These institutional constraints became the mechanisms by which the regime 
determined the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from the state. Ethnic groups who 
fell in the latter category were excluded from the decisions making arenas and were placed 
in less influential bureaucratic posts. Thus, while it is true that membership in the B‘ath 
party included many Shi’is, Kurds, Assyrians and other minority groups, high decision-
making posts, top security organizations, and upper echelons of the officer corps remained 
overwhelmingly staffed with Sunni-Arabs from Saddam’s Tikriti tribal base who 
constituted Saddam’s “community of trust.”589 In fact seven out of seventeen members of 
the RCC belonged to Saddam’s Albu Nasir tribe by 1998, which made the regime grossly 
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unrepresentative of the country’s ethnic and religious majority and minority groups as 
well as its urban middle class.590 As noted by Saouli, the Baathification and Tikritization 
of Iraq under Saddam Hussein delegitimized the state, alienated Sunni-Arab regime 
contenders, and galvanized and deepened Sunni-Shi’i and Arab-Kurdish animosities.591  
As will be demonstrated in the proceeding chapter, the toppling of the state in 2003 and 
the loss of the Sunni-Arab powerbase would come to pose critical challenges for 
statebuilding in post-Saddam Iraq. However, in keeping with the present analysis, the 
section below explores ethnic responses to institutional constraints under the Ba‘thist era. 
Ethnic Responses to the Ba’thist State 
Ascertaining and contextualizing ethnic responses to the state requires an exploration of 
resistance and contestation vis-à-vis state-regime relations. Thus, rather than exploring 
how the “fragments imagine the nation”, the analysis here examines how and why 
fragments contested and resisted the nation. I argue that as the state became more 
totalitarian in its configuration during the first fifteen years of the initial Ba’thist takeover, 
particularly in its capacity to penetrate society, the more ethnic and religious groups 
resisted the state. I posit that although ethnic conflict in Iraq during this time period was 
a form of group-state conflict, inter-ethnic rivalries were directed against what excluded 
groups saw as a Sunni-Arab state and regime tied closely to Saddam’s tribal base and its 
monopolization of power and institutions.592 Exclusion and growing authoritarianism, 
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deep centralization and permeation of Ba‘thist ideology, the reliance on a Sunni-Arab 
tribal powerbase, and the suppression of pluralism generated divergent responses from 
Iraq’s ethnic communities and political dissidents. 
Although symbolic efforts were made by Bakr and Hussein to placate dissident 
from Kurdish and communist political entities and all “progressive and nationalist 
elements…and all forces in the struggle for liberation, democracy,”593  in a political 
manifesto entitled The National Action Charter, their disinclination to share power with 
opposition groups resulted in their failure to consolidate an increasingly divided political 
arena.594  Thus, political parties emerged as a response to the state’s repressive and 
exclusionary governing tactics and the domination of Sunni-Arabs within the upper 
echelons of the regime. Although Saddam prohibited the formation of political parties 
along ethnic or religious lines by the late 1980s595 in order to “suppress political difference 
and to subordinate every sphere of life to its control,”596 almost all of Iraq’s ethnic and 
religious groups had formed oppositional political parties that operated underground in 
response to the regime and the state.  
Table 7: Prominent Opposition Political Parties under the Ba‘th  
Party Year Formed Ethnic Affiliation 
Iraqi Communist Party 1934 Multi-ethnic 
Kurdistan Democratic Party 1946 (approximate) Kurdish 
Al-Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party 1958 Shi’i Arab 
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Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party 
(BNDP) 
1974 Assyrian 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan  1975 Kurdish 
Assyrian Democratic Movement 1979 Assyrian 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI) 
1982 Shi’i Arab 
Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen 1991 Shi’i Iraqi Turkmen  
Iraqi Turkmen Front 1995   Iraqi Turkmen  
Yazidi Movement for Reform 
and Progress  
Unknown Yazidi 
Shaback Democratic Party Unknown Shaback 
The regime’s Arabization campaigns through forced urbanization, displacement, 
assimilation, and demographic manipulation resulted in the ethnic cleansing of contested 
groups, including Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen and Yazidis in an effort to both homogenize 
and control contested territories. 597  Thus, the imposition of these institutionalized 
constraints coupled with the regime’s failure to consolidate and reconcile divergent 
interests bolstered the efforts of opposition groups against the regime. Saddam’s failure 
to integrate group-based demands and govern inclusively was justified on various grounds. 
For Saddam and the RCC, opposition parties were formed on the basis of personal, 
economic, political, or social reasons, with a key common denominator: their cooptation 
by foreign intelligence groups who sought to destroy the Ba’thist state and regime.598 
 Shi’i grievances, as under the monarchical era, related to their exclusion from key 
governing institutions and their lack of integration with the Sunnis in order to equalize or 
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bolster their influence in the state’s bureaucracy.599 Although the Shi’i community did not 
constitute a monolithic group, as it encompassed both religious and secular elements and 
movements, the regime nevertheless targeted the community on both fronts. Moreover, 
unlike the Kurds, Iraqi Shi’is, beyond seeking greater political integration and power 
sharing, had maintained strong ties with Iraq and had made no territorial demands for 
autonomy and devolution from the Iraqi state. Shi’i resistance was manifested through 
three channels: the Hawza (the highest Shi’i religious seminary in Iraq), the more 
politically oriented al-Dawa (Islamic Call) party which emerged in the late 1950s, and the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (SIIC) formed in 1982, both of which became key 
contending forces against the regime. In addition to the formation of political parties, Iraqi 
Shi’is also resorted to public demonstrations such as the Safar intifada (insurrection) of 
1977 where an estimated 30,000 Shi’is participated in an anti-government rally. The 
politicization of Shi’i grievances and the increasingly active role of the Shi’i ulema 
coincided with the consolidation of Ba’thist power in the 1970s, particularly following 
Saddam’s takeover, the regime’s targeting of Shi’i religious figures, and their exclusion 
from the state.600 The decline of Shi’i power and policymaking influence in Iraq was 
reflected in their lack of representation in the supreme organ of the Ba’th Party, the RCC 
in the lead up to Saddam’s accession to power in 1979. The extent of the regime’s 
antagonism toward the Shi’i community and increasing sectarianism was also reflected in 
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the prohibition of the use of Shi’i family names by 1976 in order to conceal an individual’s 
sectarian affiliation.601 
In the case of the Hawza, the institution and its leadership under Grant Ayatullah 
al-Khoei was targeted for by the regime for its “phobia of Shi‘a annual, religious rituals 
and the large gatherings associated with them.”602 The regime also infiltrated and coopted 
members of the Shi’i ulema. For the Dawa, the regime vilified the party as an instrument 
of colonial powers and Iran for the purposes of instigating sectarianism in the country.603 
The party’s grievances were predicated on Shi’i marginalization from the political process 
and governing institutions, the growing influence of the Communist Party, the imposition 
of a secular ideology by the B‘ath to mitigate Shi’i/sectarian revival, and 
discrimination.604 Its clandestine operations resulted in the suppression and execution of 
both its key leader and political activist, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister, Bint al-
Huda in 1980 (al-Sadr was forced to watch his sister being tortured and then executed 
prior to his execution),605 along with 44 of its members in 1983 for “committing acts of 
sabotage, service with the Persians, who are in league with the Zionists, crimes against 
Arabs, against humanity, and against Islam.” 606  The regime also expelled tens of 
thousands of Iraqi Shi’is many whom were deported to the Iraq-Iran border and put into 
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exile. 607  Summary executions, the targeting of religious leaders, and the regime’s 
interference and infiltration of Shi’i religious institutions would continue into the 1990s, 
with the assassination of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s cousin, Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr 
in 1999 along with the disappearance of over 100 clerics since the 1991 uprisings.608  
While true that they constituted the majority of the rank and file of Iraq’s infantry,609 the 
Iran-Iraq war exacerbated tensions between the Sunni-dominated B‘ath and the country’s 
majority Shi’i due to the latter’s perceived alliance with their co-religionists in Iran.610 
These grievances are particularly important as they provide the context by which Shi’i 
leaders have negotiated and dictated their governing and state-building policies in post-
2003 Iraq.  
For Iraq’s second-largest ethnic group, the institutional constraints imposed on the 
Kurds stemmed not so much from their absence but their implementation. Unlike the 
Shi’is and other small ethnic minorities in Iraq, the Kurds have always sought autonomy 
within territories where they constitute a majority. While various political and territorial 
concessions were made during the Ba‘thist era as solutions for incorporating and 
addressing Kurdish grievances, various factors led to their lack of implementation, 
including increasing Kurdish demands, mistrust between the central government and 
various Kurdish factions, intra-Kurdish conflicts between the two dominant parties and 
tribal affiliations, and the unwillingness of the regime to implement tangible measures. 
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Thus, the consolidation of Kurdish oppositional political parties and their armed resistance 
against the state through their highly trained militia, the peshmerga (Kurdish meaning 
those who face death), led to various revolts and uprisings, including in 1961, 1965, 1972, 
1974, and 1991. Unlike the Shi’i, the regime attempted to recognize and create 
institutional solutions for the Kurds, including their recognition in successive 
constitutional documents in Iraq alongside the Arabs. However, more often than not, these 
symbolic concessions rarely materialized into tangible policy outcomes.  
Thus, various factors dictated the central government’s reaction against what the 
regime perceived to be a perennial enemy. These included the Kurdish armed struggle in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, a deterioration of the security situation in the northern provinces and 
heightened fears during the Iran-Iraq war fuelled by the KDP’s material and intelligence 
support for Iranian forces throughout the 1980s, Iran’s support in establishing Kurdish 
autonomy in the northern provinces, and intra-Kurdish political rivalry between the KDP 
and PUK. 611  By 1987, Saddam had appointed his cousin, ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid (the 
notorious ‘Chemical Ali’), with great powers and autonomy in dealing with Kurdish 
insurrections. For the aforementioned reasons, ‘Ali began an obstinate campaign known 
as the al-Anfal (the spoils of war) culminating in the use of chemical weapons to contain 
political dissidents living in the northern region. Suspects belonging to guerrilla 
organizations, primarily Kurds were executed, scorched earth policy was used to uproot 
thousands of Kurds other ethnic minorities residing in the northern region, including 
attacks on Assyrian villages along the northern borders where an estimated thirty-one 
																																																								




Assyrian villages and twenty-five churches and monasteries were destroyed between 
1987-1988.612 By 1988 the campaign led to the full use of chemical weapons especially 
on the Kurdish town of Halabja, which resulted in the death of an estimated 4,000 Kurds, 
many of which were women and children.613  Although Kurdish resistance had been 
severely curtailed as a result of the regime’s violent suppression, the Kurds would 
mobilize support and coordinate another uprising in 1991 along with the Shi’is.  
For the aforementioned reasons, and in taking advantage of the weakening in the 
state’s security sector and failed promises of American and foreign support, Shi’is and 
Kurds led an uncoordinated insurrection (intifada) that erupted in 16 out of Iraq’s 18 
provinces against the state between March-April 1991 following the First Gulf War. 
Although each community, including Sunni Arabs, had its own grievances against the 
state, the intifada coalesced the grievances of various ethnic, religious, and political 
opposition forces based on their suppression under the Ba’thist state. Economic, political, 
and human losses produced a demoralized security sector and populace who had 
undergone two major wars (Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 and the first Gulf War 1990), which also 
fuelled societal grievances with the state and regime. 614  The uprising was brutally 
suppressed as Saddam engaged in a massive military campaign across the country 
culminating in a violent suppression of Iraqis across all ethnic and religious groups. This 
produced divergent outcomes for different ethno-religious groups. For the Shi’i in the 
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south, the regime’s brutal suppression resulted in an estimated 20,000-100,000 deaths, and 
many more disappearances. The regime also drained an economically and ecologically 
vital sector for the Shi’i of the south, the Iraqi marshes, to prevent guerrilla incursions, 
causing one of the most devastating ecological disasters of the century in the region.615 
Moreover, the government engaged in a methodical anti-Shi’i campaign with slogans that 
declared “No more Shi‘a after today,” that only fuelled sectarian and religious tensions 
until the toppling of the regime in 2003.616 The outcome for the Kurds varied drastically. 
Whereas the Shi’i, who engaged in another uprising in 1999, which was violently 
suppressed, became increasingly persecuted and targeted by the regime for their 
‘transgression’, the U.S. and its allies through U.N. Resolution 688 mandated the 
implementation of a no-fly zone beyond the 36th parallel that prevented further 
insurrections on the Kurds and other displaced populations by the Iraqi army. This 
effectively established a de-facto Kurdish autonomous region, or Iraqi Kurdistan, 
configured out of three the northern provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniya 
administered by its political arm, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  
 For Iraq’s smaller ethnic and religious minorities who were never recognized in 
any constitutional documents, the institutional constraints imposed by the Ba‘th, including 
Arabization policies produced segmental cleavages resulting in their exclusion, 
marginalization, and discrimination. For the Assyrians, their resistance to the B‘ath state 
stemmed from their exclusion, but, like Iraq’s other non-Arab groups, also from the 
imposition of pan-Arabism, which only allowed Assyrians to identify as ethnically Arab 
																																																								
615 Davis, 231.  




or Kurdish Christians in official state documents. Although Resolution 440 of 1973 
granted the community the rights to establish Assyrian or Syriac language schools, Law 
No. 78 of 1971 on the Assyrian Community of Iraq allowed the regime to administer the 
internal, religious, and educational affairs of the community. Likewise, Assyrian civic 
organizations, including the Assyrian Cultural Clubs of Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Basra, as 
well as the Assyrian Athletic Club of Baghdad, which aimed to promote cultural and 
linguistic rights, were heavily monitored and co-opted by the regime through spies.617 
Another form of resistance was the formation of the Assyrian Democratic Movement 
(ADM), an opposition political party in 1979 for the purpose of combating pan-Arabism 
(which obviated Assyrian ethnic and cultural rights) and to implement Assyrian 
administrative rights.618 The party was heavily suppressed by the regime, resulting in 
mass arrests, torture, and the execution, by hanging, of three of its founding members.619 
The regime also ordered the removal of all civic clubs containing the name Assyrian in an 
attempt to homogenize and limit their civic engagement.  
 In the case of the Turkmen community, their resistance to the state also stemmed 
from the regime’s Arabization policies and their exclusion and marginalization from the 
state’s governing apparatuses. Located primarily in Kirkuk—a multi-ethnic and intensely 
disputed city, the Turkmen are considered ethnic Turks and speak a variation of Turkish. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s and at the height of Ba’thist Arabization policies, the 
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RCC decree 1391 of 1981 forced Turkmen to settle in other cities and provinces and 
Turkmen neighbourhoods and homes were replaced with Arabs from other parts of 
Iraq.620 The population exchanges that took place in Kirkuk were purposive of limiting 
any one group from laying claim to the city. Civic organizations, such as the Turkmen 
Brotherhood Club of Kirkuk, were also heavily monitored by the regime, and although 
the B‘ath granted the community rights to establish their own schools in 1970, this was 
abrogated one year later.621 The level of state infiltration of ethnic civic society groups is 
captured by Dr. Jerjis’s statement regarding the B‘ath regime’s treatment of the Turkmen 
community of Kirkuk: 
  
Until 1980, the administrative committee of the Turkmen Brotherhood Club were determined 
by elections by the members of the Club who were calculated by thousands. In 1980, the 
government arrested the leaders of the club who were the leaders of Turkmen community 
and sentenced them to death. From 1980, the administrative committee of the club was 
appointed by government.622 
 
Moreover, although the majority of Iraqi Turkmen are Sunni, Shi’i Turkmen who joined 
the al-Da’wa party along with their Shi’i Arabs co-religionists were imprisoned and 
executed in the 1980s, along with other Turkmen intellectuals and community leaders.623 
 For Iraq’s smaller minority communities such as the Yazidis and Mandeans, the 
regime engaged in systematic cooptation and persecution of its members perceived to be 
against the regime and its ideology. In the case of the former, Arabization produced two 
outcomes. First, through the confiscation of Yazidi lands resulting in their forced removal 
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to heavily populated Arab areas and the loss of their agricultural lands and livelihoods. 
Two, the Yazidis, like Assyrians and Turkmen, were forced to also identify as Arab under 
the Ba’thist system, and parents where forced to assign Arab names to their children.624 
The level of state penetration prohibited the Yazidis from forming civic or social 
organizations under the B‘ath regime. Similarly, as a religious minority, the Mandean 
community of Iraq experienced high levels of state penetration in Mandean religious and 
civic institutions. Mandeans were prohibited from publicizing their religion, religious 
organizations were heavily infiltrated and monitored by the regime, and members who 
opposed the regime either through communist or independent channels were executed.625 
Dr. Alroomi, a Mandean survivor of the Ba’thist era recounts the following: 
The few civil organisations that existed in the eighties and nineties were limited and restricted in 
function and have [sic] to be careful not to trespass the regime apparatus of tight control and 
monitoring. The fear and fright of persecution that was practiced by the regime made people too 
scared to defy the system and in a way it was self monitoring against any deviation from what was 
allowed at the time under the tight control and the brutality of the system. Any community or 
individuals who defy the regime would be brutally dealt with. Many young Mandaean [sic] 
individuals were killed and or executed or punished by imprisonment because of being political 
activists.626  
 
High levels of state infiltration in civic, religious, and social life, combined with a deep 
state security monitoring system enabled the state to permeate and exert its control over 






624 Interview, Mr. Mirza Ismail of the Yazidi Human Rights Organization, (March 2014).  
625 Interview, Dr. Layla Alroomi, Mandean Human Rights Organization, (February 2014).  




An institutional analysis of regime and state consolidation following the collapse of the 
monarchy and the birth of the republic reveals a pattern of path dependence resulting in 
the ethnic re-domination of the state by Sunni-Arabs through the Ba‘th party and regime. 
The imposition of a monolithic ethnic-based ideology, pan-Arabism as a strategy of ethnic 
dominance by Sunni Arabs and its institutionalization under the Ba‘thist state created 
constraints and equally opposing responses from ethnic and religious groups who saw 
themselves outside the state and its ideology resulting in “conditions where mass murder, 
genocide and ethnocide could be committed and justified in the name of protecting the 
integrity and identity of the Iraqi state.”627 As state institutions became heavily embedded 
in a regime that favoured exclusion and authoritarian governance rather than inclusion and 
conciliation of its divided segments, ethnic and religious groups resorted to alternative 
forms of contestation.  
A common experienced shared by all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups points 
to the presence of four factors: forced displacement, regime infiltration and cooptation of 
civic, religious and political organizations and entities, exclusion from the state’s 
governing institutions, and, in the case of minorities such as Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen, 
Yazidis, and Mandeans, a shared Arabization experienced. The collapse of the state in 
2003 ushered social, economic, and political transformations of the state that had existed 
for over three decades under the B‘ath regime. This exogenous shock and the opening of 
the political space that had remained close for nearly four decades produced new 
																																																								




challenges for governing this deeply divided society as the dynamics of ethnic dominance 

































Continuity and Change: Institutions, Statebuilding, and Ethnic Discord 
following Regime Collapse 
 
 
“Acknowledging God's right over us, and in fulfilment of the call of our homeland and citizens, and in 
response to the call of our religious and national leaderships and the determination of our great (religious) 
authorities and of our leaders and reformers, and in the midst of an international support from our friends 
and those who love us, marched for the first time in our history toward the ballot boxes by the millions, men 
and women, young and old, on the thirtieth of January two thousand and five, invoking the pains of sectarian 
oppression sufferings inflicted by the autocratic clique and inspired by the tragedies of Iraq's martyrs, Shiite 
and Sunni, Arabs and Kurds and Turkmen and from all the other components of the people and recollecting 
the darkness of the ravage of the holy cities and the South in the Sha'abaniyya uprising and burnt by the 
flames of grief of the mass graves, the marshes, Al-Dujail and others and articulating the sufferings of racial 
oppression in the massacres of Halabcha, Barzan, Anfal and the Fayli Kurds and inspired by the ordeals of 
the Turkmen in Basheer and as is the case in the remaining areas of Iraq where the people of the west 
suffered from the assassinations of their leaders, symbols and elderly and from the displacement of their 
skilled individuals and from the drying out of their cultural and intellectual wells, so we sought hand in hand 
and shoulder to shoulder to create our new Iraq, the Iraq of the future free from sectarianism, racism, locality 
complex, discrimination and exclusion.”628 
 




This chapter seeks to explain the social and political forces that produced failed 
statebuilding following the 2003 American-led invasion and subsequent occupation. This 
third critical juncture in Iraq’s political history marked the second external intervention 
since the period of state formation in 1920. In the decade between 2003-2013, Iraq 
underwent one of the most expedient statebuilding experiences accompanied by an almost 
entire institutional reconfiguration of the authoritarian state and the dismantling of 
Ba’thist governing institutions, the liberalization of the socialist economy, and opening 
the political space for civic engagement. In many ways, this transformation is perhaps the 
																																																								




most critical as it loosened the political landscape and altered the institutional setting to 
accommodate previously excluded majority and minority groups in governing the state.  
While regime change led to the collapse of the authoritarian equilibrium that had 
existed for over thirty years, this period is characterize by failed statebuilding resulting in 
the replication of the causal mechanisms that produced exclusion and ethnic dominance, 
albeit with a reversal in the privileged and excluded groups. Likewise, the prioritization 
of a “pat formula” by the American architects of Iraq’s democracy rather than 
emphasizing the process of “negotiation among the parties that not only translates their 
power in the conflict into positions in the new system, but that also provides both 
protection to the parties whatever their position, and trade-offs and incentives for all to 
preserve the regime”629 defined the post-conflict institutional playing-filed and reshaped 
forms of exclusion, mobilization, and state contestation. Thus, while institutional 
reconfiguration was purposive of creating the opportunity structures that could 
accommodate inclusive and representative democratic governance, expedient and 
inadequate institutional design during the first critical years of the occupation 
unintentionally reproduced ethnic dominance by previously excluded elites. Rather than 
attributing democratic breakdown to the power-sharing and consociational institutions 
that were chosen to govern Iraq as a divided society, I argue that ethnic allegiance as a 
defining marker of political mobilization is an outcome of both an inadequate and 
expedient statebuilding that failed to devise parallel institutions that could depoliticize 
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ethnic grievances, as well as ethnic elite behaviour that have deepened segmental 
cleavages following regime collapse.  
Chapter Outline 
The chapter aims to do the following. The first section examines the conceptual 
requisites for democratic transition in order to frame the conditions and processes that led 
to regime collapse and an exogenously imposed statebuilding period post-2003. Attention 
is paid to the American foreign policy toward Iraq since the First Gulf War and its shift 
post-9/11. This background is followed by an examination of the institutional overhaul of 
the Ba’thist state and the political context that dictated its democratic transition. Crucial 
to this analysis are the policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as the 
primary civilian institution tasked with engineering democratization in Iraq and the limits 
and consequences of its statebuilding attempt. In the last section, I explain failed 
statebuilding resulting in a protracted ethnic conflict by highlighting domestic and 
regional causal factors that have exacerbated ethnic tensions.  
 
State Collapse, Democratization, and External Intervention 
Conceptualizing Transition and Democratization in Iraq 
 
Explaining democratic transition in Iraq since 2003 requires a disaggregation of the causal 
mechanisms that have shaped the state’s governing trajectory following regime collapse. 




regime and another”630 due to either endogenous forces that succeed in toppling and 
recapturing the state or through external intervention culminating in regime and state 
collapse631, opens a previously closed political arena. A democratic juncture often creates 
a fissure in the power dynamics that previously structured the political, social, and 
economic composition of the state under autocratic rule. It also signals a divergence from 
the previous order whereby “the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to 
political institutions previously governed by other principles…or expanded to include 
persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations…or extended to cover issues 
and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation.”632  However, as such 
succinctly noted by O’Donnell and Schmitter—and of particular importance to this case, 
authoritarian transitions have variable effects and consequences ranging from the 
institutionalization of political democracy or a return to authoritarian rule, noting that: 
The outcome can also be simply confusion, that is, the rotation in power of successive governments 
which fail to provide any enduring or predictable solution to the problem of institutionalizing 
political power. Transitions can also develop into widespread, violent confrontations, eventually 
giving way to revolutionary regimes which promote changes going far beyond the political 
realm.633  
 
Outcomes often define the parameters and the processes that result in the modes of conflict 
and cooperation between emerging governing elites, which shape the transition and the 
emergent state. In the given context, the ethnic security dilemma created during this 
																																																								
630 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 6. 
631 State collapse here denotes the “reduction and then the collapse of the state’s coercive and spatial 
monopoly, while regime collapse denotes a “disorganization of political power” that opens the space for 
previously excluded actors to share power in the given polity resulting in what Bunce succinctly calls the 
“deregulation of politics.” See Bunce (1999), 11-12.  
632 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 8. 




fissure results in the intensification of these processes as it can foster competition between 
ethnic groups in divided societies.634     
Various factors contribute to the stagnation of democratic transition in Iraq 
following regime change. First, the historical legacy of institutionalized exclusion and 
authoritarianism have created a culture of fear in how ethnic groups perceive each other 
and how they perceive the state and its governing apparatuses producing political 
ideologies based on “exclusive group-based interest rather than on universal, society-wide 
interests.” 635  This is discernable in how elites (initially externally imposed) have 
consistently used their “strategic positions in government as a basis for eliminating other 
players” rather than agreeing to “occupy those spaces contingently and to share them with, 
or turn them over to, opposing players according to preestablished rules of 
competition.”636 Second, these animosities result in ethnic outbidding whereby extremist 
elites capitalize on grievances which encourages the proliferation of ethnic parties by 
marginalizing moderating forces producing instability in fragmented societies.637  Thus, 
while Iraq has always been politically fragmented along many social fault lines (including 
class, urban-rural, and ethnic), the opening in the political space post-2003 heightened, 
and, to an extent, exacerbated this fragmentation.638 Iraq’s experience is not anomalous 
for an ethnically divided society transitioning from authoritarian rule as the initial 
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democratic opening in the political space allows for groups to organize and rebel against 
the state without fear of repression. 639  Nevertheless, the historic absence of an 
accommodative and consensual political culture one characterized by a “people’s 
predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the 
political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system”640 has shaped ethnic 
elite behavior as much as the deficiencies stemming from the post-2003 transition from 
single-party autocratic rule.   
In situating the post-2003 transition along a longitudinal analysis of the state’s 
development, we observe that the initial opening during this critical juncture redefined 
and reproduced the parameters of inclusion and exclusion as ethnic elites attempted to 
define and negotiate their position in the emergent political order. While the American 
architects of Iraq’s democracy attempted to revamp the authoritarian state by formulating 
a political system predicated on allotting all groups in society a stake in governance, the 
ethnification of political grievances have affected the post-2003 governing trajectory. 
Consequently, the inadequate implementation of a consociational model of governance 
post-occupation produced a diametrically opposite effect whereby previously excluded 
ethnic elites reproduced preceding governing patterns that reoriented the state and 
democratic institutions toward an exclusionary and authoritarian trajectory.  
 Framing Iraq’s post-2003 transition requires an analysis of the initial conditions 
and policy outcomes that dictated its transition following regime collapse. 
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Conceptualizing this trajectory requires an explanation of American foreign policy in its 
emphasis on regime change in Iraq both prior to and post-911.  
American Foreign Policy and Iraq 
 
In many ways, America’s exogenous statebuilding project for Iraq following the 2003 
invasion and subsequent occupation corresponded with Britain’s state formation and 
subsequent statebuilding of the country in 1920. Whereas the former resulted in the 
toppling of one of the region’s longest standing dictators and effectively ended Sunni-
Arab monopolization of the state and governing institutions, the latter had given rise to 
this governing pattern since the time of state formation. Both periods reflect a systematic 
effort to politically engineer and re-engineer of the institutional foundations of the Iraqi 
state. In observing some of the parallel continuities, we thus see a reversal in the pattern 
of ethnic dominance in Iraq from the time of state formation in 1920 and post-2003. On 
an institutional level, whereas the British Mandate was tasked with building the 
institutional, political, economic, and to an extent, the social capacity of the Iraqi state 
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the redrawing of regional boundaries 
into nation-states, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was likewise, tasked with 
rebuilding Iraqi state capacity following the collapse of the state in 2003. As noted by 
Dodge, the inability of both foreign powers to create a functioning and secure state 
affected Iraq’s governing trajectory post-occupation.641  
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American foreign policy objectives toward Iraq must be contextualized alongside 
the political processes that unfolded over the decade following the First Gulf War. As 
noted in the preceding chapter, the Gulf War also resulted in Shi’i and Kurdish uprisings 
against the regime. Whereas the Shi’is in the south became heavily suppressed by the 
regime, the Kurds were able to retreat to what effectively became an internationally 
protected Kurdistan region under Operation Northern Watch642 (which was subsequently 
deemed illegal and in violation of Iraqi sovereignty by the United Nations)643 following 
the allied powers’ creation of the no-fly zone beyond the 36th parallel. This territorial 
protection facilitated the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) consisting of Iraqi 
expats and opposition groups led by Ahmad Chalabi (who would be instrumental in 
providing now considered inflated intelligence to American policy makers prior to the 
2003 invasion) along with the Iraqi National Accord established in 1990 led by Ayad 
Allawi. In particular, two Iraqi opposition conferences, one held in Vienna in April of 
1992 and later on October 27 of the same year in Salahuddin in Iraqi Kurdistan 
representing ethnic, religious, sectarian, and secular delegates became the impetus for 
devising the structural and political plan for a post-Hussein transitional Iraq.644 Thus, 
unsurprisingly, the majority Shi’i and minority groups, including the Kurds, Assyrians, 
Turkmen, Yazidis, and Mandeans who had been systematically targeted by the regime, 
supported the initial invasion. This was exemplified by the Visions of Freedom meeting 
																																																								
642 “Operation Northern Watch,” Global Security: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/northern_watch.htm  
643 BBC, “No-Fly Zones: the Legal Position,” February 19 2001: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm  
644 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale 




and declaration that took place in the city of Nasiriyah (where a major battle had been won 
by coalition forces against Ba’thist insurgents between March 23-29 2003) on April 15 
2003 and attended by 100 Iraqis from across the ethno-religious spectrum (less than a 
month into the invasion), concluding that,  
I. Iraq must be democratic; 
II. The future government of Iraq should not be based on communal identity; 
III. A future government should be organized as a democratic federal system, but on the basis of 
countrywide consultation; 
IV. The rule of law must be paramount; 
V. That Iraq must be built on respect for diversity including respect for the role of women. 
VI. The meeting discusses the role of religion in state and society; 
VII. The meeting discused [sic] the principle that Iraqis must choose their leaders, not have them 
imposed from outside; 
VIII. That political violence must be rejected, and that Iraqis must immediately organize 
themselves for the task of reconstruction at both the local and national levels; 
IX. That Iraqis and the coalition must work together to tackle the immediate issues of restoring 
security and basic services; 
X. That the Baath party must be dissolved and its effects on society must be eliminated; 
XI. That there should be an open dialogue with all national political groups to bring them into 
the process; 
XII. That the meeting condemns the looting that has taken place and the destruction of 
documents; 
XIII. The Iraqi participation in the Nasiriyah meeting voted that there should be another meeting 
in 10 days in a location to be determined with additional Iraqi participants and to discuss 
procedures for developing an Iraqi interim authority.645 
  
While the architects of the occupation were external forces supported by a select-few 
vetted expatriate members of the Iraqi opposition, there remained a semblance of 
endogenous support for the emergent post-Ba‘thist order immediately following the 
occupation, particularly from non-Sunni Arabs.  
Furthermore, although the 2003 occupation was an instrument of the George W. 
Bush’s National Security Plan, 646  American policy toward the removal of Saddam 
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Hussein was a common theme throughout the 1990s advocated largely by a narrow group 
of neoconservatives tied to various American Jewish lobby organizations and their allies 
in congress since the late 1990s and post-9/11 that sought to “portray Arafat, bin Laden, 
and Saddam as critical parts of a looming menace that threatened both Israel and the 
United States.” 647  In particular, neoconservatives during the Clinton administration 
including key figures such as Paul Wolfwotiz, Lewis Libby, Dick Cheney, and William 
Kristol later became architects of Bush’s foreign policy approach to dealing with 
perceived threats to American and international security under the doctrine of pre-emption 
policy.648 For example, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998—the blueprint for regime change, 
noted that “It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the 
regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of 
a democratic government to replace that regime.”649 This unequivocal policy toward 
regime change also delineated material and humanitarian support for vetted Iraqi 
democratic opposition groups who were “committed to democratic values, to respect for 
human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq’s neighbors, to maintaining Iraq’s territorial 
integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam 
Hussein regime” with the understanding that these groups would fill the political vacuum 
and institute democratic reforms following the toppling of the Ba‘th regime.650 Similarly, 
the December 2002 London conference of the Iraqi Opposition resulted in the formation 
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of a sixty-five person committee representing various organizations from Iraqi opposition 
groups who would play a role in Iraq’s post-Saddam transition. However, the conference 
failed to devise a tangible plan for political consolidation post-transition and to address 
critical issues that would come to dominate the political landscape in post-2003 Iraq such 
as how to revamp the Sunni-dominated system, the meaning and scope of federalism and 
Kurdish separatism, the role of religion, Iranian influence, and de-Ba‘thification.651  
Although the United States and its allies remained key actors in Iraq’s post-
invasion transition, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies soon began to 
facilitate Iraq’s political transition by emphasizing the need to aid Iraqis in establishing 
their own transitional representative government and to rebuild Iraqi state and institutional 
capacity.652 The subsequent policies of the CPA following regime collapse in May of 
2003 were largely predicated on recommendations made in the Future of Iraq Project of 
the Transitional Justice Working Group at U.S. Department of State with the intention of 
“transforming an unstable and chaotic state, caused by a dictatorship with a legacy of gross 
human rights abuses, to a democratic pluralistic system which respects the rule of law.”653 
As a blueprint for post-regime statebuilding, it outlined expansive legal and institutional 
reforms and included proposals for the dissolution of all Ba‘thist state entities starting 
with abolishing and banning the party and its members, disbanding and restructuring the 
armed forces, and disbanding the state’s special security apparatuses. 654  Almost all 
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subsequent CPA policies reflected much of the policy recommendations made by 
working-groups comprising of Iraqi leaders in exile, including de-Baathification, which 
was outlined in the Future of Iraq Project’s Transitional Justice Plan.655 Moreover, and 
without taking into the account the inherent differences in the application of the post-
WWII American statebuilding paradigm in Germany and Japan (two culturally and 
ethnically homogenous societies) and in ignoring a key factor that justified America’s 
engagement—that the Axis powers had directly threatened and attacked the United States 
and its allies,656 American policy-makers, including President George W. Bush and Paul 
Bremer, looked to Germany and Japan as cases for replicating successful post-conflict 
statebuilding.657 The assumed transplantation of these success cases to Iraq was rooted in 
a ‘one-size’ fits all policy that failed to contextualize the scope and justification of the 
interventions.    
Contextualizing post-2003 statebuilding in Iraq thus requires an analysis of the 
causal processes that affected its outcome and trajectory. This is important considering 
this transitional period suffered from a “systematic dilemma”658 of the local (endogenous) 
versus international (in this case, American) ownership of the process of democratization 
and peacebuilding particularly where regime collapse did not accompanied by endogenous 
statebuilding that would have incorporated vetted Iraqi technocrats into the emergent 
governing system. Rather, the CPA, as an externally imposed interim regime/government, 
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acted as an organization that ruled the polity “during the period between the fall of the 
ancien regime and the initiation of the next regime.”659 Headed by Ambassador Paul 
Bremer—directly appointed by the President of the United States—the CPA acted as an 
international supervisory authority660 with full legislative, executive and administrative 
powers from 2003-2004. 661  On a structural level, it reflected a complex, nebulous 
institution consisting of U.S. policy makers, military and intelligence officials, unilateral 
and multilateral aid agencies, intergovernmental organizations such as the U.N., and 
contractors, all tasked with rebuilding what would become Iraq’s post-occupation 
democratic governing system.662 Nevertheless, this external governing body initiated the 
transitional process, set the rules for transition, and managed the transitional process 
almost entirely without any endogenous support.663 Complicating the civil administration 
was Bremer’s appointment. With no experience in Iraq or in post-conflict statebuilding 
and development, and lacking proficiency in Arabic, Bremer was appointed by George W. 
Bush because he was “widely viewed as having both the diplomatic polish and the 
neoconservative credentials to win support from both the State Department and the 
Pentagon.”664  
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While the role and efficacy of the CPA has been scrutinized elsewhere,665  I 
analyze a select few policy decisions from May 2003 to 28 June 2004 in order to 
contextualize their subsequent impact on statebuilding a decade later to demonstrate how 
such policies inadvertently provided the opportunity structures that fostered the 
reproduction of historical modes of exclusion and authoritarianism by emerging ethnic 
elites. These policies reflect the CPA’s intention to ‘clean house’ immediately following 
regime collapse in 2003. Thus, from March 2003 to June 2004, we see the most abrupt 
institutional changes that had swept Iraq since the time of state formation in 1920 under 
British tutelage, albeit, with a caveat. While the latter period resulted in the imposition 
and institutionalization of Sunni-Arab rule through the Hashemite monarchy and the 
replication of this governing pattern under Ba‘thist rule, post-2003 saw the reversal in the 
ethnic ownership of the state, one unintentionally dominated by the previously excluded 
Shi’i Arab and Kurds. The reversal of the preceding governing pattern that defined the 
parameters of inclusion/exclusion has directly shaped the processes and mechanisms that 
have fuelled Iraq’s protracted inter-ethnic discord during this last critical statebuilding 
period. In order to contextualize the causal processes that unfolded following regime 
collapse, it is instructive to assess the outcomes of critical policies choices implemented 
in Iraq following occupation. 
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Commencing on a Clean Slate: Institutions and Statebuilding after 
Regime Collapse  
De-Baathification and Institutional Reconfiguration 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the regime and the Ba‘th Party had effectively 
become the Iraqi state. The encapsulation of the state by the regime and the party, and its 
diffusion in society imposed, both willing and unwilling, a policy that ensured state-wide 
party membership to subvert dissidence.666  The dissolution of the Ba’thist state and 
subsequent revamping of the country’s governing institutions was entrenched in Iraq’s 
post-2003 statebuilding schema; i.e. the emphasis on dissolving any semblance of the 
Ba’thist state was the chief policy the CPA. Whereas CPA Order No. 1 of May 16 2003 
for the de-Baathification of Iraqi Society officially disbanded the Ba‘th party in its 
entirety 667  Order No. 2 dissolved all Ba‘thist entities, party structures, financial 
institutions, leaders and leadership positions, that led to a systematic and direct cleansing 
of individuals and technocrats deemed to be party supporters. This included the complete 
dissolution of the following political, security, and intelligence institutions, some of which 
were later replaced with new mandates: 
 
 The Ministry of Defence 
 The Ministry of Information 
 The Ministry of State for Military Affairs  
 The Iraqi Intelligence Service 
 The National Security Bureau 
 The Directorate of National Security (Amn al‘am) 
 The Special Security Organization 
 Entities comprising Saddam Hussein’s bodyguards: 
o Murafaqin (Companions); 
o Himaya al Khasa (Special Guard). 
 Military Organizations: 
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o The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defence Force, and other military services; 
o The Republican Guard; 
o The Special Republican Guard; 
o The Directorate of Military Intelligence; 
o The Al Quds Force; 
o Emergency Forces (Quwat al Tawari).  
 Paramilitary units: 
o Saddam Fedayeen; 
o Ba‘th Party Militia; 
o Friends of Saddam; 
o Saddam’s Lion Cubs (Ashbal Saddam). 
 Other state organizations: 
o The Presidential Diwan (Presidential Council-highest executive authority); 
o The Presidential Secretariat; 
o The National Assembly; 
o The Youth Organization (al-Futuwah); 
o National Olympic Committee; 
o Revolutionary, Special and National Security Courts.668 
  
In order to maintain this institutional transformation, the CPA Order Number 5 of May 
2003 established the Iraqi de-Baathification Council consisting of vetted members of the 
Iraqi opposition tasked with investigating all aspects relating to the individual, collective, 
structural and institutional Ba‘th purging process that was mandated in Orders No. 1 and 
2 mentioned above. 669  This was also promulgated in key sections of the Law of 
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (also known as the TAL) 
of 2004, which acted as the country’s interim constitution during the transitional period 
post-occupation. Specifically, Articles 31 B (2,3), 36 B and 49 of the TAL contained 
provisions that prohibited members of the dissolved Ba’th Party from participating in the 
National Assembly and running for presidential or executive office.670 The TAL was 
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replaced with a new Iraqi constitution in October of 2005, which upheld the power, 
function, and validity of the High Commission for de-Baathification under Article 135.671  
Although this council was disbanded following the transfer of sovereignty under 
CPA Order No. 100 in June 2004 to the Interim Iraqi Government, it was re-established 
as Law No. 10 of 2008—Law of Supreme National Commission of Accountability and 
Justice to fulfill the original mandate of “uprooting” or de-Baathification with the intent 
to “dismantle the system of the Baath Party from the Iraqi Society, State institutes and 
civil society organizations ideologically, administratively, politically, culturally and 
economically.”672 Article 3 attributes six functions to the Commission: 
1. Prevent the ideological, administrative, political and practical return of the Baath Party 
under any name into power or public life in Iraq. 
2. Cleanse the establishments of the public and mixed sectors, the civil society organizations 
and the Iraqi society from the Baath Party system in any form whatsoever. 
3. Refer elements of the dissolved Baath Party and Repressive Services, who through 
investigation are convicted with criminal offences perpetrated against the people of Iraq, 
to the competent courts for fair trial.  
4. Enable victims of the crimes of the Baath Party and Repressive Services, through referral 
to the competent authorities, to claim and collect compensations for damages inflicted 
upon them because of those crimes.  
5. Contribute in the detection of funds that had been seized by the Lieutenants of the Defunct 
Regime by illicit means inside and outside Iraq and work of returning them to the state 
treasury.  
6. Serve the Iraqi memory through documenting the crimes and illegal practices of the 
elements of the Baath Party and its Repressive Services, and provide a database about 
those elements to be accessible to the public in order to fortify future generations from 
falling into the clutches injustice, tyranny and oppression.673  
 
The permeation of this institution in subsequent Iraqi constitutional documents bolstered 
its scope and mandate and determined the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of Iraqis 
during this critical statebuilding process. 
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Incongruous Statebuilding under the CPA   
 
An assessment of these critical CPA policies during the first few months of the occupation 
aids in contextualizing much of the political and communal responses to the emergent and 
exogenously imposed order. Although largely concerned with the implementation of 
neoliberal and liberalization policies of Iraq’s economic sector following regime collapse, 
the architects of Iraq’s post-occupation statebuilding were aware of the pervasiveness of 
the army as strong functioning institution with a deep loyalty to the regime, as noted by 
L. Paul Bremer III, 
The army was a coherent institution but it was the primary institution of repression, physical 
repression of the people so it was a functioning institution but it was used as a weapon by Saddam 
against his own people. It probably was the only other institution and again I don’t think this is 
unusual in a dictatorship normally the security forces is a coherent institution royal to the 
dictator.674   
 
The rash decision of the CPA to dismantle this key institution left an estimated half a 
million armed Iraqi men without wages and without jobs. Although precise figures are 
difficult to ascertain, the CPA’s institutional sweeping of former Ba’thist members 
through de-Baathification resulted in the purging of an estimated 20-120,000 Iraqis, 
including doctors, teachers, and other technocrats675 along with an estimated 100,000 
members of Iraq’s various intelligence and security sectors676 following regime collapse. 
Likewise, the exclusion of former Ba‘th party members from the new governing 
institutions extended to the New Iraqi Army (NIA) created by the CPA Order No. 22, 
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which stipulated the “absence of affiliation with the security and political control organs 
of the former regime” for all members of the NIA.677  Consequently, these policies not 
only resulted in the absolute collapse of the country’s security sector, but left an estimated 
500,000 Iraqi soldiers armed, unemployed, and without pension pay until a vetting process 
was put in place a few months later that reinstated selective pension payouts.678  
Moreover, inadequate planning on the part of the CPA coupled with insufficient 
material and financial support from the occupying powers, and a mounting insurgency 
resulting from the absence of an endogenous security sector gravely impeded the capacity 
of the New Iraqi Army and security sectors.679 Although the CPA began issuing monthly 
stipends to an estimated quarter of a million soldiers it had unemployed, growing 
resentment toward the CPA and the occupiers by disenfranchised officers fuelled the 
armed resistance and contributed to the speedy deterioration in the security situation post-
occupation.680 In an attempt to institute order and integrate some former Iraqi officers into 
the new security sectors of the state CPA Order 27 created the Facilities Protection Service 
aimed at protecting critical infrastructure, while CPA Order 28 created the Iraqi Civil 
Defense Corps in September of 2003 as a temporary institution to replace the functions of 
the army and military. It was tasked with controlling urban and rural areas, seizing illegal 
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weapons, manning checkpoints and security routes, riot patrols, provide security for 
humanitarian missions, and acting as liaisons with the coalition forces.681 Nevertheless, 
CPA Order 2 and subsequent efforts to depose Iraqi society of any semblance of the 
Ba’thist state conditioned the processes that unfolded regarding the deep security vacuum 
and insurgency that ensued. Likewise, the absence of a security system that could ensure 
a stable security environment both pre and post transition gravely hinders, if not makes 
impossible, all subsequent political, economic, and cultural rebuilding.682 
A critical policy error on the part of the coalition policy makers was the absence 
of a comprehensive and tangible disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
plan683 further exacerbated ethnic tensions as groups began organizing along militias in 
the absence of a respected endogenous security force that could maintain law and order. 
A well-devised DDR plan is a critical policy prescription for countries undergoing 
transition from conflict as it drastically determines the extent and trajectory of post-
conflict reconstruction, development, and peacebuilding efforts in war-torn countries.684 
In the case of Iraq, although a Transition and Reintegration Implementation Committee 
																																																								
681 CPA, Order Number 28-Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps: 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030903_CPAORD_28_Est_of_the_Iraqi_Civil_Defense_Corp
s.pdf  
682 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Post-conflict societies and the military: Challenges and 
problems of security sector reform,” in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, eds., 
Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 1.  
683 As a critical component to post-conflict peacebuilding in war-torn societies, DDR usually consists of a 
multilateral effort to a) collect, document, and control and dispose of small arms, ammunition, explosives 
and light and heavy weapons from combatants and from civilian populations; b) a formal plan to control 
and discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups; c) to integrate ex-combatants into 
civilian life by providing them with sustainable assistance and employment income. See United Nations 
Peacekeeping, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml  
684 Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes, “Disarmement, Dembolization, and Reintegration: Not Only a 
Job or Soldiers,” in People Building Peace II, eds., Paul van Tongeren et al., (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 




had been established under CPA Order 91 pertaining to the Regulation of Armed Forces 
and Militias,685 it was established over a year later in June 2004 at which time many 
militias and insurgent groups had already established their networks across the country.686 
Confounding the implementation of a tangible DDR plan was an estimated 600,000 tons 
of arms and ammunition that was made accessible to Iraqis through looting, of which the 
CPA had only managed to secure and destroy a mere 75,000 or 12.5 percent of six months 
into the occupation.687 In addition to the availability of weapons, Sunni Arabs perceived 
the dismantling of the entire army as a concerted effort to marginalize and exclude them 
out of the post-Saddam political process, which only fuelled the insurgency that followed 
immediately post occupation, as echoed by Hatem Jassem Mukhlis—a member of an old 
soldier family from Tikrit (Saddam’s home base) and the president of the Iraqi National 
Movement,  
The Americans are forcibly confiscating weapons they find in Sunni regions while Shiite and 
Kurdish armed militias thrive. Sunnis feel targeted by the decision to dismantle the army, which 
marginalised their status in public and political life. It is unfair, and it neglects the fact that all 
serious coup attempts against Saddam were led by officers coming from our [Sunni] regions.688 
 
Thus, the collapse of the army and security forces was perceived by Sunni-Arabs as a way 
of systematically alienating them from the post-2003 governing order. This, in turn, 
fuelled the Sunni insurgency that followed particularly considering that its key support 
base was the “Sunni Triangle”, an area northwest of Iraq above Baghdad, which provided 
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both ideological and material support for former Ba’thists and insurgency fighters.689 
Confounding the security dilemma was the limited number of coalition forces coupled 
with the absence of a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy which severely impeded 
CPA statebuilding efforts.690  As noted by Bremer, Dobbins, and Gompert, “a better 
prepared and resourced programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
would almost certainly have both attenuated the reaction to the army’s ‘disbandment’ and 
made reconstitution of a new force somewhat easier…the failure to develop, fund and 
staff such a programme prior to the invasion proved a costly mistake.”691 Additionally, 
the U.S. military’s disdain for what they perceived to be an insurgency characterized and 
dominated by Sunni Arabs who sought the return of Saddam Hussein and the old Ba’thist 
order deem these elements as “inherently irreconcilable”, which severely curtailed their 
demobilization and reintegration.692 While true that a group of primarily Sunni Arab 
politicians dominated the Ba’thist era, the CPA and the invasion’s policy-makers failed to 
account for the fact that Saddam Hussein nevertheless relied on a very close patronage 
network of clan and family members that became his support base693 which excluded 
many Sunni Arabs from the centres of power.   
By July 2003, the CPA handed all power and authority of the de-Baathification 
Commission to the Interim Governing Council (IGC) and became spearheaded by a group 
of mostly Shi’i Iraqi expats led by Ahmed Chalabi, who staffed the Commission with 
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predominantly Shi’i Arab technical personnel.694 Shortly after handing the administration 
of the Commission to the Interim Governing Council, Bremer voiced concerns over its 
revised and expansive powers as a tool for the systematic exclusion of Sunni Arabs and 
perceived regime sympathizers beyond the 1 percent of the upper echelons of the Ba’th 
party as initially proposed in the CPA order. Examining the policy in hindsight, Bremer 
in an interview noted that “I certainly made a mistake in how I allowed Iraqi politicians 
to be responsible for the implementation of de-Baathification ”695 particularly as the 
expansion of the Commission’s definition of those subject to de-Baathification 
exacerbated tensions with the Sunni community and provoked “plausible claims that the 
politicians were more interested in creating job openings for their cronies than in weeding 
out lower-level B’athists who had truly misused their positions.”696 Over the next eight 
years, the Commission’s scope and mandate was indeed expanded to include a de-
Baathification committee in each governing ministry, which gave it enormous powers to 
“influence political participation, civil service recruitment, social status, and the economic 
welfare of many thousands of Iraqis.”697 Thus, whereas Shi’i Arabs and Kurds welcomed 
de-Baathification as an integral remedial approach to revamp the political system under 
the preceding authoritarian regime, Iraqi Sunni Arabs, and for warranted reasons, saw it 
as an avenue for institutionalizing and securing Shi’i domination following regime 
collapse in 2003.698  
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 Nevertheless, the CPA’s failure to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former 
soldiers and militia members exacerbated the security situation by creating two equally 
polarizing alternatives that further intensified ethnic divisions. First, the American 
architects of the occupation effectively allowed Shi’i militias in central and southern Iraq 
and Kurdish militias including the Peshmerga in the North to operate within their given 
sanctuaries. This, in turn, resulted in the mobilization of disenfranchised groups, 
particularly Sunni-Arabs, many of whom constituted former soldiers, to join Sunni 
insurgency groups including Al-Qaeda in Iraq.699 Inadequate and inconsistent planning 
on behalf of American and coalition policy makers illuminates the expedient, 
uncoordinated, and short-sightedness that defined much of the invasion and occupation, 
particularly in terms of developing an effective strategy regarding the method, scope, and 
implementation of post-conflict statebuilding, as reflected in Bremer’s response to the 
question regarding the CPA’s biggest challenge immediately post-invasion, noting that, 
The key issue was security. Any government has as its primary function to provide security for its 
citizens and we were the government of Iraq and we were not doing that. The looting was going 
on and the insurgency pickup at the end of 2003 and we still didn’t have an effective strategy to 
deal with it. So security was the single biggest immediate and ongoing issue that we faced. The 
way I describe it is we had three challenges. We had to provide security, we had to get the Iraqis 
on the path to a government and we had to try to get the economy going. The dilemma that I faced 
and CPA faced was that we didn’t have authority over the security problem. That fell into the 
responsibility of the military. We had responsibility for the political and economic reform. Primary 
one was security and we didn’t handle it well.700  
 
When asked about whether the American government had taken into account the issue of 
security prior to the invasion, the response was as follows:  
I was a businessman up until two weeks before I showed up in Baghdad so I was not involved 
inside the government in the discussions. But if you read some of the other books about it, it appears 
that not enough attention was paid to the question of providing post-conflict security.  Found when 
I got there that effectively General Franks the CENTCOM commander had not made any plans for 
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post-conflict security he was planning to simply withdraw the vast majority of American forces by 
September 1 2002. So to the extent that there was a plan for security I don’t know.701   
 
The inadequate attention paid to post-conflict peacebuilding had dire consequences on 
America’s democratization efforts in Iraq immediately post-invasion. The lingering 
effects of de-Baathification and the absence of an effective DDR plan continue to 
complicate the security situation over a decade into the occupation. This is best 
exemplified by the alliance of well-trained former Ba’thist generals and officials and 
Saddam Hussein loyalists and members of the resistance group known as the Naqshbandi 
Army who had been purged under de-Baathification, with the ISIL militants in their 
takeover of key cities and towns since June 2014.702  
Effectively, commencing on a clean slate was an objective of American policy 
makers following state collapse guided by a group of highly corrupt Iraqi exiles who were 
“catapulted to positions of power and authority”703 with very little indigenous support 
within the country and little to no experience in governing a state.704  In particular, the 
latter’s fixation on dismantling the Ba‘thist state in order to both cleanse it from all 
elements of the former regime and to install a new political order was predicated on the 
assumption and fear that the “Baathists permeated everything, since just about anyone 
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could be a potential agent.”705 This ‘clean house’ policy facilitated the formation of an 
institutional mechanism by which the ethnic re-dominance of the state can be recaptured 
and reframed. In other words, it allowed groups to reverse and reframe state ownership 
according to the identities of previously excluded ethnic elites defined by and framed in 
ethnic fault lines. Fuelling these tensions was regime cooptation of state nationalism, 
which under the Ba’thist era aligned more closely with Sunni Iraqi nationalism than its 
Shi’i counterpart.706 Thus, regime collapse and the subsequent institutionalization of de-
Baathification was welcomed by groups previously excluded or disassociated from what 
had been a prevailing Sunni Arab state narrative and identity. The CPA also failed to 
account for the dangers in proscribing all Ba’thists, particularly Iraqi technocrats and 
careerists who had joined the party in order to ensure their economic and employment 
prospects, from becoming stakeholders in the rebuilding of the state.707 In fact, the CPA’s 
assumption that there were no Iraqi technocrats left in Iraq grossly underestimated the 
complex political structure that sustained the regime’s survival for well over three 
decades.708  
These assumptions dictated the institutional arrangements and governing 
structures that emerged following regime collapse. The attempt to systematically reorient 
the Iraqi state and society toward a path of democratization thus required the eradication 
of the old order and the establishment of a more inclusive and representative government. 
The next step in the statebuilding schema was the creation of accommodative institutions 
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that could give previously excluded groups a stake in the government. On an idealistic 
level, power-sharing institutions were devised to both accommodate previously excluded 
groups and to accord all ethno-religious groups a stake in the political process and in 
building the emergent state particularly where distrust of a presidential strongman meant 
opting for a system without winners and losers that made it difficult for ethnic elites to 
“ever choose anything other than power-sharing institutions.”709  
Failed Statebuilding and Ethnic Discord Post-2003  
Institutional Engineering and the New Iraqi Government 
 
The processes resulting in the systematic overhaul of the state occurred affected 
institutional engineering and dictated the parameters of inclusion and exclusion following 
state collapse. This one-shot process hindered endogenous support, cooperation, and 
participation in state reformation following authoritarian breakdown. In the absence of a 
structural and institutional base by which a state could be rebuilt, questions emerged 
regarding the best political system that could consolidate and represent diverging group 
interests. Prescriptions for the design of representative governments for states in transition 
from either civil wars or violent ethnic conflict emphasize the importance of institutions 
that can mitigate conflict and create inclusive governments through various electoral 
arrangements. These prescriptions largely fall along those advocating consociational 
versus centripetal systems structured around parliamentary versus presidential systems. 
As will be demonstrated, in the case of Iraq, decades of authoritarian rule under a 
																																																								




presidential system that saw the centralization of power in the hands of a single autocrat 
precluded any possibility for the institutionalization of a presidential form of government.  
American policy makers and coalition allies attempted to create a functioning and 
representative state following regime collapse in 2003. The political revamping of the 
state was outlined and maintained by various American policy formulations with the intent 
to “build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests 
of all Iraqis, and facilitate Iraq’s full integration into the international community."710 
Three months into the occupation, the CPA facilitated the formation of a 25-member Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC) proportionally representative of Iraq’s various ethno-religious 
groups consisting of 13 Shi’is, 5 Sunni Arabs, 5 Kurds (also Sunni), 1 Turkmen, and 1 
Assyrian Christian tasked with “laying down the foundation for a pluralistic, federal, 
democratic system and respecting human rights.”711 The CPA transferred sovereignty to 
the Interim Iraqi Government in June 2004 and was replaced by a transitional government 
both of which operated under the Transitional Administration Law (TAL). Part of the 
institutional reconfiguration was to reformulate the state’s electoral rules in order to have 
the democratic desired effects of the transition and to facilitate social and political 
engineering through the public policy process.712 A parliamentary consociational model 
seemed the more practical option for accommodating group interests while eliminating 
hegemonic control of the state by a ruling autocracy through either coercion or 
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cooptation.713 A PR party-list electoral system with a single electoral constituency based 
on national lists was chosen as it facilitated the creation a more inclusive political 
spectrum by allotting diverse political parties and coalitions adequate representation in 
government.  
The permanent post-Ba‘thist constitution of 2005 characterizes Iraq as an Islamic 
federal parliamentary democracy with executive, legislative and judicial branches. The 
government consists of a unicameral legislative body known as the Council of 
Representatives elected every four years and a hybrid executive branch consisting of the 
Office of the Prime Minister which appoints the Council of Ministers and the office of the 
President. Both the PM and the President have the right to appoint as many as three deputy 
Prime Ministers and Vice Presidents. As a norm to accommodate Iraq’s three dominant 
ethnic and religious groups, the heads of key executive and legislative institutions have 
been represented by a Shi’i Arab PM, a Kurdish President, and a Sunni-Arab Speaker of 
Parliament. On a symbolic level, this power-sharing arrangement was purposive of 
accommodating previously excluded groups by allotting them a stake in the government 
while simultaneously creating an institutional mechanism for encouraging elite bargaining 
at the executive levels. Smaller minority groups with little numerical clout, such as the 
Turkmen, Assyrian Christians, Yazidis, Shabacks, and Mandeans are allotted 
representation under the quota system. The constitution also stipulates that the Council of 
Representatives must acquire a minimum of twenty-five percent or 82 seats female 
																																																								




representation in parliament and mandates that each party list must have one female 
candidate for every three male candidates.  
The rationale for adopting a consociational system for Iraq was twofold. First, 
preceding historical processes of groups under a heavily centralized majoritarian system 
under Ba‘this rule fuelled the proclivity of ethno-religious groups to adopting a 
presidential model. This was largely predicated on the need to placate the interests of 
previously excluded segments of the population, namely Shi’i Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, 
Assyrians, and Yazidis who had been excluded and marginalized from governing the state 
prior to 2003. The experience of previously excluded and oppressed groups under the 
previous regime determined their unwillingness to accept a presidential model. Second, 
the literature on institutional design in divided societies demonstrates that more states are 
moving toward a PR rather than a winner take all presidential/majoritarian system since 
the former is statistically associated with greater democratic improvements, democratic 
consolidation, and improves the overall representation of women in parliament. 714 
Furthermore, given the circumstances by which Iraq’s democratic transition unfolded 
through external intervention and the indisposition of majority and minority groups 
toward a political system that favoured the centralization of authority under a presidential 
system, institutional engineering options in Iraq were inherently limited to a power-
sharing arrangement under a consociational system that could accommodate these 
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longstanding grievances by terminating and managing conflict. 715  Nevertheless, any 
analysis of Iraq’s post-2003 transition must, in conjunction with factoring in the viability 
of said institutions, take into account the role of political processes, policy outputs, and 
economic performance as measures and possible explanations for the success or failure of 
democratic consolidation.716 
Elections, Political Parties, and the Limits of Power-sharing: 
Contextualizing the Legacies of the CPA 
 
Political parties in emerging, socially fragmented divided democracies can produce three 
diametrically opposite outcomes: they can “aggregate social cleavages, translate social 
cleavages into political cleavages or block the politicization of social cleavages.”717 In the 
present case, the proliferation of ethnic parties—defined as a party that “overtly represents 
itself as a champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of categories to 
the exclusion of others, and that makes such a representation central to its strategy of 
mobilizing voters” rooted in ascription, exclusion, and centrality718 of its identity to its 
political platform have contributed to the politicization of social cleavages. As 
demonstrated in Table 1 below, we observe the politicization or articulation of social 
cleavages in four major elections: January 2005 (election to form a Transitional National 
Assembly), December 2005 (election to form a permanent Council of Representatives), 
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March 2010 (election of the Council of Representatives) and the more recent elections in 
April 2014 for the Council of Representatives. In October 2005, a successful national 
referendum was held to vote for a permanent constitution.  
 
Table 8: Ethnic Distribution of Coalition Seats in National Parliamentary Elections 
in Iraq, 2005-2014 
 
January 2005 Transitional National Assembly 
Party Ethno-religious affiliation Seat 
distribution 
United Iraqi Alliance-UIA 
Kurdistan Alliance 
Iraqi List 
The Iraqis  
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
National Independent Cadres and Elites 
Communist Party 
Islamic Kurdish Society 
Islamic Labor Movement in Iraq 
National Democratic alliance  
Al-Rafidain List 













Assyrian Christian  

















December 2005 Council of Representatives
Party Ethno-religious affiliation Seat 
distribution 
United Iraqi Alliance-UIA 
Kurdistan Alliance 
Iraqi Front-Tawafuq 
Iraqi National List 
Hewar National Iraqi Front  
Islamic Union of Kurdistan  
Reconciliation and Liberation Party  
Risalyun-Bearers of the Message 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
Al-Rafidain List  
Mithal al-Alusi List for the Iraqi Nation  































March 2010 Council of Representatives 
Party Ethno-religious affiliation Seat 
distribution 
Al-Iraqiya 
State of the Law Coalition 
Iraqi National Alliance 









Kurdistan Alliance  
Goran Movement 
Iraqi National Accord 
Unity Alliance of Iraq 
Islamic Union of Kurdistan 
Islamic Group of Kurdistan 
Al-Rafidain List  
Chaldean, Syriac, Assyrian Council 
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress  
Muhammad Jamshid al-Shabaki 






























April 2014 Council of Representatives
Party Ethno-religious affiliation Seat 
distribution 
State of the Law Coalition 
Coalition of the Free 
Al-Muwatin Coalition-Supreme Islamic Iraqi 
Council 
United for Reform (Muttahidoon) 
Iraqi National Accord-Ayad Alawi 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Al-Arabiya)  
Goran Movement for Change 
Islamic Virtue Party  
National Reform Movement 
Diyala is our Identity 
Iraq Alliance  
Islamic Union of Kurdistan 
Islamic Group of Kurdistan 
Nineveh National Alliance 
Civil Democratic Alliance 
Loyalty to Anbar 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
Iraqi Loyalty Alliance-Al Wafaa al-Iraqi 
Competences and People Gathering  
Unity of Iraqis-Wahdat Abnaa al-Iraq 
Al-Rafidain List  
Chaldean, Syriac, Assyrian Council 
Democratic Uruk List 
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress  
Hareth Shanshal Sunaid al-Harithi 
Council of Free Shabaks 







































































Source: Data for this table was gathered from the following sources: International Foundation for Electoral 




Study of War Iraq, http://iswiraq.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/final-2014-iraqi-national-elections.html; 
Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq, http://www.ihec.iq/en/; Marr (2012). 
 
 
Subsequent elections have demonstrated a similar pattern: the reliance on ethno-
religious affiliations as the basis for political participation and engagement over more 
secular political parties and politicians. The January 2005 parliamentary election was 
arguably the most critical as it represented the first free and seemingly fair election in the 
country that created a transitional government tasked with drafting the country’s first 
democratically elected and representative constitution written by a narrow group of 
elected elites representing Iraq’s various ethno-religious groups. While the election was 
hailed a success by international observers, the largest winners were primarily the United 
Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a Shi’i coalition represented primarily by the Dawa Party, the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and smaller Shi’i political 
entities such as the Sadrist movement and the Kurdish bloc, represented by the KDP and 
the PUK among other smaller Kurdish political entities. Sunni Arab representation, on the 
other hand, posed a precarious challenge to the emergent democratic order and the 
transitional political process.  
While some Sunni-Arab political parties, such as the Assembly of Independent 
Democrats, headed by the veteran Iraqi politician Adnan Pachachi (whom later joined 
Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi List) participated in the 2005 January elections to the National 
Assembly, major political parties such as the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) heeded the advise 
of the Association of Muslim Scholars and boycotted the election citing their 




order and a growing security and insurgency dilemma in Sunni areas.719 This proved 
disastrous for the Sunni Arab community as their lack of representation exacerbated the 
insurgency and their marginalization from the emergent political order. Nevertheless, 
concessions were soon made to include elected representatives from Iraq’s various ethno-
religious communities with the following composition: 28 Shi’is (including 5 women), 15 
members from the Kurdish coalition (including 2 women), 8 members from the secular 
Iraqi List (including 1 woman), and 5 members of Iraq’s minorities groups and 1 woman, 
and fifteen prominent Sunni elites in the seventy-one member constitutional drafting 
committee.720 The reliance on ethnic powerbases for electoral victories was also reflected 
in the overall distribution of the 275 parliamentary seats in 2005 where the United Iraq 
Alliance won 140 seats, the Kurdish alliance 75 seats, and liberal/secular lists such as the 
Iraqiya (Iraq) Alliance headed by Iraq’s prominent secular Shi’i Arab politician, Ayad 
Allawi, won a meager 40 seats.721 This trend is also reflected in all subsequent Iraqi 
national elections with very few coalitions cutting-across communal lines and attempting 
to accommodate members outside of their ethnic and sectarian powerbase.  
Despite seemingly positive developments and the capacity of the state to 
accommodate previously excluded groups in the emergent and democratizing political 
order, critical shortfalls regarding the form of federalism and the formation of regions and 
administrative units, oil and gas resource distribution, and checks and balances on the 
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executive branch of government also impede inter-ethnic cooperation. This is reflective 
of the expedient nature by which the constitution was drafted and the fact that the 
constitutional drafting committee was given a period of three months to draft a full text, 
with the expected delivery date of August 15 2005 and a national referendum to be held 
on October 15 2005. While both international observers under the United Nations as well 
as the constitutional drafting committee’s chairman, Sheikh al-Hamoudi requested a six-
month extension in the drafting process, American policy makers operating through the 
American embassy blocked the request and proceeded to pressure the committee to 
finalize the text in order to hold the referendum by the assigned date.722  
Moreover, the shift from a closed-list (established by the CPA) to an open-list PR 
in 2010 under Al-Maliki’s government fuelled tensions as some 511 Sunni Arab 
candidates, many of whom had served under the post-2003 government without dispute, 
were barred from entering the election because of alleged ties to the former regime and 
Saddam Hussein. This is particularly troubling as a closed-list PR in power-sharing 
systems encourages party institutionalization, rival cooperation, provides a more robust 
check on the executive level of government, diffuses power across the system, and has a 
positive correlation with good governance and the sustainability and duration of peace 
post-elections.723  Similarly, whereas an open-PR system encourages electoral reformers 
to bolster legislative responsiveness and accountability to local communities, a closed-PR 
system strengths party discipline and cohesion in divided and factionalized 
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democracies.724 This is particularly crucial for ethnically divided emerging democracies 
seeking to reconcile and consolidate a divided political arena as it opens political space to 
include reformed members of the ancien regime to partake in the electoral process without 
fears of reprisals based on their individual candidacy. In the given context, it would have 
minimized the Prime Minister’s targeting of Sunni-Arab candidates on de-Baathification 
grounds.  
While the CPA facilitated the formation of the state’s institutional configuration 
during the transitional period by acting as the interim government, it also played a critical 
role in defining the institutional parameters of inclusion and exclusion by reconstituting 
Iraq’s ethnic balance of power from the pre-2003 order.  It is imperative to note, while 
critics have accused the CPA of institutionalizing sectarianism within the existing 
consociational model, notwithstanding the legal and ethical considerations of the invasion 
and the subsequent expedient statebuilding as it is outside the scope of this chapter and 
has been discussed elsewhere, an alternative system would have simply been unattainable 
considering the deeply-seated grievances experienced by previously excluded 
communities, particularly among Shi’i Arabs and Kurds under decades of Ba’thist rule, 
as noted by Dawisha, “after 35 years of Saddam’s narrow and virulent ethnosectarian 
policies, the CPA had to try and give as many groups as possible a place at the table.”725 
Thus, while power-sharing was a necessary institutional arrangement for consolidating an 
emergent democratic order in highly fractionalized society, its spurious application and 
the absence of a reconciliatory institutional mechanism resulted in its failure to regulate 
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conflict. This a sentiment was echoed by Bremer when asked the extent in which ethnic 
and sectarian issues factored into the state and institutional building processes, noting that:  
In a way, I think it was regrettable that it appeared as early as it did when it was essentially driven 
by the Shi‘is. The American government had been talking about a representative government, well 
if you move to that, Sunnis are not a majority so there is going to be a fairly significant shift in 
power in Iraq. The Shi’i were very insistent that they were a majority in the country and that 
therefore whatever interim government was setup, the Shi’i insisted that they had to be the majority. 
Well, once they made that red line for them in how to setup the Governing Council, it immediately 
forced the Kurds to say well we need 40% of representatives (this is what they thought they were 
in the country) then the Sunnis said that were a majority in Iraq we’re not a minority, we’re a 
majority, and then of course the Turkmen and Christians came in the picture. So the Shi’i insistence 
right from the onset that in the interim government, they had to be a majority forced us further than 
I wanted to go into a kind of quota system, and that’s how the Government Council got off to a 
wrong foot, which was thinking about the representation in the Governing Council in sectarian or 
ethnic terms. Question is, was there an alternative? I don’t think there was.726  
 
The reliance on the ethnic ownership of the state among contending ethno-religious groups 
reflects a path dependent trend since the founding of the Iraqi state, particularly as various 
ruling elites attempted to consolidate a divided society. The reliance on ethnic grievances 
as a source of political mobilization among contending elites not only defined their 
institutional preferences but also reoriented their strategic interests toward their ethnic 
base. Consequently, political engineering by the CPA and international actors had to 
reflect the interests of previously excluded groups that occupied the centres of power 
following regime collapse.  
Elites, State Fragility, and Institutional Collapse  
 
Statebuilding is often accompanied by a shift in the political culture of a given polity 
punctuated by three critical stages: the breakdown of the dictatorial regime, the 
																																																								




creation/reconstruction of democracy, and the consolidation of a new regime.727 When 
assessing Iraq’s governing trajectory eleven years following regime collapse, we observe 
the presence of the first two factors, both regime breakdown and the 
creation/reconstruction of democracy but an absence of democratic consolidation—
defined as the presence of democratic institutions and democratic politics as mutually 
enforcing mechanisms for maintaining democratic politics.728 While a combination of 
elite behaviour and institutional flaws have contributed to post-2003 ethnic 
fractionalization, we see a replication of the causal mechanisms predicated on the 
following conditions: 
a) Preceding patterns of governance under a highly centralized and autocratic presidential system 
dictated the institutional choices of incumbent elites following authoritarian breakdown;  
b) For previously excluded elites, political institutions became a remedial tool for reversing and 
reinventing state ownership, which has produced ethnic winners and losers rather than moderation 
and consensus; 
c) State reconfiguration during this critical juncture reformulated the state, its structures, centres of 
power, and institutions but failed to devise institutional formulas for incentivizing cross-cutting 
ethnic elite bargaining—a critical element in a consociational system that would mitigate ethnic 
triggers by reconciling group-based demands within the political process. 
 
Thus, we see an attempt to diverge from the preceding path during this critical juncture as 
manipulative elites from previously excluded groups recapture the state and redefine it in 
accordance with past grievances stemming from their exclusion. This, in turn, has fostered 
discrimination and incentivized the mobilization against ethnic foes, all of which have 
contributed to the hardening of ethnic boundaries and the escalation of conflict.729  
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I attribute the spike in post-2003 ethnic strife to structural incongruities embedded 
in the initial policies and the application of institutional choices made under an externally 
imposed transition and statebuilding as well as the behaviour of ethnic elites that have 
reproduced political exclusion and re-emergent authoritarianism. In the first instance, 
regime collapse and the subsequent dismantling of the state resulted in the creation of 
formal democratic institutional arrangements without the institutionalization of 
substantive democratic politics. The absence of initiatives that would have bolstered a 
check on the executive, the implementation of rule of law, separation of powers, and the 
redistribution of power that could facilitate citizen access to decision making processes, 
produced critical democratic deficits. 730  This was exacerbated by a rupture in the 
preceding governing equilibrium following autocratic breakdown that resulted in the 
reconfiguration of asymmetrical power relations that reinforced ethnic dominance, 
exclusion, and authoritarianism as observed by Maliki’s polarizing rule. 731  As 
demonstrated in the preceding sections, institutional constraints that fostered the exclusion 
and purging of large segments of the Sunni ruling elite and the country’s security sector 
through de-Baathification and the dissolution of political and military entities set in 
motion the parameters of exclusion and violent political mobilization against the emergent 
state by Sunni Arabs who lost ownership of the state.  
As a foreign occupying power, the CPA engaged in statebuilding without 
peacebuilding. Whereas the former requires the “strengthening or construction of 
legitimate governmental institutions,” the latter denotes “efforts to create conditions in 
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which violence will not recur.” 732  Further confounding Iraq’s post-2003 governing 
trajectory was the absence of a concerted effort on the part of the CPA and coalition allies 
to foster initiatives that would promote nationbuilding predicated on the “strengthening of 
a national populations collective identity, including its sense of national distinctiveness 
and unity.”733 In fact, institutional engineering failed to devise tangible institutions that 
promoted interethnic cooperation and the depoliticization of civic space and devise efforts 
to foster national unity, which can serve as a background condition for democratization.734 
The permeation of ethnic parties and coalitions over secular and cross-communal ones are 
a product of expedient statebuilding and the imposition of a faulty institutional design by 
the CPA that restructured political life along past historical grievances in the absence of 
an institutional mechanism that would mediate group grievances such a national 
reconciliation and the incomplete application of power-sharing arrangements that enabled 
ethnic elites to politicize grievances within the electoral arena.  
In accounting for these critical institutional choices, the contention here is more 
with democratic deficiencies rather than with institutional typology; i.e. the escalation of 
conflict rests less with the consociational model and power-sharing arrangements and 
more with how these institutions were created and structured to serve the interests of 
previously excluded ethnic elites. Moreover, institutional and substantive deficits 
stemming from expedient democratic reconfiguration as discussed above suggest 
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structural conditions that have collectively limited the space and exercise of political 
moderation “facilitated by the capacity of a system to resolve key dividing issues before 
new ones arise.”735 The emphasis on institutions is predicated on the contention that 
political institutions shape and determine the logic and outcomes of democracy,736 and 
the trajectory of ethnic elite political behaviour can be explained by contextualizing it 
within the given institutional deficits following regime collapse.  
While Iraq’s institutional design enables us to situate the country’s political 
developments since 2003, the behaviour of ethnic elites within the given institutional 
setting and the reproduction of exclusionary politics have equally hampered democratic 
consolidation. In particular, Shi’i Arabs and Kurds have used past grievances against 
Sunni Arab domination of the state to negotiate their position in the post-2003 order. The 
outcome has been the ethnic recapturing of the state and its reorientation to accommodate 
those grievances while fuelling counter reactions from Iraq’s Sunni Arabs resulting in the 
hardening and intransigence of their demands. Smaller minorities such as Turkmen, 
Assyrians, Yazidis, Mandeans and Shabaks have suffered more in proportion to their 
numbers and status post-2003 due to their systematic targeting by extremist groups, their 
discrimination and marginalization from the political process, and more recently, the 
ethnic cleansing and mass purging of these minorities groups following ISIL’s 
advancement into Iraq. The behaviour of ethnic elites cannot be taken out of the 
institutional and political context in which they operate, particularly as exogenous 
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statebuilding can foster weak statehood as state and sub-national elites seek to maintain 
their own strategic interests at the expense of the peace and statebuilding process.737  
Punctuated by the aforementioned incongruities in the statebuilding process, 
domestic and external factors have amplified ethnic fault lines following regime collapse. 
Militant Sunni-Arab resistance to the new regime that catapulted Shi’i Arabs and Kurds 
to power was exacerbated by both regional and domestic factors. First, the disinclination 
of Sunni Arabs, Ba’thists and their neighbours to accept Shi’i ascendency coupled with 
the growing intransigence of their demands has gravely affected the democratic 
consolidation and the escalation of violence.738 Thus, domestic instability resulting in 
state weakness emanating from the reconfiguration of ethnic dominance following regime 
collapse in 2003 has been markedly influenced by wider regional developments. 
Capitalizing on Sunni-Arab grievances, Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda, initially led by 
the Jordanian Islamist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have contributed to ethnic polarization as 
regional rivalries vie for influence and control.739 Likewise, Iran’s meddling in Iraq’s 
affairs to counter Sunni-Arab regional hegemony has been equally damaging to national 
reconciliation and democratic consolidation.   
On a domestic level, Maliki’s increasingly divisive policies toward any person or 
group, but particularly Sunni Arabs using the judiciary, security forces, and de-
Baathification intensified tensions for a community that had already felt it had lost control 
																																																								
737 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zurcher, “The peacebuilder’s contract: how external statebuilding 
reinforces weak statehood,” in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar 
Peace Operations, eds., Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 24.   
738 Shireen T. Hunter, “The Real Causes of Iraq’s Problems,” Lobelog June 14 2014: 
http://www.lobelog.com/2014-06-the-real-causes-of-iraqs-problems/  




of the state.740 His use of the electoral process, the judiciary and the Supreme Court, de-
Baathification, and the state’s security forces to marginalize the Sunnis aggravated that 
community’s response to the emergent order.741 As succinctly noted by Saouli, Shi’i 
ascendancy in governing the state has produced a diametrically opposite reaction from 
Sunnis who had controlled the state since its colonial creation. Thus, Sunni resistance has 
“reinforced the Shi’a drive to monopolize power. The Shi’as fear of a reversal of the state-
building process and Sunni perception of marginalization entrenched the Shi’a-Sunni 
divide.”742 This feedback loop, shaped by both regional and domestic problems, has 
dictated sectarian strife.  
The increasingly divided political arena is also indicative of the failure of ruling 
elites to depoliticize the security sectors by devising a policy to integrate all armed forces 
within the state among other structural factors have also contributed to ethnic grievances 
post-2003. A quantitative measure of this analysis using basic descriptive statistics 
highlights these the challenges these issues pose to the post-2003 order. Using the Fragile 
State Index, I isolate seven social, political and military indicators: 
Dependent Variable (DV): Group Grievance (GG) (measured by the 
presence of discrimination, powerlessness, ethnic violence, communal 
violence, sectarian violence, and religious violence)  
 
 Independent Variables (IV): state legitimacy (SL), public services (PS), 
human rights and rule of law (HR), the security apparatus (SEC), 
fractionalized elites (FE), and external intervention (EXT) as the IVs.743  
																																																								
740 Reidar Visser, “Iraq’s New Government and the Question of Sunni Inclusion,” September 2014: 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/iraqs-new-government-and-the-question-of-sunni-inclusion  
741 Al-Ali (2014), 132-38. 
742 Saouli (2015): 325. 






The variables are coded on a scale of 10 (10 indicating extremely high pressures and 
fragility and 0 being the least). The sum of each variable, coded from 0-10, is aggregated 
from 2005-2014 (the earliest to the most recent data available). I applying multiple linear 
regressions to measure the impact of the IVs on the DV in order to better elucidate the 
institutional variables that have had the greatest impact on group grievance from 2005-
2014. Due to the scarcity of data on Iraq, this dataset was selected as it contained the most 
comprehensive and up to date variables for analyzing ethnic grievances in the country. 
Moreover, the availability of data beginning in 2005 complements political developments 
in the country, particularly with the first elections and the subsequent rise of Al-Maliki’s 
rule until his ousting in 2014. 
 A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict the impact of IVs on the DV. 
The findings are demonstrated below. 
 
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .980a .960 .881 .18905 
a. Predictors: (Constant), External Intervention, Security Apparatus, 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 2.597 6 .433 12.110 .033b
Residual .107 3 .036   
Total 2.704 9    




b. Predictors: (Constant), External Intervention, Security Apparatus, State Legitimacy, 




odel Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -10.862 8.480  -1.281 .290
State Legitimacy -.351 .371 -.222 -.945 .414
Public Services .789 .963 .601 .819 .473
Human Rights and Rule of 
Law 
.045 .328 .048 .138 .899
Security Apparatus 1.449 .569 1.283 2.547 .084
Fractionalized Elites .528 .825 .132 .640 .568
External Intervention -.265 .235 -.361 -1.127 .342
Dependent Variable: Group Grievance 
 
The predicated y model for this equation is: 
Y= -.351X1 (state legitimacy)+.789X2 (public services)+.045X3 (human rights 
and rule of law)+1.449X4 (security apparatus)+.528X5 (fractionalized 
elites)-.265X6 (external intervention)-10.862 
 
Although individually none of the IV variables are statistically significant on their own, 
but together regressed to group grievance, they demonstrate a strong relationship between 
the DV and IVs. An R Square of .960 demonstrates that 96% of variation in the DV can 
be explained by the collective impact of the IVs, which denotes a strong effect of the IVs 
on the DV. Similarly, an ANOVA significance of 0.33 or 97% reiterates the strength of 
the relationship between the IVs and the DV; thus, rejecting a null hypothesis.   
The analysis above demonstrates that the security apparatus followed by public 




relationship can be explained by the breakdown in the security environment following the 
dissolution of the state’s army and key security forces and the absence of security sector 
reform and DDR of soldiers, ex-combatants, and militia personnel. A key impediment to 
security sector reform has been the ethnification of the state’s security services, including 
the army but particularly the Federal Police, which played a direct role in enflaming 
sectarian tensions. 744  The weakening of the state’s institutional capacity and the 
abolishment of its security sectors following state collapse facilitated the formation of 
ethnic militias and paramilitary groups that sought to fill the security vacuum.745 Maliki’s 
centralization of key security posts exacerbated sectarian tensions. Between 2006-2014, 
the then Prime Minister’s attempt to centralize the state’s security forces was reflected in 
the formation of two extra-constitutional committees— the Office of the Commander in 
Chief and the proliferation of Provisional Command Centres, and the formation of the 
Counter-Terrorism Bureau as a ministerial body directly linked to the PM’s office 
cemented his grip on the state’s security sectors, the army, and intelligence agencies.746 
This enabled the PM to bypass parliament, which subverted the power of the legislature 
to control the power of the PM’s office and made Iraq’s Special Forces, commonly dubbed 
as “Fedayeen al-Maliki’,  “the personal coercive tool of its prime minister.”747  The 
advancement of ISIL into predominantly Sunni Arab territories and the immediate 
collapse of the state’s security sectors with many generals and soldiers either abandoning 
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their posts or joining ISIL fighters is symptomatic of the inability of the state to 
consolidate its security sectors and the increasingly divisive political arena that had 
emerged since Maliki’s accession to power. 
 A strong relationship between group grievances and public services reflects the 
regionalization of Iraq’s domestic boundaries which has also produced ethnic polarization 
of economic outcomes. Whereas the Shi’i south and the northern semi-autonomous 
Kurdistan region enjoy more socio-economic stability and prosperity stemming from oil 
outputs and greater security, the predominantly Sunni-Arab central region and provinces 
experience the most stagnation due to the breakdown in the security environment, the 
pervasiveness of ethnic strife, and increasing political factionalism and regional 
meddling.748 Group grievances are also indicative of the precarious relationship between 
Baghdad and the KRG over oil revenues, distribution, and production, have undermined 
national unity and the capacity of the government to mitigate ethnic tensions over natural 
resources. Tensions escalated when the central government under Maliki cut off the 
allotted 17% budget to the KRG in early 2014 as punishment for the KRG’s independent 
oil exports, a move that contravenes natural resource management according to the 2005 
constitution, which both parties diverge on its interpretation.749 Overall, however, socio-
economic stagnation cuts across ethnic and sectarian lines due to government incoherence, 
incompetence and the mismanagement of funds allotted for public service provision 
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particularly under Maliki’s two terms as PM aggravated Iraqis discontent with an 
increasingly divisive government.750 Likewise, the link between group grievances and 
public services is an outcome of high levels of corruption coupled with socio-economic 
disparity amid high oil production rates and increased oil revenues since 2003. 751 
Corruption is another contributing factor to the overall stagnation as demonstrated by 
Iraq’s ranking in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score. As demonstrated in Figure 
16, a steady increase in Iraq’s corruption and global ranking score makes it one of the 
most corrupt countries in the world. 
Figure 16: Iraq Corruption Score and Global Ranking, 2002-2014  
 
Data source: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index. 
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Moreover, sluggish and marginal improvements of the judicial sector and rule of law 
explain the effects of the security apparatus, public service provision and human rights 
and rule of law on group grievances as measured by the World Bank Development 
Indicators for Iraq from 2003-2012: 
 Figure 17: Iraq World Governance Indicators, 2003-2012 
 
Source: The above graph measures Governance Effectives (GE); Political Stability and the Absence of 
Violence (PV); Regulatory Quality (RQ); Rule of Law (RL); Voice and Accountability (VA); and Control 




Likewise, a significant correlation between group grievances and fractionalized elites 
speaks to an increasingly fractionalized political arena whereby elites and entrepreneurs 
capitalize on group grievances as the primary drivers of political mobilization. As 


































and the behavior of ethnic elites within the given political system all of which reflect an 
absence of moderation and conciliatory politics.  
Attempts at national reconciliation over the past eleven years failed to materialize. 
On January 14 2004, Regulation No. 4 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
established the Iraqi Property Reconciliation Facility with the aim of resolving property 
claims disputes relating to the Ba‘th Party’s Arabization policies aimed at alerting the 
demographic and communal composition of strategic towns and neighbourhoods 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Although progress has been slow due to the security 
situation and the continual remapping of districts, towns, and cities, this institutional 
mechanism nevertheless created a forum for managing territorial and property disputes 
during this critical period of statebuilding throughout the country. Similarly, CPA Order 
No. 82 of April 28 2004 established the Iraqi National Foundation for Remembrance in 
order to memorialize the victims of the preceding regime. Additionally, the Foundation 
sought to hold officials accountable for the atrocities committed against the Iraqi people 
under the previous regime and promoting public education initiatives to safeguard against 
future human rights abuses, while, simultaneously, commemorating the victims of the 
Ba‘thist regime through the erection of public monuments, memorials, and historic sites 
and artistic exhibitions.  However, lack of funding coupled with a decline in political will 
from Iraq’s communal elites has derailed implementation of these initiatives.  
Accordingly, in an effort to prevent Iraq’s descend into a full-scale civil war in 
2006, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had announced a 24-point national reconciliation 
scheme, which included disarming communal militias, reversing the stringent de-




national reconciliation conference aimed at mending communal tensions between Iraq’s 
religious and ethnic groups. The proposal, however, was shelved as a result of the growing 
sectarian rift resulting in a deterioration of the country’s security environment and al-
Maliki’s increasingly divisive and authoritarian governing tactics stemming from his 
targeting of Sunni-Arab politicians, the monopolization of the state’s security forces, and 
his disinclination to govern inclusively. External attempts at reviving national 
reconciliation in Iraq include a conference hosted by the United States Institute of Peace 
in 2008 entitled New Avenues for National Reconciliation in Iraq, which included 
panellists from Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian groups. Correspondingly, the U.N. Security 
Council and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) have repeatedly 
called for the institutionalization of a national reconciliation mechanism as a political 
process for both boosting national dialogue and for mitigating growing tensions between 
Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups.   
Efforts have also been made within civil society to create institutions that foster 
inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue between various communal groups. One such 
effort has been the formation of the Iraq Interfaith Dialogue, which initially began as an 
initiative to reach out to Iraq’s Assyrian Christian community and other minority 
communities such as Mandeans and Yazidis who had been systematically targeted by 
extremist Islamic groups such as Al Qaeda Iraq and more recently ISIL. The initiative has 
been supported by Iraq’s highest Shi’i religious establishments with the aim to increase 
public diplomacy by raising awareness about Iraq’s various religious and ethnic 
communities, reorienting Iraq’s current education curriculum to include religious and 




leaders across ethnic and sectarian divided and give them a stake in the reconciliation 
process as integral “parts of the solution, not just the problem.”752 Thus, the inability of 
ethnic elites to reconcile and accommodate inter-communal grievances and its lack of 
prioritization as a policy initiative has markedly affected national reconciliation efforts 




In sum, two constraining factors account for Iraq’s protracted ethnic conflict post-2003. 
The first relates to the sequencing of expedient statebuilding as a result of external 
intervention following regime collapse. The American-led invasion not only destroyed 
Iraqi state capacity, but inadequacies in the transitional statebuilding period provided the 
institutional opportunity structures for replicating authoritarian and exclusionary 
governance. Fuelling ethnic discord has been the inadequate application of power-sharing 
to a political arena previously closed off to accommodative institutions that enabled 
previously excluded elites to replicate and sustain previous patterns of governance in their 
attempt to recapture the state. In particular, incongruities in the CPA’s statebuilding 
policies and its failure to devise parallel institutions, such as DDR and a national 
reconciliation commission, to address deeply-seated ethnic grievances and political 
divides exacerbated the ethnification of the emergent democratic order as the new 
governing elite relied on ethnic mobilization as a defining marker of group membership.   
																																																								




Second, the behaviour of ruling elites and the ethnic recapturing of the state have 
replicated preceding exclusionary governing patterns dictated by both domestic and 
regional polarization. Consequently, the opening of the contestable political space during 
the democratization process753 in Iraq has been characterized by elites who have reframed 
state ownership as a zero-sum game of winners and losers based on past grievances, 
resulting in the permeation of ethnic attachments over a more inclusive civic identity that 
binds ethnic elites to the democratic process. This path dependent relationship has become 
increasingly difficult to alter as the costs of switching to more inclusive and representative 
alternatives could yield new power dynamics that alter the ownership and control of the 
state.  
To recapitulate, critical decisions and policy choices during the democratization 
process set the institutional playing field and determined the causal pathway, producing 
three interlocked outcomes that have defined the scope and level of ethnic mobilization:  
a) Incumbent ethnic elites, primarily Shi’i Arabs and Kurds, sought to recapture 
the state in order to reconstitute and redefine the ‘rightful’ and ‘legitimate’ 
ownership of the state predicated on preceding patterns of authoritarian ethnic 
dominance that culminated in their suppression and exclusion from the centres 
of power. 
b) Elements of the ancien regime, which was characterized by Sunni Arab control 
of the state since the time of state formation, have been both excluded for fears 
of their loyalty to the Ba’thist regime and have also been disinclined to accept 
a new emerging order and their loss of the state.   
c) The resultant political field has been characterized by the reversal in the ethnic 
dominance of the state, the replication of exclusionary and authoritarian 
governance (albeit, with new actors, interests, and dynamics), and the 
ethnification of the political arena.  
 
																																																								
753 Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo, “Issues and Debates in Transitional Rule,” in Interim Governments, 





These factors have subverted the potential for the formation of an accommodative political 
playfield and have hampered the legitimacy of democracy as a governing system in post-
2003 Iraq. 754  As a result, incumbent elites transposed exclusion and authoritarian 
governance based on their historical grievances resulting in the reproduction and (re)-
institutionalization of ethnic discord. Consequently, the reproduction and replication of 
exclusionary governing strategies has obviated the capacity of ethnic elites to both deviate 
from this pattern and devise conciliatory institutions that would mitigate group-based 

































Recapitulating the Puzzle 
 
The puzzle underpinning this dissertation of why it has been difficult to govern Iraq as a 
divided society even following authoritarian breakdown and democratization continues to 
grapple academics and policymakers, alike. I use the term ethnic conflict for greater 
conceptual rigor that more accurately reflects the theoretical and empirical puzzle this 
research seeks to explain. In doing so, I move beyond an analysis of sectarianism in Iraq 
that emphasizes the triumvirate group narrative of Sunni, Shi’i, and Kurds, to include both 
majority and minority groups such as Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidis, Shabaks, and 
Mandeans affected by ethnic strife in and who share equally relevant grievances against 
the state. In order to reconceptualize the roots of ethnic discord, I have proposed an 
explanation of ethnic conflict that situates group grievances along a historical continuum 
of the failure of ruling elites to devise institutions that could accommodate and consolidate 
group demands throughout three formative statebuilding periods. Framing the evolution 
and development of ethnic conflict along a given temporal setting facilitates a more 
contextual analysis of the processes and institutional mechanisms that fuel ethnic 
grievances against the state. By systematically analyzing the institutional conditions that 
have determined ethnic grievances, this research has sought to explain the historical 
legacies of early institutional engineering as manifested by the presence of two 




As a divided society plagued by a violent struggle over the state’s ownership and 
the latter’s grapple with survival and legitimacy, elites operating within Iraq’s institutional 
setting have played a formidable role in exacerbating ethnic discord state due to their 
inability to consolidate group grievances and foster a horizontal civic identity based on 
citizenship. Specifically, the socio-cultural and political stratification we observe 
following regime collapse in 2003 is a corollary of an increasingly fragmented political 
culture and arena where past and contemporary grievances have come to be viewed and 
experienced through an ethnic prism influenced by the presence of four interlinked and 
often overlapping factors: state weakness and secessionist movements, discriminatory 
political institutions, exclusionary nationalist ideologies and contentious inter and intra-
group politics at the mass and elite levels.755 Economic and social factors rooted in 
economic problems and a discriminatory economic system that determines the distribution 
of resources and privileging one group over another also affect group grievances. Lastly, 
cultural and perceptual factors produced patterns and processes that led to cultural 
discrimination resulting in the imposition of an official language, destruction of material 
culture resources, the prohibition of cultural practices and traditions, and conflicting group 
histories that include instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing.756    
By identifying and assessing both ruptures and continuities during critical 
statebuilding junctures throughout three formative time periods that frame the temporal 
setting for the present inquiry, we observe that institutions created and fostered patterns 
of ethnic dominance of the state during the period of state formation by which successive 
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ruling elites configured the state. While true that the violent permeation of ethnic conflict 
in post-2003 Iraq can largely be attributed to an expedient statebuilding process imposed 
by an external invasion and subsequent occupation of the country, the grievances that 
frame group mobilization are also a manifestation of historical processes that set the path 
for the ethnification of the state. Whereas Sunni-Arabs dominated the institutional 
parameters of the state since state formation and the monarchical period and subsequently 
under the under the Ba’th, post-2003 marked a reversal in the patterns of ethnic dominance 
by the previously excluded Shi’i Arabs. Here, we observe that previously excluded elites 
have replicated preceding authoritarian patterns of governance by making institutions 
subservient to the interests of their intra-group elites rather than cutting across ethnic 
boundaries. Furthermore, the inadequate implementation of consociationalism and power-
sharing institutions post-occupation produced a diametrically opposite effect that enabled 
previously excluded ethnic elites to reproduced preceding governing patterns that 
reoriented the state and democratic institutions toward an exclusionary and authoritarian 
trajectory. I argue this largely rests largely with past grievances of previously excluded 
groups that, while seeking to ‘own’ the state, have produced new and equally divisive 
forms of governance based on their historical experience with exclusion and 
authoritarianism.  
An Overview of the Work and Argument 
	
The key finding of this study is that early forms of institutional exclusion and 
authoritarianism during the critical period of state formation set the path by which 




variables across time created a path dependent trajectory of how successive ruling elites 
control a divided society. I argue that the fragmentation of Iraq’s political sphere can be 
attributed to the level of ethnic elite fractionalization as reflected in the relationship 
between the state’s political institutions and its constituent social forces.757 The outcome 
produces ethnic dominance of the state by a ruling ethnic elite and results in the 
institutionalization of these governing patterns. Since the institutionalization of a political 
system denotes a “process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and 
stability...defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its 
organizations and procedures,” 758  ruling elites replicate and reproduce patterns of 
exclusion and authoritarianism and are unable to diverge from preceding governing paths 
since doing so alter the dynamics of state ownership.   
 
I have argued that ethnic conflict in divided societies like Iraq emerges as a social 
process that unfolds overtime and with divergent outcomes during critical statebuilding 
periods. Specifically, I posited that, at least in the present case, paying attention to the 
“longue durée” rather than taking ‘snapshot’ views of ethnic conflict aids in elucidating 
a more contextual and thus historical account of the institutional mechanisms at the root 
of ethnic fractionalization and group grievances. 759  Here, I attribute early and 
contemporary struggles with ethnic strife to the country’s institutional development that 
became the structures for the application of exclusionary governance. Framing the 
institutional origins of exclusion and authoritarianism enables us to identify the factors 
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that cemented ethnic conflict as a response to institutional barriers during formative 
statebuilding periods. Thus, while true that “ethnicity could be a necessary but not always 
a sufficient condition for violent conflict formation,”760 the exclusion of ethnic groups 
from the state’s institutional and governing structures created the necessary conditions for 
ethnic mobilization against the state.  
I have postulated that explaining and understanding the country’s current grapple 
with ethnic violence requires an analysis of the impact of preceding historical processes 
and governing tactics on group mobilization post-2003. Attention here is paid to timing 
and sequencing in the given temporal setting in order to situate the causal chain and 
identify when institutional constraints emerged under formative conjunctures in Iraq’s 
political history since “self-reinforcing processes affecting a particular aspect of political 
and social life can transform the consequences of later stages in a sequence.”761 Drawing 
on theoretical insights from state formation, governing in divided societies, and historical 
institutionalism, I identify the causal mechanisms that affected how ethnic groups in Iraq 
have negotiated their position in the state under successive statebuilding periods and 
produced structural and institutional constraints. Thus, this work is much less concerned 
with how Iraq’s ethnic divisions came about than with why and under what institutional 
conditions that led groups to mobilize against the state. The argument is summed as 
follows: 
 The historical legacies of exclusionary institutional configurations 
cemented group grievances along ethnic and religious lines; 
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 Ethnic conflict is a social process that unfolds overtime and in a given 
temporal setting;  
 The presence and persistence of exclusion and authoritarianism as causal 
mechanisms explain ethnic grievances against the state;  
 Explaining the difficulty in governing Iraq as a divided society requires an 
analysis of the asymmetrical power relations embedded in state institutions 
rather than primordialist group attachments alone;  
 Exclusion and authoritarian governance are two variables that aid in 
understanding the vertical power dynamics that shape ethnic mobilization 
against the state;  
 Placing these variables along a historical continuum enables us to delineate 
the historic causal processes underpinning contemporary ethnic 
grievances;  
 Ethnic elites produce and reproduce the institutional parameters of 
inclusion and exclusion in divided authoritarian states.    
 
The temporal causal chain began in chapter three with an exploration of the 
regional and domestic factors that led to exogenous formation of the Iraqi state by British 
colonial powers following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of a 
contiguous nation-state system. Using British archival sources alongside Iraqi government 
documents, the first empirical chapter outlined the processes and the conditions that 
defined and determined the parameters of inclusion and exclusion in the emergent 
monarchy. We observe that early statebuilding produced ethnic winners and losers as 
Sunni-Arabs came to dominate the governing institutions of the state in order to largely 
serve British colonial interests in the country and the region and as a way of managing an 
otherwise highly fragmented but newly centralized nation-state. A detailed analysis of the 
state’s governing institutions, laws, decrees, parliamentary representation, political parties, 
and civic associations reveals the institutional and structural barriers to non-Sunni Arab 




and why institutional barriers cemented ethnic strife as excluded groups challenged the 
imposed status quo of the Sunni-Arab ruling elite. 
I argue that this initial policy produced three interdependent outcomes. First, it set 
the preference for the ethnic control and dominance of the Sunni-Arab minority as the 
guardians of the state and its governing structures and institutions. Second, it set a path 
dependent trend by which successive Sunni-Arab ruling elites came to govern Iraq as the 
guarantors of the state. Third, the exclusion of the majority Shi’i Arabs as well as other 
ethnic minorities including the Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians and Yazidis from the centres 
of power led to the ethnification of grievances resulting in their mobilization against the 
state and the further fractionalization of Iraq’s diverse and complex socio-cultural fabric. 
This, in turn, obviated the emergence of inclusive and representative governance bounded 
by civic principles of citizenship. This, I argue, set the barometer by which successive 
ruling elite in Iraq, particularly under the Ba‘thist period structured the state and Ba‘thist 
ideology to accommodate Pan-Arab socialism as a way of controlling a divided society.  
 In chapter four, I assessed the historical governing conditions and institutional 
mechanisms under the monarchy that led to its toppling and the birth of the republic in 
1958. Between 1958-1968, we observe a confluence of shifting ideologies that affected, 
and to an extent, shaped the governing choices of ruling elites. In particular, growing 
tensions between the Iraqi communists— arguably, the most ethnically diverse party to 
have emerged in Iraq to date, and the growing power of the pan-Arab Ba‘th socialist party 
divided an already fragmented political arena. The latter’s consolidation following the 
Ba’thist takeover in 1968, and the subsequent rise of Saddam Hussein as the president of 




authoritarian rule permeated by a highly militarized and centralized state and governing 
institutions. Based on an extensive analysis of the state’s institutions, laws, constitutions, 
governing decrees, and Ba‘thist state documents, I argue that exclusion and 
authoritarianism were sustained by the regime’s ideology and structural diffusion in 
society coupled with Saddam Hussein’s personalistic rule sustained by a patrimonial 
system of Sunni-Arab, Tikriti rule. While true many Shi’is served in the armed forces and 
at some hierarchical levels of the RCC, the overwhelming majority of the upper echelons 
of the RCC’s, including those serving in key executive posts, remained Sunni-Arabs.   
Under this time period, ethnic parties emerged in opposition to Ba‘thist pan-
Arabist ideology and Hussein’s increasingly autocratic and praetorian rule that reinforced 
the military’s intervention in politics as a mechanism for controlling a divided society.762 
As laws and decrees placed limits on civic engagement and the regime penetrated the 
economic, social, and political spheres, groups formed to challenge the state and regime. 
We also observe that the almost absolute purging of the Iraqi Communist Party and the 
suppression of its members both obviated inter-ethnic cooperation and fuelled the 
formation of intra-ethnic opposition groups and dissident networks. Increasing resentment 
toward Sunni-Arab domination of the state and its institutions legitimized ethnic claims 
against the state as observed by the efforts of opposition groups operating in Iraqi 
Kurdistan after the imposition of the 1991 no-fly zone and those residing in various Iraqi 
diasporic communities. These groups were instrumental in shaping the post-2003 
transition whereby many resorted to their ethnic base for political support.  
																																																								





Chapter five marked the third critical juncture resulting from an external 
intervention that produced an almost absolute overhaul of the authoritarian state that 
existed for over three decades. Paralleling the developmental trajectory of the colonial 
period, American and British-led expedient statebuilding imposed democratic governance 
and an institutional overhaul of the country based on consociational power-sharing and 
proportional representation in the absence of the necessary conditions that could foster 
democratic consolidation. The latter entails a process whereby the “rules, institutions, and 
constraints of democracy come to constitute ‘the only game in town” through shared 
norms, political trust, tolerance, the ability to compromise, and a belief in democratic 
legitimacy,763 which must be promoted and fostered alongside institutional reformulation 
during times of transition. Critical policies under the CPA, including de-Baathification, 
the dismantling of the army, the absence of a DDR mechanism, mounting corruption, and 
the reversal in the patterns of ethnic dominance under al-Maliki’s rule have affected the 
intensity of ethnic strife following authoritarian breakdown.    
Evaluating the Empirical and Theoretical Contribution 
 
The present inquiry has juxtaposed formative periods in Iraq’s statebuilding history with 
the country’s institutional design in order to elucidate the latter’s effect on ethnic 
mobilization. The application of a historical institutionalist approach has facilitated a more 
contextual analysis of the evolution of the causal mechanisms that affect the ethnic 
mobilization against. By systematically identifying the institutional parameters of 
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exclusion, I have argued that the surge in ethnic violence post-2003 must be 
conceptualized alongside the state’s historical development that created institutional 
barriers to the incorporation of majority and minority groups. As succinctly noted by 
Waldman, what we observe post-2003 is a problem of perpetuation whereby “one of the 
typical traces of violence is a compulsory reaction of the same kind. Violent actions most 
probably lead to violent reactions…This produces a chain of successive violent actions, 
in which every action…is at the same time provocation and reaction, cause and effect.”764  
Explaining Ethnic Conflict, Exclusion, and Authoritarian Reversal 
 
Since the creation of the state by British colonial powers, successive Iraqi leaders have 
grappled with devising institutional mechanisms for managing and governing a deeply 
divided state and society. By delineating the conditions that produce ethnic dominance in 
the given temporal setting for the given case, I posit that an analysis of institutions in the 
given temporal causal chain demonstrates the reliance on exclusion and authoritarianism 
as the causal mechanisms by which contending elites governed this divided society. Here, 
institutional constraints imposed a particularly ethnic order as a mechanism for preventing 
contending ethnic groups from contesting the state.  
In Iraq, we observe a pattern of ethnic dominance of Sunni-Arabs as an outcome 
of British colonial policy for managing a society created out of an otherwise 
heterogeneous mix of ethnic and religious groupings from the three Ottoman provinces of 
Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. These were previously governed under the millet system that 
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allotted religious groups some levels of autonomy in the administration of their internal 
affairs. The consolidation of Iraq into a nation-state and the subsequent instalment of a 
foreign, Hashemite monarchy that lacked indigenous support following its independence 
from British colonial rule in 1932 solidified Sunni-Arabs dominance of the state 
subsequently under Ba‘thist rule and until 2003. By engaging in a temporal analysis of the 
causal factors that drive ethnic mobilization, I have sought to explain how institutions, as 
the governing instruments of ruling elites, impose constraints on ethnic groups and why 
this produces counter-reactions from excluded groups that frame grievances in ethnic 
terms. As succinctly noted by Haddad, the “a-sectarian” ideals attempted by successive 
governments in Iraq prior to 2003 that attempted to subvert ethnic attachments often 
“entailed the suppression, censorship, and marginalization of such identities and of 
sectarian expression wherever they persisted.”765  
An analysis of archival data illuminates a pattern of exclusion and ethnic 
dominance under successive authoritarian regimes, beginning with the period of state 
formation under British colonial tutelage. Beginning with the monarchy, Shi’i Arabs along 
with Kurds, Assyrians, Jews, Yazidis, and Turkmen were either underrepresented in high-
ranking government posts (as was the case of the majority Shi’i Arabs and some Arabized 
Kurds), or were not represented at all. The toppling of the monarchy in 1958 and the 
creation of the republic culminated in the Ba‘thist takeover in 1968 dominated largely by 
Sunni-Arabs that imposed ideological (pan-Arabism) constraints on society through 
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purges and prohibition on ethnic and religious identifications, a methodical Arabization 
campaign purposive of eliminating ethnic and religious social and territorial attachments, 
and the suppression of ethnic-based associational life. On an institutional level, continued 
amendments to the Purge Law of 1958 by successive regimes enabled ruling elites to 
legally, and often through extra-judicial means, to eliminate potential rivals and excluded 
groups from mobilizing against the state. An analysis of Ba‘thist state documents, 
constitutions, and laws and decrees of the RCC in Chapter two exposes both the regime’s 
level of penetration in society and its concern with ethnic dissidence and mobilization 
through civic organizations and political parties that were deemed a threat to national 
security and regime stability.  
The collapse of the regime—and, by extension, the state, in 2003 as a result of the 
American-led invasion and subsequent occupation toppled one of the region’s most 
durable authoritarian regimes. While domestic, regional, and international factors have 
contributed to the escalation of ethnic strife in the country, I attribute ethnic 
fractionalization under this time period to elite behaviour and expedient statebuilding by 
American policymakers. In the case of the former, we observe a reversal in the ethnic 
dominance of the state attributed largely to the grievances of previously excluded majority 
and minority groups that saw 2003 as a critical opening in laying claim to the state and its 
confines of power. In particular, Nouri al-Maliki’s rule from 2006-2014 has been 
characterized by the exclusion and targeting of Sunni-Arabs, the rise and reliance of 
sectarian militias, and his increasingly authoritarian tendencies characterized by the 
centralization of power and the perversion of the ethnic bargaining formula implemented 




While these factors have exacerbated ethnic tensions, expedient statebuilding by 
American policy makers imposed democratic power-sharing institutions in the absence of 
the necessary conditions for democratic consolidation. Specifically, de-Baathification 
created an institutional mechanism by which previously excluded ethnic elites purged 
perceived regime sympathizers resulting in the targeting of Sunni-Arab politicians and 
others who posed a threat to al-Maliki’s increasingly authoritarian rule. Likewise, the 
absence of a DDR strategy, appropriate application of power-sharing and ethnic elite 
bargaining within the consociational framework, mounting corruption, and continued 
American meddling in Iraq’s electoral process as seen in 2010 and the Obama 
administration’s preferential support for al-Maliki amidst his electoral defeat, all affected 
Iraq’s democratization trajectory that ultimately produced a stagnating and highly 
fractionalized state ten years following regime collapse. Moreover, the failure to institute 
a national reconciliation mechanism that could redress past atrocities of the Ba‘thist era 
and ensure that ethnic grievances did not dictate the political process resulted in ethnic 
elites using the state, its governing institutions, and the consociational system not as 
instruments of power-sharing and constructive elite bargaining, but as remedial tools for 
framing ethnic interests and ownership of the state.  
Explaining the conditions and processes that affect ethnic strife requires the 
identification of the institutional causal mechanisms that frame patterns of ethnic 
dominance that affect ethnic grievances. In the given case, early patterns of elite exclusion 
during the critical time of state formation determined the sequential response of ruling 
elites to contending forces, which, over time, set the path by which successive leaders 




accommodate and depoliticize group grievances throughout Iraq’s history determined 
how ethnic elites negotiated their position in the post-2003 transitional order. Thus, the 
replication of preceding governing patterns and following regime collapse in 2003 points 
to the diffusion and permeation of these incongruities that provided the justification for 
the reversal of these governing dynamics by previously excluded incumbent ruling elites, 
namely the Shi’i and Kurds. This produced two diametrically opposite outcomes. First, it 
altered the power dynamics whereby the previously excluded Shi’i ruling elites have 
sought to claim the state based on past grievance stemming from their exclusion under 
preceding authoritarian governments. Second, the intransigence of Sunni-Arab demands 
resulting from their loss of the state and the permeation of ethnic and sectarian politics in 
the post-2003 order produced a Sunni-Arab ‘sectarian awakening.’766  
Empirical and Theoretical Implications 
 
I have attempted to demonstrate that understanding ethnic mobilization following 
authoritarian breakdown and democratization in Iraq post-2003 must be analyzed along a 
historical continuum of past institutional conditions of exclusion and authoritarianism that 
fuelled mobilization and grievances against the state. Juxtaposing these findings alongside 
both exogenous and endogenous shocks, I have shown how and why institutional 
constraints imposed by ruling elites have both posed a persistent barrier to civic and 
democratic consolidation, which has markedly affected ethnic mobilization in response to 
exclusion and authoritarian governance. Thus, while ethnic strife is not in and of its self a 
product or the linear progression of inter-group hatreds, early incongruities of the 
																																																								




country’s institutional design during the critical period of state formation determined the 
sequential response of ethnic elites to the state.  
To support the argument, I employed mixed methods research tools through the 
application of a comparative historical analysis using archival documents, state and 
regime sources, and descriptive statistics to triangulate the empirical findings. Archival 
and governmental data here were used to provide a systematic and nuanced understanding 
of how and why institutions, as the mechanisms that created and framed the political 
opportunity structures for mobilization, were designed and altered during critical 
statebuilding. Furthermore, by tracing the processes that produced the causal mechanisms 
that fuelled mobilization, this research has distilled the institutional variables that resulted 
in ethnic strife in Iraq across three critical junctures. The findings demarcate the 
institutional causal factors that triggered and determined the parameters of inclusion and 
exclusion in Iraq since the time of state formation and subsequent statebuilding. Moreover, 
this is the first study of its kind to systematically analyze and identify the longitudinal 
effects of institutional constraints on ethnic conflict in Iraq. Its key strengths are found in 
the extensive research conducted using both archival and government sources that 
produced the two aggregate indexes of laws and regulations that elucidate the intuitional 
constraints throughout two critical time periods during early state formation and following 
the Ba’thist takeover.  
Beyond its empirical contribution, this thesis fused three strands of literature on 
state formation, governing in divided societies and historical institutionalism. By 
analyzing the interplay between the historical development and transformation of 




a path dependent and temporally grounded analysis of the evolution of ethnic conflict in 
divided societies like Iraq. Illuminating the complex web of interactions that determine 
ethnic group power dynamics during the critical period of state formation provides the 
context by which successive statebuilding periods can be analyzed in divided societies, 
one that moves beyond attributing ‘ancient hatreds’ to ethnic discord. Moreover, an 
exploration of the conditions that lead to state formation, in this case, as an outcome of 
colonial expansion, exposes the effects of preferential power dynamics that propel a given 
ethnic group to power. This, I argue, both framed and set the path by which successive 
elites came to govern Iraq. The opening in the political space and expedient and ineffective 
statebuilding following authoritarian breakdown and regime collapse (which, by 
extension, resulted in state collapse) produced an institutional, political, and socio-
economic vacuum for the manifestation of ethnic discord. By fusing the literature on 
ethnic conflict and institutional design in divided societies, this research has filled an 
existing gap within the discourse on Iraq by illuminating the structural and institutional 
conditions that have incentivized ethnic and religious mobilization against exclusion and 
authoritarianism throughout formative statebuilding periods.     
  Similarly, this research contributes to the scholarship on governing in divided 
societies in two ways. First, it demonstrates the importance of infusing a temporal analysis 
of the impact of early institutional design on group mobilization in order to better 
understand the origins of group grievances. Second, identifying the effects of historically 
contingent factors is crucial for devising conflict regulation strategies that go beyond 
applying a one-size fits all solution, whether in the forms of consociationalism or 




this case has demonstrated, the inability of post-conflict institutional engineering to 
mitigate conflict following regime collapse is both a symptomatic outcome of the absence 
of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration mechanism and of parallel 
institutions such as a truth and reconciliation commission that would have minimized the 
politicization of group grievances and mobilization along ethnic fault lines.  
The application historical institutionalism to the present case inserts a new 
dimension to the study of state-society relations in Iraq, one that centres on bridging the 
structural with the social in order to provide a more nuanced explanation of the impact of 
historically contingent events on contemporary struggles with governance. This case 
contributes to the HI literature by adding an understudied regional dimension that 
examines the institutional conditions that underpin ethnic fragmentation in authoritarian 
states. Moreover, I have demonstrated the utility of applying the toolkits found within HI 
in order to trace and analyze the systematic effects of abrupt and incremental changes on 
the institutional causal mechanisms that cemented ethnic grievances against the state 
throughout formative time periods.  
Limitations and Prospects for Future Research 
This research was limited in scope, theory, and methodology. First, while I attempted to 
factor in external influences, the overwhelming focus on domestic factors and variables 
undervalued the penetration of both material and ideological regional dimensions 
including various Arab-Israeli wars, the Iran-Iraq war, and Shi’i, Kurdish, and Assyrian 
intra-ethnic solidarities across contiguous states, particularly Iran, Turkey, Syria and 




Second, although largely out of the scope of the present inquiry, a more intimate account 
of endogenous social and intellectual movements would have nevertheless highlighted the 
diverse forms of dissidence that go beyond the ethnic paradigm. Third, space constraints 
impeded a more detailed exploration of inter-ethnic solidarities that would have otherwise 
demonstrated modes of conflict and cooperation during critical statebuilding periods. 
Fourth, the deliberate omission of a systematic analysis of ISIL’s takeover of swaths of 
territories in June 2014 by limiting the timeframe of the last empirical chapter to the 
decade following the American-led invasion from 2003-2013 stemmed from timing and 
space constraints. Nevertheless, it provided a structured framework by accounting for a 
very critical dimension to the study of ethnic grievances resulting from the institutional 
limitations of the consociational and power-sharing arrangements and the inability of 
ethnic elites to cut-across their ethnic powerbase.  
On a theoretical level, while institutions played a critical role as constraining 
mechanisms that both sustained the power of ruling elites and excluded contending ethnic 
groups from governing the state, an institutionalist explanation alone cannot fully account 
for the propensity of ethnic elites toward exclusion and authoritarianism. Other factors 
understudied here such as socio-economic disparities and urban and rural divides also 
have the potential to explain fragmentation and strife. Likewise, the argument is limited 
in explaining the precise role of the security vacuum created following state collapse in 
2003 on ethnic strife and the reliance on ethnic militias and paramilitary groups. Lastly, 
the failure to account for a sociological explanation of elite behaviour precluded a more 
nuanced explanation of the mobilizing factors of ethnic entrepreneurs in divided societies 




On a methodological level, while I was able to identify and aggregate the 
institutional variables necessary to conduct a within-case comparative historical analysis, 
limited socio-economic and political quantitative data on Iraq hindered a more systematic 
investigation of their impact on ethnic mobilization beyond the descriptive statistics using 
the Fragile States Index. The dearth of such data affected a more precise examination of 
the effects of the independent variable (institutional constraints) on the dependent variable 
(ethnic conflict). Accordingly, timing constraints limited a more systematic consultation 
of Ba’th government documents at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which 
houses the largest Ba’thist state archives outside of Iraq. Lastly, this study would have 
benefited from fieldwork in Iraq which was impeded by an increasingly unstable security 
environment. Doing so would have remedied the dearth of data collection while 
simultaneously widening the interview selection pool both numerically and substantively. 
Although not an ethnographic or anthropological research endeavour, this work could 
have also benefited from mining memoirs and primary data. There were two limitations 
to this. First, personal memoirs of Iraqis are difficult to locate; second, timing and funding 
constraints meant state and government archives were prioritized as part of the primary 
research data collection since they offer more empirical clout and bolster the theoretical 
contribution of this work.     
To supplement some of this research’s shortcomings, and to complement its 
contributions, future research on Iraq can be advanced in two ways. First, a more 
systematic and intimate account of the role of regional dimensions, both ideological and 
material, will illuminate how and why such conditions affect domestic governing choices 




takeover make it difficult to conduct tangible and systematic research on its trajectory and 
its effects on Iraqi society, future research assessing the impact of ruling elites, 
institutional deficiencies, and ethnic fractionalization post-democratic opening will 
highlight the socio-economic and political vacuum ISIL’s advancement sought to fill for 
disenfranchised ethnic groups particularly Iraq’s Sunni-Arabs. Doing so will also fill an 
existing gap in the literature on ethnic conflict in the Middle East and North Africa by 
fusing the rising sectarian and ethnic polarization of divided states across the region 
following the Arab Uprisings and the increasing role of non-state actors such as ISIL and 
Al-Qaeda. 
Moving beyond these limitations, I have attempted to identify the processes and 
conditions that aggravated ethnic mobilization against institutional constraints in Iraq 
since the critical period of formation by tracing and analyzing the effects of two variables: 
exclusion and authoritarianism. By developing a theoretical model that accounts for a 
temporal infusion of institutional formation and transformation with ethnic mobilization 
during critical junctures, I have demonstrated that historical institutionalism and its 
analytical toolkits facilitate a systematic and nuanced exploration of the institutional 
factors that shaped ethnic dominance resulting in strife throughout three formative time 
periods. I postulated that understanding Iraq’s current grapple with a seemingly protracted 
ethnic conflict following regime collapse in 2003, and analyzing why it has been difficult 
to govern Iraq as a divided society, must be contextualized along a temporal exploration 
of failed statebuilding that impeded national unity and the formation of a conciliatory and 




dependent on national unity in divided societies.767 Such an analysis, I argue, anchors our 
understanding of ethnic mobilization and strife in Iraq not necessarily as an outcome of 
inter-group hatreds or primordialist group attachments, but as a product of an inadequate 
institutional design that set the foundation for the ethnic dominance and re-dominance of 
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Index A: Laws and Regulations, 1958-1968 (First and Second Republic) 
 
Law/Regulation Year Significance   
1958 Interim Constitution 1958 Proclaimed Iraq a republic 
Law No. 1-Purge of Judicial 
Officials 
1958 Force retirement and purging of judges from monarchical 
era. Extended subsequently under different 
transformations  
Law No. 2-Purge Law for Officials 1958 Purged all governing institutions of monarchical-era 
officials, repeatedly amended until 2003 
Law No. 7-Punishing perceived 
enemies of state 
1958 Targeted perceived enemies of state and the revolution 
through extra-judicial means 
Interim Constitution  1958 Proclaimed Iraq a republic, part of Arab world 
Law No. 7 1958 Punished anyone perceived to be plotting against the state 
or the ruling system 
Law No. 115-Law for the Public 
Concourses and Demonstrations 
1960 Heavily centralized and limited freedom of assembly  
Regulation No. 18-Establishment of 
the Ministry of Interior  
1960 Extended the power of the executive to manage the 




Law No. 99-Amending the 
Baghdad Penal Code 
1960 Proscribed insults directed at the president, the prime 
minister or the commander-in-chief of the armed forces 
who participated in the July 14th Revolution of 1958 
Regulation No. 50, Ministry of 
Guidance 
1961 Reoriented society toward the aspirations of regime and 
the 1958 revolution through “publication, broadcasting, 
and propaganda.” This ministry would play a formidable 
role as a surveillance system under the Ba’thist era.  
Law No. 158-for the Iraqi News 
Agency 
1961 State and government sponsored media directed by the 
executive branch with representatives from the ministries 
of guidance, planning, defense, interior, and foreign 
affairs. Paved the way for blocking independent media by 
successive governments until 2003.  
Law No. 1-Societies Law 1961 Placed limits and restrictions on freedom of association, 
managed by the ministry of interior, societies could not 
contradict the government, regime, or the revolution.  
Law No. 98-Iraqi Journalist 
Association 
1962 Founded by the executive branch, limited freedom of 
speech, prohibited the publication of anything deemed 
harmful to the revolution and the state.  
Press Law No. 24 1963 Created by the Revolutionary Command Council 
following 1963 revolution, required all free press to apply 
for permits from ministry of guidance, severely restricted 
freedom of press 
Law No. 35-National Guard 1963 Became a key security apparatus of the RCC 
Law No. 25-Establishing the 
Revolutionary Command Council 
1963 Initially formed as the National Council of the 
Revolutionary Command following the 1963 Arif coup, 
this key institution became the executive and legislative 
and primary governing body in Iraq until 2003.  
Law No. 9-Economic Organization 1965 Heavily centralized and nationalized economic sectors 
Law No. 100-Nationalization of 
Commercial Banks 
1965 Nationalized all private and non-governmental banks, 
monitored by a government appointed “Public 
Organization for Banks.” 
Law No. 138, National Defence 
Council 
1966 Granted wide powers to the armed forces. 
Law No. 58-Teachers Union 1967 Executive order to create a teachers’ union, heavily 
centralized and limited its operating structure and tied its 
scope and objectives to promote Pan-Arabism and Islamic 
renaissance.  
Law No. 2 Supreme Council of 
Universities  
1967 Reported to the Ministry of Education, this consultative 
body allowed the executive branch to interfere in the 
administration of public and private post-secondary 
education in Iraq. 
Law No. 38 Purging of 
Government System 
1967 Created an institutional mechanism within the Executive 
branch specifically tasked with monitoring, investigating, 
and purging government employees deemed engaging in 
questionable behaviour.  
 






Law/Regulation Year Significance  
Law No. 96-Students Union of 
Iraq 
1968 Created by the RCC and cantered around Baghdad, 
institutionalized government control and censorship 
over student activities across the country. Aimed at 
propagating and imparting Arab nationalism to 
encapsulate and minimize other influences.  
Regulation No. 14-
Standardisation of the Emblem of 
Iraq 
1968 Institutionalized banal forms of Arab and Ba'thist 
nationalism.   
Regulation No. 26-Establishing 
Ministry of Northern Affairs 
1968 Included a directorate for Kurdish studies, this 
department created by the RCC to create an 
institutional mechanism for centralizing Kurdish 
affairs in the northern regions.   
Regulation No. 44-Elementary, 
Intermediate and Preparatory 
Religious Schools 
1968 Enabled federal government to dictate and censor the 
mandate and objectives of religious school across Iraq 
by choosing the schools’ directors and teachers.  
Law No. 61-Creating the Diwan 
(Office) of the Republic 
Presidency 
1968 The highest executive and decision-making institution 
of the RCC. This deeply centralized office effectively 
dictated all executive, legislative, and judicial matters 
in Iraq until 2003. 
Law No. 123-Establishing the 
Iraqi National Oil Company  
1968 Centralized and nationalized the country’s largest 
industrial and resource sector in Iraq as a rentier state.  
Law No. 66-Ministry of Youth 
Guidance 
1968 An institutional mechanism for absorbing, co-opting, 
controlling, and shaping future leaders of the 
revolution and the regime by creating a framework for 
promoting Arabism and Islamic ideals among Iraqi 
youth.   
Law No. 76-Chivlary and Youth 
Regiments 
1968 Engaging Iraqi youth with the armed forces and the 
military to create and mobilize younger cadres for the 
purpose of national defence. This was purposive of 
militarizing Iraqi youth.  
Law No. 206-Press Law  1969 Created under the 1968 Constitution to supplement the 
1963 Press Law. Regulated and suppressed freedom of 
expression, particularly political and religious 
expression. 
Law No. 171-Supreme Council 
for Universities 
1969 RCC created mechanism to encapsulate higher 
education under its mandate. PM presided over the 
council, which included the Minister of Education, 
presidents of all universities. Dictated the educational 
and curriculum of universities in Iraq.  
Law No. 7-Election of Parliament 1969 Delineated the country’s electoral system. Candidates 
and lists pended the approval of the Ministry of 
Interior and the RCC prior to participation in election. 
Severely limited and restricted electoral and party 
pluralism. Article 20 stipulated that all candidates have 
to be “faithful in the 14th July Revolution, its principles 
and aims.” Effectively limiting any form of political 
pluralism that diverged from the ideology of the 
Ba’thist takeover of 1968.  
Law No. 8-Establishment of the 
University of Basrah 
1969 Created by the President of the republic, as with Iraq’s 
other universities, one of its aims was to control and 




Law No. 190-Establishment of 
the University of al-Hikmah 
1969 Under the same mandate at the University of Basra. 
President of the University was appointed by a 
republican ordinance from the RCC.  
Law No. 191, Secretariat Office 
and Consultative Offices for the 
Council of Revolutionary 
Command 
1969 The most important executive office behind the 
Republican Diwan and the RCC. It became the 
primarily institutional mechanisms for consolidating 
and managing a highly centralized network of state 
structures and institutions under the command of the 
RCC.  
1968 Ba'th Interim Constitution  1969 Instituted and formalized Ba'thist rule and the RCC  
Resolution No. 79 of the Council 
of Revolutionary Command 
1969 Enabled the RCC to “issue the laws and resolutions 
which have the force of law without resorting to the 
Council of Ministers.” Became the impetus for 
Saddam Hussein’s rule by decree from 1979-2003.   
Regulation 21 of the Holy Shrines  1969 Heavily regulated and brought the management and 
administration of the Shi’i Holy Shrines under the 
RCC in order to control and minimize the power of 
Shi’i religious figures and awqaf (religious 
endowments).  
Law No. 178-Journalists 
Association 
1969 Replaced the mandate of the 1962 law. Mandate and 
limited the activities of journalists to work within the 
framework of Ba'thist, Pan-Arab, and socialist 
principles. Severely limited freedom of association.  
Law No. 11-Ministry of Interior 1970 Operating structure of the ministry of Interior. 
Law No. 143-Establishing 
Sulaimaniyah University 
1970 RCC order. Teaching in Kurdish and Arabic 
languages. Islamic and Kurdish Emphasis on Islamic 
and Kurdish heritage, national education, and moral 
virtues.  Heavily administered by the central 
government.  
Law No. 159 Establishing the 
Supreme Constitutional Court 
1970 Created by the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of 
Justice and the RCC to interpret laws. Administered 
and mandated by the RCC and the executive, all 
decisions approved by the executive. Enabled RCC To 
interpret and change laws 
Law No. 145-Establishing the Al-
Thawra Publishing and Printing 
House 
1970 Al-Thawra (the revolution) was created by an 
executive order as the magazine of Iraq’s government. 
It became an instrument of the regime propaganda 
especially in its emphasis on Saddam and the 
militarization of the state.  
Law No. 55-Lease of Lands and 
Gardens Belong to the Jews 
Whose Iraq Nationalities were 
Withdrawn 
1970 Enabled government under the Agrarian reform law to 
usurp Jewish lands for agricultural purposes.  
Law No. 127-Amending the Law 
of General Institution of 
Broadcast and Television No. 42 
of 1970 
1970 Although the amendment stipulated the board is 
independent of the executive, it stipulated that its 
members had to include a representative from the 
ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, RCC, the 
Director General of Iraqi News Agency, a 
representative from the General Federation of trade 
Unions and a representative from the artists 





Resolution No. 996-Establishing 
the Kurdish Academy 
1970 A branch of the Iraqi Scientific Academy, it aimed to 
promote Kurdish history, heritage, and linguistic 
rights. Although the academy was an independent 
body, it was nonetheless heavily monitored and 
administered by the RCC and the Ba'th regime.  
Interim constitution 1971  
Law No. 167-Establishing 
Mustansiriyah University 
1971 Government-created by an order of the RCC. Located 
in Baghdad.  
Law No. 45-Creation of the 
Office of Propaganda and 
Advertisement 
1971 RCC order and administered by Ministry of 
Information. Purpose was to disseminate state-
sanctioned propaganda and advertisements through 
newspapers, television, cinema, wall plasters, and 
handbooks.   
Law No. 212, Amending Law 
Concerning Organizations of the 
Control of Entertainment Places 
and Theatres 
1971 RCC created committees assigned to the control of 
entertainment places and cinemas within 
municipalities across Iraq.  
Law No. 228-Creation of the 
National Council 
1971 Order of the RCC, centred in Baghdad, 100 member 
body, members appointed by the RCC for 3 years from 
various political, economic, social and national sectors 
of “progressive native and national elements.”  
Law No. 62, Establishing Sports 
Unions 
1971 Created by the RCC and Ministry of Youth, based in 
Baghdad, administered and mandated by the executive. 
Law No. 67-Services of Religious 
and Charity Establishments 
1971 Heavily regulated all Islamic religious establishments 
in Iraq.  
Law No. 78-Administration of the 
Assyrian Community in Iraq 
1971 RCC and Ministry of Justice executive order to create 
a committee to administer the affairs of the Assyrian 
community, including religious Awqafs (endowments, 
churches, schools and all matters and affairs 
concerning the community.   
Law No. 124-Ministry of 
Education 
1972 RCC created, heavily mandated the orientation of 
elementary and secondary education with an emphasis 
on Arab and Islamic cultures, and the nationalist 
aspirations of the state. 
Regulation No. 13-Ministry of 
Education 
1972 Outlined the operational structure of the ministry, 
provided special provisions for Kurdish and Turkmen 
education in their respective territorial areas.  
Law No. 165-Municipal 
Administration 
1972 Outlined the administration of provincial and 
municipal territories and district and the formation of 
municipal Councils elected by the population of given 
municipalities.   
Regulation No. 47-Ministry of 
Economics 
1972  
Regulation No. 13-Ministry of 
Youth 
1972 Similar to the Ministry of Youth and Guidance of 
1968, this institution was created by the RCC in order 
to prepare the youth “mentally, nationally and socially 
in accordance with the high interests of building a 
socialist and progressive society and to prepare 
programmes for the building of strong youthful spirits 
and decided believing in the objects of the Arab nation 
and its immortal destination and capable of executing 




Arab land and struggle against colonization and 
imperialism.”  
Law No. 34-Office of Legal 
Affairs of the RCC 
1972 RCC apparatus, members and director appointed by 
RCC, surveyed Iraq’s legal system and laws to ensure 
their compatibility with the “direction of political and 
social thought of the Revolution.” Purpose was to 
reformulate laws of the country to suit the purposes 
and objectives of the RCC and revolution.   
Law No. 132-Higher Education 
and Scientific Research 
1973 Created by Ministry of Education and RCC, 
integration of key education and scientific branches of 
various political, defence, economic, and social aspects 
of the state and to fulfil the objectives and 
requirements of the Revolution’s. 
Resolution No. 440-
Establishment of Syriac 
Language Academy 
1973 RCC Mandate to grant the Assyrian community the 
right to teach this “ancient language of Iraq” in its full 
linguistic and cultural form. Heavily mandated and 
monitored by the RCC.  
Law No. 42-State Organization of 
Radio and TV 
1973 Created by the RCC-a key mandate was to use radio 
and TV to spread the national (i.e. Ba'thist) awakening 
among the people  
Regulation No. 22-Directorate of 
Kurdish Studies 
1974 RCC mandated and monitored by the ministry of 
education, for the teaching of Kurdish language and 
culture 
Regulation No. 21-Ministry of 
Information 
1974 Controlled and disseminated the Party’s agenda and 
ideology through the following: 1) to acquaint the 
“masses” with Arab and Islamic civilization and to 
assimilate its message 2) develop the nationalist 
consciousness of the people 3) resurrections of Islamic 
and Arab legacy 4) supporting folklore, the arts, and 
cultures 5) to direct people to the Arab cause.  It 
included the department of censorship under its 
mandate.  
Law No. 139-Genderal 
Federation for Iraqi Women  
1974 Included the Kurdistan Women’s Federation, one of its 
key aims was to “prepare and mobilize the women of 
Iraq to play their active role in the struggle of the Arab 
Nation against Imperialism, Zionism, Reactionism and 
under-development with a view to achieve cultural 
progress and the building up of a United Socialist 
Democratic Arab Society.”  
Law No. 36-Legislative Council 
for Kurdistan District  
1974 Created an elected legislative body for Iraqi Kurds, 
although heavily centralized.  
Law No. 37-General Amnesty for 
Militarian and Civilian Kurds 
1974 RCC order, pardoned Kurds failed to report to military 
duty if they reported to and joined their local or 
provincial Iraqi military ranks.   
Law No. 64-Censorship on 
Classified Materials and Cinema 
Films 
1974 RCC order to censor and prohibit the importation of 
classified materials such as foreign films, 
commercials, videotapes, and music and dancing that: 
1) propagate atheism, sectarianism, corrupt morals, 
high crime, alcoholism, gambling, use of narcotics, 
and that are deemed a threat to internal security 2) 
propagate reactionary, chauvinistic, radicalism, 
thoughts favouring “defeatism, imperialism, and 




destiny, and the offend the national liberation 
movement 4) not translated into Arabic.   
Interim Constitution 1974 With Amendments  
Law No. 33-Law of Autonomy 
for Kurdistan Region 
1974 Based on the 1970 Manifesto, this RCC issued order 
gave territorial and legislative autonomy to Kurds in 
the Kurdish-region of northern Iraq where Kurds 
constituted a majority to administer their internal 
affairs within the political, economic, and social 
framework of the federal government and the Iraqi 
Constitution of 1970.  
Law No. 63 General Federation 
of Iraq Youth 
1975 RCC created, included the Kurdistan Democratic 
Youth Federation with the primary role of mobilizing 
and prepare Iraqi youth to fulfil their “revolutionary 
role in the Arab Nation struggle against imperialism, 
Zionism, and reaction for the sake of civilization 
progress and building the unified socialist democratic 
Arab Society.” 2) solidarity and unity between Arab 
and Kurdish Youth 3) participation in the Arabian 
revolution and the Arabian armed struggle and the 
Iraqi Ba’thist  revolution.  
Law No. 111-Al-Tadhamon 
House for Kurdish Printing and 
Publication 
1976 RCC order, supervised by Ministry of Information, 
facilitated printing and publishing in Kurdish.  
Law No. 115-Educadtional 
Affairs Council 
1977 Served to integrate and strengthen the educational 
curriculum to realize the “political economic and 
social planning of the revolution” and to push for 
progress through by building and structure the 
educational system and Iraqi society around Arab 
unity, freedom, and socialism. This law effectively 
instituted Ba’thist  ideology within the education 
system in Iraq.  
Regulation No. 4-Administrative 
Formations for Autonomy of 
Kurdistan Region 
1977 RCC order, dictated the duties and management of 
Kurdish administration.   
Law No. 101-Formation of the 
Ministry of Justice 
1977 RCC order, to develop and apply laws within the 
framework and purposes of the Revolution and its 
aims.  
Law No. 89-National 
Development Plan 
1978 Fulfilling mandate of 8th Regional Congress, to 
conduct, steer, and establish the socialist system as a 
method for establishing Arab unity. Purpose: a) 
accelerate the development processes outlined in the 
revolution to establish economic independence in the 
form of a comprehensive socio-economic development 
to change society; b) construct and develop socialist 
modes of societal organization an economic 
development 
Law No. 133-Ministry of Culture 
and Arts 
1978 RCC order, some purposes: 1) developing and guiding 
fields of culture and arts in accordance with the Ba‘th 
party principles and its revolution 2) revive Islamic 
and Arab legacy in order to counter reactionary 
movements, racism, Zionism and imperialism 3) 
develop national cultures of minorities in accordance 




Regulation No. 37-Teachers 
Training Regulation 
1978 RCC issued: outlined guidelines for training teachers 
within ideological framework of the Ba‘th Party.  
Resolution 884-Former 
government employees  
1978 RCC order: the death penalty will be awarded to any 
for military and police men and women and their 
pensioners of volunteers who’s service was terminated 
after July 17 1968 (post-Ba’thist  takeover) who joined 
any other political party other than the Ba‘th Socialist 
Party.  
Law No. 163-the Iraq Academy 1979 RCC order, bolstering Arabic and Islamic heritage, 
language, literature, and art, granted special rights for 
the development and maintenance of Kurdish and 
Syriac (Assyrian) linguistic rights. Consisted of 38 
members, including members/experts from the above 
communities. Heavily mandated by Ba’thist  ideals.  
Resolution No. 565-Jurisdiction 
of the Revolutionary Court 
1979 RCC order, gave wide-ranging powers and the RCC 
jurisdiction over almost all major offenses to be tried 
in a non-civil court, which would override 
constitutional rights of suspects.  
Resolution No. 895-Election of 
Saddam Hussein as Chair of RCC 
July 16 
1979 
Saddam Hussein was unanimously elected as the 
chairman of the RCC and President of the republic 
until 2003.  
Resolution No. 903 1979 Saddam decides to integrate the presidents of the 
Legislative and Executive Councils for autonomous 
region (Kurdistan) as members of the Council of 
Ministers, heavily centralizing their rule and 
jurisdiction within the RCC.  
Resolution No. 928 1979 Council of ministers to be chaired by the President of 
the Republic and the he can summon the Council  for 
meetings at any time.  
Regulation No. 11 for 
Kindergarten  
1979 RCC issued order that stipulated the mandate and the 
educational, emotional, mental, and academic 
development children in kindergarten. A key objective 
was to impart and secure children’s cooperation with 
the principles of Arab society and for the creation of 
“citizenship and national consciousness emphasizing 
the national goals of the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party, 
hence to cultivate the spirit of the revolution and 
homeland inside the children.”  
Law No. 142-Teacher’s Union for 
the Republic of Iraq 
1980 RCC order, a non-independent body, created the 
Teacher’s Union for teachers who believe in the 
Ba’thist  revolution and who can fulfil their national 
duty to protect and mobilize society. As with other 
RCC created unions, it became a mechanism for both 
controlling and diffusing Ba’thist  ideology.  
Regulation No. 30-Primary 
Schools 
1980 RCC order, regulated, organized, and promulgated 
laws for the administration of primary schools in Iraq. 
Similar to the 1979 Kindergarten administration, the 
Primary Schools Regulation likewise emphasized the 
development of school children to fulfil the socialist 
and ideological principles of the Ba‘th Party.  
Law No. 83-Guarantee of 
Trustees in Defence of the 
Revolution  
1980 RCC order for intelligence officers. Trustee any person 
who “works with or without wage on behalf of the one 




intelligence b) Directorate General of Security c) 
Directorate General of Military Intelligence.  
Law No. 195-Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs 
1980 Outlined the operating structures of the department of 
labour and social affairs by disseminating the Ba‘th 
Party’s ideas within their policy-making capacity.  
Resolution No. 518 1980 RCC order by Saddam Hussein to not grant Iraqi 
citizenship to any person of Iranian origin.  
Resolution No. 526 1980 RCC order by Saddam Hussein to except from 
punishment anyone who within 2 weeks of issuing the 
order, turns himself in and provides information 
regarding the Da’wa Party (the main Shi’i opposition 
party), its members, its operations, and logistics 
operating within Iraq.  
Law No. 55-the National 
Assembly 
1981 RCC issued, stipulated the mechanisms for elections to 
the National Assembly (Iraq’s parliament and largest 
elected body). Comprised of 250+, members chosen 
by a direct free ballot, candidates had to be 25 years+, 
Iraqi by birth, supporter of the Ba’thist  revolution, 1 
representaive/50,000 people; heavily supervised by an 
RCC appointed supreme electoral body, containing 
members of the Ba‘th Party; call candidates approved 
by RCC and Ministry of Interior.  
Law No. 50-Ministry of Awqaf  
(religious endowments) and 
Religious Affairs 
1982 RCC order-managed and administered all religious 
endowments, committee contained Ba‘th Party 
member and other appointed representatives, became 
an instrument for state interference in the religious 
affairs of communities, particularly the Shi’i 
community.  
Law No. 137-Iraqi Jurists 
Federation 
1982 RCC created federation for Iraqi jurists, mandated by 
the executive to facilitate the development of legal 
thought, justice among citizens, and to serve the 
national development and socialist plans of the Ba‘th 
Party. 
Law No. 57-National Institute for 
Youth 
1982 RCC order. Purpose to foster leadership among Iraqi 
youth both regionally and nationally within the 
principles of the Ba‘th Party.   
Law No. 70-Genderal Federation 
of Literates and Writers in Iraq 
1983 RCC order, to regulate Iraqi writers and artists and 
mandate content production to fulfil the aims cultural, 
regional, national, and humanitarian ambitions of the 
Ba’thist  revolution; to mobilize writers to confront 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, and 
reactionism and to inspire the Arab and national 
Islamic heritage of the country.  
Regulation No. 94-Ministry of 
Culture and Information 
1983 RCC created, mandate: 1) to familiarize masses with 
Arab and Islamic civilization through information 
media; propagate and disseminate Ba’thist  ideology 
and the July 17 Revolution2) help direct the public’s 
consciousness toward their nation and the 
revolutionary cause; 3) “the ministry shall propagate, 
deepen and emphasise the ideology and principles of 
the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party in Iraq and the Arab 




Law on the International 
Regulation of the National 
Assembly  
1984 RCC issued order outlining the operating structure of 
the National Assembly, its mandate and its function. 
The presidency of the National Assembly consisted of 
the Speaker, vice-speaker, and secretary, set the 
agenda and the budget of the assembly and 
coordinated its relations with the RCC. Gave RCC and 
National Assembly presidency office great leeway in 
removing an elected member 
Law No. 104-State Organization 
for Social Reform  
1984 RCC order. Purpose to re-socialize prison inmates and 
correct their behaviour, educated them about various 
cultural and religious schemes and the objectives of 
the Ba‘th party.  
Law No. 5-Department of  
Censorship 
1984 RCC order, heavily monitored, censored and 
suppressed freedom of speech and the press in 
accordance with the regime’s Ba’thist and socialist 
objectives.  
Decree No. 840 1986 1. RCC order on insulting the President: 
Anyone who insults the president of the 
republic, his deputy, the Revisionary 
Command Council, the Arabic Socialist 
Ba‘th Party, the National Assembly, or the 
government is subject to life imprisonment 
and confiscation of property, both 
transferable and non-transferable. If the 
insult took place in public with the 
intention of inciting public opinion against 
the authority, the punishment is death. 
2. Anyone who publicly insults the courts or 
the armed forces or any of the other 
national authorities, office, and government 
establishments, is sentence to imprisonment 





English Translation of the 1990 Interim-Iraqi Constitution  
 
Introduction to the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq 
In the Name of Allah the Beneficent, the Merciful 
"…And Take Counsel with them in the affair; so when you have decided, then place 
your trust in Allah…" 
Allah has Spoken the Truth. 
 
It was three o'clock after midnight of Wednesday the 17th of July 1968. 
The revolutionary act occurred again, even if in another form. On the strike of three 
o'clock in the afternoon on Tuesday the 30th of July, when the people thundered and bolted, 
expressing their revolution for what they demand, after the ability has matured to act 




campaign until it turned to a disciplined, organized typhoon capable of achieving the aims 
that people wanted. There it was; the Great July Revolution. 
When the corrupt ruling regime toppled and the power of the people prevailed, the 
Ba'thists represented the lead. They were the leaders in the rejection against corruption, 
and pioneers in the mission of Jihad, which was crowned by the success of their revolution 
between 3 o'clock in the morning of the 17th of July, and 3 o'clock on the night of July 
30th.  
The Ba'thists led the mission, ever since then, with fidelity, sincerity, and bravery seen so 
little in the modern Arab era and in the history of Iraq. They were in harmony with the 
greatness and honor of responsibility, and nobility of the aims and principles which they 
bore in their minds and hearts, and for which they presented great sacrifices. 
Although the Ba'thists were the leaders of the revolution and the men of struggle and Jihad 
stances, in the circumstances of the revolution's eruption and its further journey, where 
the construction that achieved all this appropriate position of glory for the people, and 
their ability to protect their rights and gains toward all the circumstances of the following 
path and the vicissitudes of time.  
And although, in all circumstances, they proved an exceeding ability to mobilize the 
people and audience, under the leadership of symbolic leader Saddam Hussein, and they 
accomplished all achievements that others were not capable of accomplishing in times of 
peace and war.  
And although the great people of Iraq believed in their leadership role through all the 
mission's trials; the Ba'thies, or the leader of the people Saddam Hussein, where not the 
kind that would isolate themselves from life and from the obligations of the movement 
and interacting with it.  
They did not fall for the arrogance of success and victories, including the historic victory 
of the Iraq-Iran war, so they won't drift from the interaction and great relation with the 
people, and so they won't fall in the abyss of solitude and narrow visions. 
The July revolution, and the state's apparatuses that constructed it, were open to all the 
qualified who believed in the ascending path and the basics of the main principles of the 
new mission. This mission involved several parties, in addition to independent 
representative, and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. It also included the three powers of 
state—the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, in addition to its high circulations, 
side by side with the Ba'thists, and good citizens from different trends and parties. 
The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party practiced its responsible leadership role and bore the 
sacrifices and risks accompanying this role in solely starting the July revolution without 
the participation of another political movement or party. Therefore, its leadership of the 
authority and society is a leadership of merit, which adds up to the competence of the role 
and ability to hold responsibility. 
The chance to seize power in the name of the people was not only available for the Arab 
Socialist Ba'th Party. However, according to the traditional perspective, the chance was 
open to more parties and movements, and that's due to the focus of oppression against it, 
and the fear of the then authority apparatuses from it, dubbing the party "the nominee" to 
step up for its clear effectiveness and brave revolutionary struggle. 
It is not wrong when we remind the people and affirm history that the signs of darkness 




and made an enemy out of it; for reasons related to fearing it, or to the surrounding 
circumstances of what happened during its rule in the revolution of Ramadan – February 
8, 1963, and its Arab relations back then. 
Therefore, and in the name of the people, the party seized the opportunity, which no one 
else deserved in the blessed July revolution to lead the people and practice its leadership 
role in power. 
The party practiced its leadership role on this basis and not on an arbitrary basis. It 
represented the people according to a responsible leading vision, without being secured 
by the constitution, and without looking down upon the parties that shared responsibility 
in following stages. 
Despite all that, and although our people never requested any form of rule different from 
that to which they were used to in the July mission under any title or form of insistence 
and importunity similar to what happened and is happening in other experiments.  
 
And as the people have been used to, and as their trust set in the right place entrusting the 
Ba'th party, and their son and leader Saddam Hussein, the conscience of the people was 
driven in to recognize what's best for the people and what represents their aspirations.  
This constitution was therefore formed, along with its new provisions including electing 
the president of the country through direct confidential voting for the first time in Iraq's 
old and modern history. It also included handing in the responsibilities of the Revolution 
Leadership Council and the great consignment carried by this struggling leadership 
institution throughout twenty-two years, to new institutions decided by the constitution. 
The opportunity to form new parties was also granted. 
All this was given in order to confirm the ability of the Ba'th party and the son of the 
people Saddam Hussein, in interacting with life and its successful leadership so that the 
great people of Iraq will remain in the lead of taking responsibility in the right path, to 
serve its goals and those of the Arab nation, on the basis of the Great July Revolution 






The Draft Resolution of the Republic of Iraq 
First Division 
The Republic of Iraq 
Article One 
Iraq is an independent sovereign state ruled by a republic-presidential regime/system. 
Article Two 
Iraq is a part of the Arab world, and seeks inclusive Arab Unity. 
Article Three 
The People are the source of power and its legitimacy, and they practice it through 





The Iraqi territory is an integral unit, and no part of that unit shall be relinquished for any 
reason or under any circumstances. 
Article Five 
Islam is the state's official religion. 
Article Six 
The Iraqi people constitute of Arabs and Kurds, and the constitution acknowledges the 
Kurds' national rights and guarantees the legitimate rights for all Iraqis within the unity of 
the country, state, and society. 
Article Seven 
Arabic is the official language. The Kurdish language shall also be an official language 
alongside Arabic within the self-ruled zone. 
Article Eight 
Baghdad is the capital city of Iraq. 
Article Nine 
First: The Iraqi flag, its slogan and national anthem, shall define the laws. 
Second: The national holiday is July 17, marking the memory of the great July 17-30 
revolution. 
Article Ten 
The political regime in Iraq is based on democracy and socialism, by virtue of the people's 
opinion and interest, and in what guarantees social justice and economic freedom defined 
through banning [forms of] exploitation. 
Article Eleven 
Iraq constitutes administrative units, and organizes its local affairs in terms of the law. 
Article Twelve 
By virtue of law, the regions of Iraq with a majority Kurdish population shall have self-
rule in the framework of Iraq's legal, political, and economic unity, and the unity of its 
people. 
Article Thirteen 
Iraqi nationality and its regulations shall be ruled by law. 
Article Fourteen 
First: The armed forces are the armor of the country and its sword. Their duty is to defend 
the country, its independence and sovereignty, and protect its unity and security. 
Second: The state, and only the state, undertakes the task of forming armed forces, and 
no other state has the right to established military or semi-military institutions or armed 
organizations. 
Article Fifteen 
Iraq shall respect the principles of International Law, and shall abide by the United Nations 
Charter, preserve the principles of good neighborliness, support international cooperation 
and development of friendly relations among countries. Iraq shall not interfere in internal 
affairs and shall resolve conflicts by peaceful means on the basis of equality, mutual 
interest, and reciprocation. 
 
Second Division 







Authority in Iraq is practiced by virtue of constitutional regulations and laws. Each law 
shall not be contradictory to the constitution. 
Article Seventeen 
Law shall have authority above all relations and behavior of the society. 
Article Eighteen 
State institutions shall commit to the law and its sincere implementation in its businesses 
and behaviors in a way that guarantees the sovereignty of the law. 
Article Nineteen 
First: Regulations are issued to facilitate the implementation of laws, and they shall not 
be violated. 
Second: Instructions are issued in order to clarify how to implement the law or regime, 
and they shall not be violated. 
Article Twenty 
Law shall not be retroactive, unless there was a clause indicating so. This exception shall 
not be referred to penal laws, tax laws, and financial costs, unless it served the indicted or 
taxpayer. 
Article Twenty One 
Laws and regulations and their instructions shall be published in the official gazette, and 




Article Twenty Two 
First: Social solidarity is the first foundation of society, and its content indicates that the 
citizen shall perform his duties, fully, towards society. Society must guarantee the citizen's 
full rights and freedoms in a way that does not contradict the interests of society by virtue 
of law and the constitution's regulations. 
Second: Society shall confirm the higher social harmony values, preventing the promotion 
of sectarian, racist, regional, or anti-Arabian sentiments. 
Article Twenty Three 
First: Family is the core of society, and the state seeks its development by virtue of high 
values and concepts of Iraqi society based on its heritage and modern and ancient values 
of the Arab Nation's heritage. It shall protect it and support its moral and patriotic 
resistance. The state shall also foster maternity and childhood. 
Second: Care and mutual respect is prevalent among the members of the family by virtue 
of wellborn and ancient values of society in the framework of rights and duties as 
determined by law. Children shall respect the rights of parents and provide them with total 
care. 
Article Twenty Four 
Defending the homeland and maintaining its unity is a sacred duty and an honor to citizens. 




First: Martyrdom for the sake of the homeland, the nation, and principles of the people is 
an honor and high value for which the state and society work to promote its patriotic, 
national, social, and moral values. 
Second: The state shall foster the parents of the martyrs by honoring them and giving them 
priority in privileges, facilities, and employment opportunities, according to law. The state 
also supports veteran fighters and those wounded in battles. 
Article Twenty Six 
Military service is compulsory. The law organizes its execution. 
Article Twenty Seven 
Financial taxes and fines are a duty that shall not be imposed, amended, or collected but 




Article Twenty Eight 
The state undertakes control of the national economy in order to foster society's interest, 
protect it from exploitation, achieve economic prosperity, increase national income, 
advance livelihood standards, and achieve Arab economic unity. 
Article Twenty Nine 
Natural resources are owned by the people. The state invests in them in accordance with 
requirements of the public interest. The central authority shall, exclusively, take control 
of investing in the major natural resources such as oil, gas, minerals, in the form of a direct 
investment. 
Article Thirty 
Ownership is a social function. The law organizes how to conduct it, use it, and utilize it, 
in what complies with the public interests and economic and social foundations stated 
herein in the constitution. 
Article Thirty One 
The public property is owned by the people, and has a special sanctity. The state and the 
citizens shall provide its safety and protest it. Each step to vandalize it or trespass shall be 
deemed vandalism of the whole society, and an encroachment upon it. 
Article Thirty Two 
Private property and individual economic freedom are sponsored by law in a way that 
does not harm or contradict the interests of society and the economic and social 
foundations stated herein in the constitution. 
Article Thirty Three 
The state encourages coordinating activities and sponsors it. 
Article Thirty Four 
First: Private property shall not be dispossessed unless there are public interest 
requirements with a fair compensation stated by law. 
Second: Private property shall not be confiscated or expropriated unless it was according 
to law or a judicial decision. 
 
Article Thirty Five 




Second: Law regulates property ownership of citizens from Arab nations. 
Article Thirty Six 
Inheritance is a guaranteed right organized by law. 
Article Thirty Seven 
Law decides national currency. 
 
Third Division 
Rights, Liberties and their Guarantees 
Chapter One 
Rights and Liberties 
Article Thirty Eight 
First: Citizens are equal in their rights and duties before the law, and they all have its 
protection without any discrimination. 
Second: Equal opportunities are guaranteed for all citizens by virtue of law. 
Article Thirty Nine 
Suspects are innocent until proven guilty in a legal trial. 
Article Forty 
Law guarantees a suspect's right of defense directly or through an attorney. 
Article Forty One 
Each individual charged with a crime has the right of compensation according to law, in 
case there appears to be critical mistakes in achieving justice after sentences have been 
ruled. 
Article Forty Two 
First: Each assault against an employee or individual assigned with a public service while 
performing his task is considered a crime. 
Second: Each assault by an employee or individual assigned with a public service against 
personal freedoms or the sanctity of the citizens' personal lives and other liberties covered 
by the constitution or law, is considered a crime. 
Article Forty Three 
First: The seizure, arrest, imprisonment, or detention of individuals shall not be permitted, 
unless by virtue of a warrant issued by a judicial or specialized party according to law. 
Second: The state shall provide fair compensation to an individual in return for the damage 
caused by a breach in the (First) clause of this article. 
Third: A seized or detained individual has the right to contact his family and lawyer. 
Article Forty Four 
Punishment shall be personal. 
Article Forty Five 
There is no crime or punishment except those stipulated by law. Punishment shall only be 
for an act that the law considers a crime when perpetrated. A harsher sentence than the 
legal applicable sentence at the time of the crime may not be imposed. 
Article Forty Six 
The sanctity, dignity, and honor of the people are safeguarded. The privacy, honor, and 
reputation of any individual shall not be arbitrary or illegally sabotaged. 




Homes have sanctuaries. They may not be entered, searched, or violated except by a 
judicial decision in accordance with law. 
Article Forty Eight 
The secrecy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications shall be guaranteed, 
and may not be violated except for legal and security necessities, and proceedings 
regulated by law. 
Article Forty Nine 
Citizens are equally entitled by law to perform governmental jobs. 
Article Fifty 
Employment is a right, duty, and honor for each citizen, needed for the participation in 
building, protecting, and developing society. The state seeks to provide it within the 
economic activity sphere. No one shall be forced to work without compensation. 
Article Fifty One 
The state shall guarantee social and health security for citizens in cases of sickness, old 
age, or impotence, as regulated by law. 
Article Fifty Two 
Peaceful assembly and demonstrations are guaranteed in accordance with the 
requirements of security protection, general system, or protecting others' rights and 
liberties, and shall be regulated by law. 
Article Fifty Three 
The freedom of opinion, intellect, and expression through media and cultural means is 
guaranteed, and the application of these liberties shall be regulated by law. 
Article Fifty Four 
Freedom of the press, printing, and publication is guaranteed, and the practice of these 
liberties shall be regulated by law. 
Article Fifty Five 
Media outlets shall practice their message freely and responsibly in accordance with the 
constitutional principles in order to express public opinion trends, contribute to media and 
guidance, maintain freedoms, ensure rights and duties with respect to the duty indicated 
in Article Eighty of the constitution, without targeting the sanctity of the individual’s 
personal lives, and in the framework of the moral foundations on which society and the 
17-30 July Revolution principles are based, in addition to the values that were established 
after the Iran-Iraq War, first of which are martyrdom, redemption and sacrifice. 
Article Fifty Six 
The formation of political parties and the freedom to join them shall be guaranteed for 
citizens, and this shall be regulated by law in a way that does not contradict the regulations 
of the constitution, the general system, and national unity. 
Article Fifty Seven 
The formation of associations and the freedom to join them shall be guaranteed under the 
law in a way that does not contradict the regulations of the constitution, the general system, 
and national unity.  
Article Fifty Eight 
The establishment of political parties, organizations, and clubs that stand on the basis of 
embroiling religion with politics, atheism, sectarianism, racism, regionalism or anti-




The prohibition shall also apply to those parties that seek the isolation of Iraq from its 
natural national statehood in the Arab nation, or those that do not adopt democracy in their 
doctrine, approach, practices or behaviors. 
Parties, organizations and clubs shall adopt an open approach, and shall not use power or 
violence in their practices. 
Article Fifty Nine 
Any party other than the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party shall not be allowed to work, in terms 
of politics or parties, in the armed forces and internal security forces, or with its members. 
Article Sixty 
The law shall guarantee the formation of syndicates and unions and the freedom to join 
them. 
Article Sixty One 
First: All parties, organizations, syndicates, unions, and clubs shall not be permitted to 
receive any sort of aid, or any transferred or non-transferred money against law. 
Second: The state shall provide the needed reasons for political parties, organizations, 
syndicates, unions, and clubs to continue their activities in accordance with law. 
Article Sixty Two 
Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rituals are guaranteed, just as long as it 
does not contradict the regulations of the constitution and laws, or comes contrary to the 
general interest, general system and manners. 
Article Sixty Three 
Each citizen has the right to elect and be elected, take part in referendums and public life, 
according to law and constitutional regulations. 
Article Sixty Four 
First: The state protects public health through combating diseases and their causes, and 
works on providing medical services and its requirements for citizens, in protection, 
treatment, and medication, according to law. 
Second: All government apparatuses and members of the nation shall protect the 




Article Sixty Five 
The State shall guarantee the right to education for all citizens, and education shall be 
mandatory in the primary level at least. The State shall combat illiteracy according to law. 
Article Sixty Six 
First: The State shall guaranty and support scientific research, provide reasons for its 
progress and development, and encourage excellence, creativity, ingenuity in different 
intellectual, scientific, and cultural aspects. 
Second: The State shall protect the private ownership, and this is regulated by law. 
Article Sixty Seven 
First: The right for the citizen to travel outside the country or return is guaranteed, and 
restraining the citizen's location and resident shall not be permitted unless provided by 
law. 




Article Sixty Eight 
Political asylum in Iraq is guaranteed, and any political refugee shall not be extradited. 




The Judiciary and General Prosecution 
Article Sixty Nine 
There is no authority over the Judiciary except that of the law, and interference in the 
affairs of justice shall not be permitted. The Judiciary has the total freedom to adopt 
decision in a way through which it can fully perform its judicial duties. 
Article Seventy 
The President of the Republic shall guarantee the Judiciary is performing its 
responsibilities according to law, and in achieving justice. 
Article Seventy One 
The Judiciary shall make sure Justice is achieved by applying the law in a way that suits 
the core of justice and humane relations in the matters in question. 
Article Seventy Two 
The Judiciary shall contribute to deepening the economic and social transitions through 
implementing the law, and this shall comply with the economic, social, and political 
philosophy of the state. 
Article Seventy Three 
The reign of the Judiciary shall be implemented on all people, on the natural, moral, public 
and private aspects, except what has been excluded by law. 
Article Seventy Four 
The right of litigation is guaranteed for everyone. The law shall clarify the needed 
procedures to practice this right. 
Article Seventy Five 
The law shall decide on the way through which the courts are formed, their types, degrees, 
and competence. 
Article Seventy Six 
The court hearings are open to public, except if security concerns, a request from the 
general prosecutor stated otherwise, or in case the court believed the session must be 
confidential with regard to public order, or maintaining standards of behaviors. 
Article Seventy Seven 
The Judiciary regulations are issued in the name of the people. 
Article Seventy Eight 
The establishment and institutions in the Republic of Iraq are obliged to implement all 
regulations and decisions issued by the Judiciary. 
Article Seventy Nine 
Special exceptional courts shall not be established except the state security required so, 
and with a decision from the President of the republic. The work of the court terminates 





The General Prosecution shall represent the society in defending justice and protecting the 
legitimacy, the public order, state security and its money, and protecting the family, 




The Institutions of the Republic of Iraq 
Chapter One 
The President of the Republic 
Article Eighty One 
The President of the Republic is the head of state, and the model of the people and its 
leader. He is the General Commander of the armed forces, and he secures the protection 
of the country, guarding the national independence, implementing and respecting the 
constitution. He shall also ensure the supremacy of law, protection of the national unity, 
the country's security, and the good performance of the country's executive, legislative, 
and judiciary institutions. 
Article Eighty Two 
The people shall elect the President of the Republic through confidential, direct public 
voting. The law shall regulate the procedures of electing the President of the Republic. 
Article Eighty Three 
A nominee to the Presidency of the Republic must be: 
First: An Iraqi by birth, born to parents who are Iraqi by birth, and with no foreign origin. 
Second: Fully qualified and over forty years of age. 
Third: Of good reputation, and known for his uprightness, fairness, bravery, wisdom, 
experience, patience, and loyal services to the homeland and nation. 
Fourth:  
1- A believer in the principles of the Great (17-30) July Revolution and its objectives. His 
contributions during the Iran-Iraq war, whether through participating, volunteering, or 
donating in the fields of work and production, or through his intellectual, literal, 
mobilization, and political productions, shall be efficient, special, and comply with his 
capabilities and capacities. He shall be a believer that the Iran-Iraq war has glorified Iraq 
and the Arab nation, and that it is the only way to protect Iraq and its land, waters, sky, 
security and sanctities. 
2- To be a believer in Socialism, and shall have a socialist and democratic approach. 
Article Eighty Four 
First: The procedures for the election of the President of the Republic shall begin seventy 
days before the term of the ruling presidency finishes. The Council of State shall declare 
the launching date of these procedures. Nominations are presented to the Council within 
ten days of the launch of procedures. Within twenty days from the final date of presenting 
nominations, the Council shall announce the names of the nominees, who meet the 
required conditions. The new President shall be elected no more than ten days before the 
end of the period designated for the said procedures. 
Second: The Council of State shall confirm that the conditions required for the nominees 
are met, and shall supervise the procedures of electing the President of the Republic, 




For this reason, a committee led by the Head of Council and ten members elected by the 
council from its own members is formed, to present its adopted recommendations, through 
agreement or by majority, while referring the counter opinion to the Council to be 
discussed, settled and announced. 
Third: The nominee receiving the absolute majority of votes is the President Elect. In the 
case when none of the nominees acquired this majority, the election shall be repeated two 
weeks after announcing the election results of the two nominees that attained the majority 
of voted in the first elections. The nominee receiving the absolute majority of votes in the 
second elections is the President Elect. 
Fourth: In case nominations led to one nominee, elections are executed, and in case he 
received the absolute majority of votes from the voters, he than shall be designated as 
President Elect. 
Article Eighty Five 
First: The President of the Republic, within one week after announcing the election results, 
shall take the constitutional oath before the Council of State and the National Council in 
a joint session under the chairmanship of Head of Council of State, as follows: 
"I swear by God Almighty, and by my honor and belief, to preserve the independence 
and safety of Iraq and the unity of its lands, to preserve the Republic regime, to abide 
by the principles of the Great 17-30 July Revolution, the constitution, and law, and I 
shall safeguard the interests of its people, and shall endeavor to protect the people's 
dignity, pride, happiness, and achieve the objectives of the Arab Nation, in unity, 
freedom, and socialism." 
Second: In the case when one of the aforementioned councils was not present, the 
President of the Republic shall take the constitutional oath before the present council. 
Third: In the case when neither of the aforementioned councils was present, the President 
of the Republic shall take the constitutional oath before the Council of Ministers. 
Article Eighty Six 
The Presidential term in office shall be a renewable eight years term. It shall start directly 
after the elected President of the Republic takes the constitutional oath. 
Article Eighty Seven 
The President of the Republic is the Head of the executive authority, and fills the position 
of Prime Minister. The President of the Republic shall take over the executive authority's 
duties directly, or through the Council of Ministers. 
Article Eighty Eight 
The President of the Republic shall perform his jurisdictions in issuing orders, decisions, 
or republican decrees. 
Article Eighty Nine 
The President of the Republic shall assume the following: 
First: To maintain the independence of Iraq, the unity of its lands, and protect its internal 
and foreign security. 
Second: To guarantee the implementation of the constitution, and supervise the well 
execution of laws and decisions. 
Third: To set the general policy of the state, and supervise its implementation. 
Fourth: To supervise the well execution of the Judiciary to guarantee the achievement of 




Fifth: To safeguard the rights of the citizens and their liberties, and supervise the well 
performance of their duties. 
Article Ninety 
First: The President of the Republic shall claim responsibility over the defense affairs, 
and internal and foreign security. 
Second: The President of the Republic shall call for general mobilization, and for the use 
of armed power when needed, to defend the country and high national and patriotic 
interests. 
Three: The President of the Republic shall settle for a truce. 
Fourth: The President of the Republic shall conclude peace pacts, which shall be ratified 
according to the regulations of article 167 of the constitution. 
Article Ninety One 
The President of the Republic shall propose draft laws, and shall announce them according 
to constitutional procedures. 
Article Ninety Two 
First: The President of the Republic shall appoint one or more deputies. The deputies of 
the President of the Republic shall take the constitutional oath as stated in Article (156), 
before the President of the Republic. 
Second: The President of the Republic shall decide the domains of his deputies, their 
duties, and has the right to discharge them from their positions. The deputies shall be 
directly responsible for their duties before the President. 
Third: The regulations of Article (148), and the (First) paragraph of Article (149) of the 
constitution are applied on the deputies of the President of the Republic. 
Article Ninety Three 
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister, the deputies of the Prime 
Minister, and Ministers, and he has the right to discharge them from their positions. 
Article Ninety Four 
The President of the Republic shall: 
First: Appoint and adopt diplomatic representatives 
Second: Receive diplomatic representatives 
Third: Conduct negotiations, and international pacts and agreements, by virtue of the 
constitution. 
Article Ninety Five 
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Judiciary, members of the Prosecution, 
special degree civilian state employees, the commanders of armed forces, internal security, 
and foreign security, and has the right to terminate their terms of services by virtue of law. 
Article Ninety Six 
The President of the Republic grants military degrees, order of merit, medals, and national 
titles. 
Article Ninety Seven 
The President of the Republic has the right to ease the execution, imprisonment, and 
detention sentences, and can issue pardons. The amnesty shall be issued by law. 




The President of the Republic shall conduct a public referendum on law drafts and 
important cases related to the supreme interests of the country. The result of the 
referendum with the absolute majority shall be obligatory. 
Article Ninety Nine 
First: In case of a danger threatening the security, independence, or safety of the country 
and its national unity, the President of the Republic shall issue, within no more than six 
months since the eruption of this danger, orders and decisions that have the power of law 
to prevent this danger. He shall also announce a state of emergency in Iraq or any area 
within, and this state of emergency shall be regulated by law. 
Second: During the time of state of emergency declaration, and within the borders of the 
area included, it is considered legal, by virtue of a decree issued by the President of the 
republic, to temporary suspend the work in the regulations of Articles 
43,47,48,52,53,54,56,57, and 67 of the constitution. 
Article One Hundred 
In the case of events that require adopting measures that don’t bear any delay, other than 
the cases mentioned in Article 99 of the constitution, the President of the Republic shall 
issue decisions that have the power of the law. These decisions shall be presented to the 
Council of State within sixty days of their issuance, and shall be regulated by the 
procedures mentioned in the (Second), (Third), (Fourth), and (Fifth) Paragraphs of 
Article 119 of the constitution. 
Article One Hundred and One 
In case of an armed conflict, The President of the Republic shall issue what he deems 
suitable laws, and adopt what he deems suitable decisions and measures to promote the 
combat capabilities of the country, popular mobilization, and general groups in all military 
and civil domains. 
Article One Hundred and Two 
For reasons related to public interest, for humanitarian reasons, or for the purpose of 
achieving justice and equity, or to tackle special cases that cannot be tackled through 
applicable laws, regulations, procedures and measures, or to reward creative individuals, 
and those who present lofty and distinct services, the President of the Republic shall: 
First: Issue valid decisions as an exception for the applicable laws, regulations, 
procedures and measures. 
Second: Grant, what he believes is suitable, of grants, aids, monetary or in kind rewards, 
pieces of land, or residential houses owned by the state. 
Article One Hundred and Three 
For the purpose of national, patriotic, or humanitarian interests, the President of the 
Republic shall present grants, aids, cash or in kind rewards, or others, for non-Iraqi states, 
organizations, and people. 
Article One Hundred and Four 
During the term of his presidency, the President of the Republic shall not conduct any 
trade or industrial business, or use state money to buy or sell for trade purposes. 
Article One Hundred and Five 
First: In case the position of President of the Republic was vacant for any reason, the 
duties of the President of the Republic shall be temporarily carried out by a Presidency 




and Prime Minister, while still carrying out their original duties. The biggest among them 
shall be Head of the Presidency Council. 
In the case when the President of the Republic is also the Prime Minister, then the senior 
deputy Prime Minister shall be Acting Prime Minister, and shall be a member of the 
Presidency Council. 
Second: The Presidency Council shall carry out the powers of the President of the 
Republic, except for what's stated in Articles 92, 93, 98, 102, 103, and 119, and the said 
Council does not have the right to disband the Council of State, or the National Council, 
or propose a constitutional amendment. The Presidency Council shall also adopt decisions 
unanimously. 
Third: The President of the Republic is elected within no more than seventy days after 
the date of which the president position is vacant, according to Article 84 of the 
constitution. 
Article One Hundred and Six 
In case the President of the Republic position was vacant for the absence of the Council 
of State, for any reason, the National Council shall carry out the duties of the Council 
State stated herein in Article 84 of the constitution, with regards to the election of the 
President of the Republic. 
Article One Hundred and Seven 
During the period when the President of the Republic position is vacant, Iraqi government 
institutions shall continue their duties according to their domains, and the constitution 
shall not be amended during that period. 
Article One Hundred and Eight 
The President of the Republic shall announce his resignation from his position through a 
written letter addressed to the Council of State or the National Council, or to one of them 




Article One Hundred and Nine 
The Council of State is the higher committee consulted by the President of the Republic 
in important political, economic, social, cultural affairs and others, while it is related to 
maintaining the path of the Great 17-30 July Revolution and its development, and to the 
causes that affect the country's security, national unity, core interests, public interests, and 
patriotic causes. The Council carries out the legislation of laws, by virtue of the regulations 
stated herein in the constitution. 
Article One Hundred and Ten 
The Council of State shall consist of fifty (50) members. The President of the Republic 
shall appoint twenty five (25) of them, while the other twenty five (25) are elected through 
free confidential direct elections, and these elections shall be regulated by law. 
Article One Hundred and Eleven 
The President of the Republic shall appoint the twenty five (25) members of the Council 
of State after the result of election of other members is announced, in a time stated by law. 




The period of duty in the Council of State is five calendar years that begin with its first 
meeting and ends with the end of the fifth year. A new Council of State is formed within 
sixty days after the termination of the aforementioned period. 
Article One Hundred and Thirteen 
The Council of State is convened by virtue of a Presidential decree, after the formation of 
the Council in a period of time determined by law. 
Article One Hundred and Fourteen 
The Council of State has the right to request information, or inquire the Prime Minister, 
his deputies, and ministers, for what facilitates the practice of the duties stated in the 
constitution. 
Article One Hundred and Fifteen 
Any member of the Council of State shall not be pursued or detained for a crime, without 
the approval of the President of the Republic, except in the cases involving a felony. The 
permission for the pursuit or detention, by virtue of this Article, shall lift all immunities 
of the member in question. 
Article One Hundred and Sixteen 
First: The dual holding of the Council of State and the National Council membership shall 
not be permitted. 
Second: The dual holding of the Council of State membership and the position of vice 
president, or Prime Minister or deputy Prime Minister, or minister, or any other 
governmental position, shall not be permitted. 
Third: The President of the Republic has the right to assign duties to the Council of State 
members. 
Article One Hundred and Seventeen 
The President of the Republic has the right to disband the Council of State when necessary. 
The dissolution decision shall include the reasons behind it. A new Council shall be 
established by guidelines stated in the constitution, and within no more than ninety days. 
Article One Hundred and Eighteen 
First: The Council of State shall examine the draft laws addressed by the President of the 
Republic, outside the time of the National Council sessions, and within a suitable period 
of time after the date of its arrival to the Head of the Council's office. The President of the 
Republic requires for it to be examined within a specific period of time. 
Second: In case the Council approves the draft law, it refers it to the President of the 
Republic to announce it. 
Third: In case the Council rejects the draft law, or amends it, it must refer it to the 
President of the Republic and state the reasons behind the rejection or amendment. 
Fourth: In case the President of the Republic agreed on the amendment, he then issues 
the law in its amended form. And in case the President of the Republic insisted on drafting 
the law in its original form, or didn’t accept the rejection, he shall return the draft law to 
the council to consider its legislation with indicating the reasons. 
Fifth: In case the Council approved the draft law in its original form, it refers it to the 
President of the Republic to issue it. If the Council insisted on its rejection or amendment 
with a majority of two thirds of the present members, in this case the decision shall be 




President of the Republic can bar from considering the draft law, issue it in its amended 
form, or disband the Council. 
Article One Hundred and Nineteen 
First: In case the Council of State was not present for any reason, and the National Council 
was not convened, the President of the Republic shall have the right to issue decrees by 
law, on the condition that they are presented before the Council of State when convened. 
Second: If the Council approved the decree, it is therefore considered a valid law. 
Third: In case the Council did not approve the decree, it then refers it to the President of 
the Republic, with reasons behind the rejection. If the President of the Republic does not 
agree with the decision of the Council, the decree is referred again to the Council for 
consideration, and the reasons behind it.   
Fourth: If the Council agreed to the decree, it is therefore considered a valid law. If the 
Council insisted on disapproving with a majority of two thirds of the present members, 
the decision is referred to the President of the Republic with indication to the reasons. The 
President of the Republic can in this case accept the decision or disband the Council. 
Fifth: In cases when the decree is totally disapproved, any retroactive effect shall be 
eliminated, without prejudice to the rights that were resulted for others. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty 
The Council of State has two terms to be convened annually, both for eight months 
decided by its internal system. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty One 
First: The President of the Republic shall extend the convening term of the Council of 
State for no more than one month in order to finalize the duties that called for the extension 
of the term. He shall also call the Council for an exceptional meeting whenever needed. 
Second: With the majority approval of its present members, the Council of State has the 
right to extent the term of its session for no more than one month, in order to finalize the 
duties that called for the extension of the term. 
 
Chapter Three 
The National Assembly 
Article One Hundred and Twenty Two 
The National Assembly shall consist of the elected people's representatives. It shall 
undertake the duty of legislating laws, and practice censorship over the performance of 
the ministries as stated in the constitution. Whenever deemed necessary, the President of 
the Republic shall consult with all, or some, members of the National Assembly regarding 
any of the state's affairs. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty Three 
The National Assembly consists of two hundred and fifty (250) members, elected through 
free, direct, confidential elections according to law. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty Four 
The term of the National Council is four calendar years, which start with its first meeting, 
and end with the end of the fourth year. A new council shall be elected within sixty days 
after the termination of the aforementioned term. 




The National Council has two convening terms annually, both for four months, and law 
shall decide how they would be convened. The convening session discussing the general 
budget shall not be suspended unless the latter is ratified. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty Six 
First: The President of the Republic has the right to extend the National Council term 
session for no more than one month in order to finalize the duties that have required the 
extension of the term. He also has the authority to call for an exceptional meeting 
whenever needed. The meeting shall only involve the issues that have necessitated its 
convention. 
Second: With majority approval of its present members, the National Council has the right 
to extend the term of its session for no more than one month, in order to finalize the duties 
that called for the extension of the term. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty Seven 
The National Council is called to convene by virtue of a presidential decree, within no 
more than fifteen days after announcing the results of the elections. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty Eight 
First: Any member of the National Council shall not be pursued or detained for a crime 
outside the framework of the session convened without the approval of the Head of the 
Council, except in the case when he is involved in a felony.  
Second: The permission for the pursuit or detention, by virtue of this Article, shall lift all 
immunities for the member in question. 
Article One Hundred and Twenty Nine 
First: The dual holding of the National Council membership and the position of vice 
president, or Prime Minister or deputy Prime Minister, or minister, or special degree 
positions, or chairmanship of administrative units, shall not be permitted. 
Second: A National Council member shall lose his membership in the council if he was 
appointed in one of the positions or job aforementioned in the (First) Paragraph of this 
Article. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty 
The President of the Republic has the right to disband the National Council when 
necessary. The disbandment decision shall include the reasons behind it. A new Council 
is sought to be established in the guidelines stated in the constitution, and within no more 
than ninety days. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty One 
First: The National Council shall examine draft laws suggested by the President of the 
Republic in a suitable time from the date it arrived to Head of the Council's office, unless 
the President of the Republic required it examined over a specific period of time. 
Second: In case the Council approved the draft law, it is then referred to the Council of 
State to examine it. In case the Council of State approved it, the draft law is referred to 
the President of the Republic to announce it. 
Third: In case the National Council disapproved the draft law or amended it, the Council 
referred it to the Council of State to examine it. If the disapproval or amendment was 
ratified, the draft law is referred to the President of the Republic indicating the reasons 
behind the disapproval of amendment. In case when the President of the Republic rejects 




Council shall convene in a joint session, and then the draft law, which receives the 
majority consent of two thirds of both councils' present members, shall be referred to the 
President of the Republic to consider its announcement. In this case the President of the 
Republic shall bar from considering the draft law, issue it in its amended form, or disband 
both councils, or one of them. 
Fourth: In case of a dispute between the National Council and the Council of State over 
the disapproval or amendment of the draft law, both Councils shall convene in one session, 
and in this case: 
(1) The original draft law, if approved by the majority of both councils' present members, 
shall be considered final and shall be referred to the President of the Republic to be issued. 
(2) The decision to refuse or amend the draft law, which in this case shall be adopted by 
the majority approval of two thirds of both councils' present members, shall be adopted, 
and referred to the President of the Republic to examine it. 
(3) In the case mentioned in part (2) of this paragraph, the President of the Republic has 
the right to return the draft law or decision adopted by both Councils to them in the joint 
session in order to reconsider it by indicating the reasons behind this return. The decision 
adopted by the majority of two thirds of both convened councils' members, whether in 
favor of the approval of the draft law, its amendment, or disapproval, shall be referred to 
the President of the Republic to examine it. In this case the President of the Republic shall 
bar from considering the draft law, issue it in its amended form, or disband both Councils, 
or one of them. 
Fifth: In case the two-third majority needed to disapprove or amend the draft resolution, 
as indicated in the Thirds and Fourth (2) Paragraphs of this article, was not available, 
the draft law is therefore referred to vote in its original form. In case it was adopted by its 
simple majority, it is referred to the President of the Republic to announce it, otherwise it 
is also referred to the President of the Republic, who in this case has the right to either bar 
from considering the draft law or disband both councils or one of them. 
Sixth: When necessary, the President of the Republic has the right retract the draft law, 
which he had already referred to the National Council which did not examine it during its 
convening session to which the draft law was referred to, and give it to the Council of 
State to consider its legislation. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty Two 
First: The National Council shall examine draft laws presented by thirty members of its 
council. 
Second: In case the Council disapproved the draft law, it is then considered a final 
disapproval, and in this case the same draft law shall not be permitted to be proposed again 
in the same annual term sessions. 
Third: In case the Council approved the draft law, it is then referred to the Council of 
State to examine it. And if the Council of State approved it, the draft law is then referred 
to the President of the Republic. 
The President of the Republic shall issue the draft law or return it to the council in a joint 
meeting, indicating the reasons behind the return. The draft law that receives the approval 
the two-third majority of the both convened councils' members shall be referred to the 
President of the Republic to consider its issuance. The President of the Republic in this 




Fourth: In case the Council of State disapproved the draft law or amended it, both 
Councils shall convene in a joint session, and in this case: 
(1) The draft law decided by the two-third majority approval of both councils' members 
shall be considered approved, whether in its original or amended form, and it shall be 
referred to the President of the Republic to consider its issuance. 
(2) The decision adopted by the two-third majority approval of both convening councils' 
members, to disapprove the issuance of the draft law, is considered final. 
(3) The President of the Republic, in the case stated in part (1) of this paragraph, has the 
right to return the draft law to the councils in a joint session in order to reconsider it and 
state the reasons behind this return. The decision adopted by the majority of two thirds of 
both councils' convening members, whether it was approved or amended, shall be referred 
to the President of the Republic to examine it. The President of the Republic in this case 
shall either issue the draft law or disband one of the councils or both of them. 
Fifth: In case the two-third majority needed to approve the draft resolution in the joint 
session, as indicated in the Thirds and Fourth (1) Paragraphs of this article, the draft 
law is cancelled. 
Sixth: The members of the National Council shall not present any draft laws related to 
matters of defence, security, and the amendment of the constitution, amendment of the 
President's powers, and amendment of the National Council law. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty Three 
With the proposal of twenty members of the National Council members, the consent of 
the Council, and the permission of the President of the Republic, the inquiry of the Prime 
Minister regarding any issue or concern related to his duties, other than those of the 
defense and security affairs, shall be permitted. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty Four 
In case the National Council was not convinced with the Prime Minister's clarifications, 
the National Council therefore, and based on the request of thirty of its members with the 
consent of the Council and the permission of the President of the Republic, has the right 
to question the Prime Minister, through the Head of the National Council, through which 
the negligence and failure associated with the Prime Minister are presented. The 
discussion shall then take place at least seven days after the Prime Minister is informed of 
the inquest. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty Five 
If through the results of the inquest there appeared for the National Council to be 
negligence and failure on the Prime Minister's part in performing his duties, then by the 
two-third majority of its members, the Council shall submit a recommendation to the 
President of the Republic proposing to discharge the Prime Minister from his position. 
The President of the Republic can discharge the Prime Minister or request a discussion of 
the recommendation in a joint session between the Council of State and National Council. 
In case both councils approved, with the two-third majority of their members, the 
recommendation to discharge, the decision is then referred to the President of the Republic. 
The President in this case shall either discharge the Prime Minister or disband one of the 
Councils or one of them. 




With the suggestion of fifteen members of the National Council, and its consent, the 
inquiry of one of the Council of Ministers' members regarding any decision or stance 
adopted by his ministry in specific matters other than those of the defense and security 
affairs, shall be permitted. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty Seven 
In case the National Council was not convinced with the clarifications of the Council of 
Ministers' member, the National Council therefore, and based on the request of twenty 
five of its members with the consent of the Council and the permission of the President of 
the Republic, has the right to inquest the member in question through the Head of the 
National Council, t address any act, decision, stance, negligence or failure designated to 
his ministry. The discussion with the minister shall then take place at least seven days 
after he is informed of the inquest. 
Article One Hundred and Thirty Eight 
If through the results of the inquest there appeared for the National Council to be 
negligence and failure in performing duties on the council of ministers' member's part, 
then by the two-third majority of its members, the Council shall refer a recommendation 
to the President of the Republic, proposing the discharge of the member from his position. 
The President of the Republic can discharge the member of the council of ministers, or 
refer the recommendation to the Council of State to discuss. In case the Council approved, 
the council of Ministers' member shall be discharged from his position, and if it wasn’t 
approved, then the recommendation is canceled. 
 
Article One Hundred and Thirty Nine 
The National Council has the right to form investigative committees from its own 




The Council of Ministers 
Article One Hundred and Forty 
The Council of Ministers is the executive board of the state's general policies stated by the 
President of the Republic. It consists of the Prime Minister, his deputies, and ministers, 
who are directly responsible, before the President of the Republic, of performing their 
duties. 
Article One Hundred and Forty One 
Before they commence their duties, the Prime Minister, his deputies, and ministers, shall 
take the constitutional oath, stated in Article (156) of the constitution, before the President 
of the Republic. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Two 
The Council of Ministers shall exercise the following powers: 
First: To prepare draft laws and refer them to the President of the Republic to look into 
its legislation according to the regulations of law. 
Second: To prepare and issue draft regulations. 





Fourth: To supervise the legitimacy of the procedures issued by the specialized minister, 
in order to facilitate the implementation of laws and regulations. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Three 
First: The Council of Ministers shall prepare the draft of the general budget, and the 
development plans. 
Second: The Council of State and the National Council shall decide, in a joint session, the 
general budget and development plans, with the exception of some aspects which the 
President of the Republic decides not to discuss. 
Third: When necessary, the amendment of the balanced accounts in the aspects of the 
General budget and the development plan during the fiscal year, by virtue of the President 
of the Republic's decision, or that of the Council of Minister, with the consent of the 
President of the Republic, shall be permitted. 
Fourth: The Council of Ministers follows up the well execution of the general budget and 
the development plans. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Four 
First: The Council of Ministers shall conclude loan agreements with the approval of the 
President of the Republic. 
Second: The Council of Ministers shall supervise foreign relations, economic and 
financial affairs, according to instructions from the President of the Republic. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Five 
The Council of Ministers shall appoint general directors from those who don’t have a 
special degree, and those of the same degree, in the state departments and socialist sector, 
and as heads of administrative units, with the exception of preservatives. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Six 
The Prime Minister shall head the Council of Ministers' meetings. The President of the 
Republic has the right to head the meetings of the Council of Ministers whenever he 
believes he should. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Seven 
The Prime Minister shall address the ministers, follow up with the well performance of 
the ministries, and coordinate among them. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Eight 
During the time in office, the Prime Minister, or anyone of his deputies or ministers, shall 
not conduct any trade or industrial business, or use the state money to buy or rent for trade 
purposes, lend or sell something from its money, or conduct an agreement with the state 
as a supplier or contractor. 
Article One Hundred and Forty Nine 
First: The Prime Minister, his deputies, and the ministers shall present their discharge 
request to the President of the Republic. 
Second: The discharge of the Prime Minister from his position does not lead to the 
discharge of his deputies and ministers from their positions. 
Article One Hundred and Fifty 
The meetings of the Council of Ministers and its discussions are confidential, and the 
Council's decisions are announced, published and notified through ways decided by the 
Council. 








Article One Hundred and Fifty Two 
The Vice President of the Republic, Council of State members, National Council members, 
and those elected in the positions of Prime Minister, his deputies or ministers shall be: 
First: Iraqi by birth to parents who are Iraqi by birth and have no foreign origin. Or Iraqi 
by birth to an Iraqi father of a foreign origin and an Arab mother from an Arab country. 
Or Iraqi by birth to Arab parents who attained the Iraqi citizenship before his birth. 
Second: Legally competent. 
Third: 
1- A believer in the principles of the Great (17-30) July Revolution and its objectives. His 
contributions during the Iran-Iraq war, whether through participating, volunteering, or 
donating in the fields of work and production, or through his intellectual, literal, 
mobilization, and political productions, shall be efficient, special, and comply with his 
capabilities and capacities. He shall be a believer that the Iran-Iraq war has glorified Iraq 
and the Arab nation, and that it is the only way to protect Iraq and its land, waters, sky, 
security and sanctities. 
2- To be a believer in Socialism, and shall have a socialist approach. 
Fourth: 
1- Finished his military duty or was exempted. 
2- Didn’t commit the crime of fleeing the military duty. 
Fifth: 
1- Was not charged for conspiracy crime against the Great 17-30 July Revolution, or 
against its ruling regime, or to try to topple that regime or contact foreign parties. 
2- Was not convicted for an immoral crime, or for the crime of deliberate murder. 
Sixth: Has educational and cultural qualifications that enable him to perform his duties 
according to what is decided by law. 
Seventh: The member shall be: 
1- At least forty years of age for the Council of State members. 
2- At least twenty five years of age for the National Council members. 
3- At least thirty years of age for the positions of Vice President, Prime Minister, Deputy 
Prime Minister, or any minster. 
Article One Hundred and Fifty Three 
When they commence their work in their positions, and at the end of their duties, the Vice 
President, Council of State members, National Council members, the Prime Minister, his 
deputies and ministers, shall present the President of the Republic with a report that 
indicated their financial status, including a statement of account of their movable and 
immovable money and their sources. 
Article One Hundred and Fifty Four 
Each member of the Council of State and National Council represents the people of Iraq. 
Article One Hundred and Fifty Five 
Convening each of the Council of State and the National Council shall not be regarded as 




the absolute majority of the convening members, in cases other than those that require a 
special majority as stated in this constitution. This article shall be implemented on the 
joint meeting of both Councils. 
Article One Hundred and Fifty Six 
Each of the Council of State and the National Council shall convene their first session 
with the chairmanship of the oldest member. Before the Council, each member of the 
Councils' members shall take the following constitutional oath: 
"I swear by God Almighty, and by my honor and belief, to preserve the Republic 
regime, and to abide by the constitution and laws,  and I shall safeguard the interests 
of the people, and shall ensure the country's independence, safety, and the unity of 
the Iraqi lands, and I shall preserve the principles of the Great 17-30 July Revolution, 
and endeavor to achieve the people's objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism." 
Article One Hundred and Fifty Seven 
During their first session, each council; the Council of State and the National Council, 
shall elect a chairman, and deputy chairman, and a council secretary, by means of 
confidential voting. 
Article One Hundred and Fifty Eight 
First: The session of the Council of State and the National Council are public, and they 
can be confidential according to a decision by the President of the Republic, or the head 
of council, or according to a request by ten members, along with the consent of the council. 
The Prime Minister or one of the ministers shall be allowed to be requested after the 
President of the Republic's permission. 
Second: The joint session of both councils shall be public, and it can be confidential 
according to a decision by the President of the Republic, or the head of the Council of 
State, or according to a request by twenty members of both Councils with the consent of 
the joint session. 
Article One Hundred and Fifty Nine 
The Council of State and the National Council shall convene in Baghdad, however, when 
necessary, they main convene in another area in Iraq, by a decision from the President of 
the Republic. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty 
First: The members of the Council of State and the National council shall not be asked 
about their opinions and their proposals and what they provide in relation to the subject, 
and each member has the total freedom to speak within the limits of the internal order of 
the Council during his term of duty. 
Second: The members of the Council of State and the National council, when practicing 
their right to speak and present facts while performing their tasks, shall be accurate, 
present the truth and not offend it, shall abide by the general order, morals, public interests, 
rules of conduct and morals, and in a way that does not include personal slander or false 
accusation. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty One 
Each of the Council of State and the National Council shall decide the authenticity of their 
members' memberships, according to the internal order, and with what ensures the 
availability of constitutional and legal conditions. The membership is annulled with a two-




Article One Hundred and Sixty Two 
During the time of membership, the Council of State and National Council members, shall 
not use the state money to buy or rent for trade purposes, lend or sell something from its 
money, or conduct an agreement with the state as a supplier or contractor. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty Three 
The Prime Minister, his deputies and ministers, with the permission of the President of 
the Republic, have the right to attend the Council of State or the National Council and 
speak during their sessions, and they have the right to get help from whomever they need 
among their subordinate employees. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty Four 
The Council of State or National Council member shall present his resignation to the Head 
of council, and it enters into force the day it is notified. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty Five 
The duties of the Council of State and National Council, and their rules of procedure, its 
members' services' affairs, their rewards, specialties, the budget of each member and their 
committees shall be regulated by law. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty Six 
The Head of the Council of State shall claim the chairmanship of the Council of State and 
the National Council, each time both convened in a joint session, according to the 
regulations of the constitution. 
 
Fifth Division 
International Pacts and Agreements 
Article One Hundred and Sixty Seven  
International pacts and agreements are ratified and joined by a law issued by the Council 
of State and the National Council, or by one of them in case the other wasn’t present, by 
a two-third majority vote of each council's members, in case its regulations including one 
of the following issues: 
1. The borders and regional sovereignty 
2. Conciliation and Peace 
3. Forming or joining international organizations. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty Eight 
The ratification of international pacts and agreements and joining them, in a way other 
than those mentioned in Article 167 of this constitution, shall be through a law issued by 
the Council of State. 
Article One Hundred and Sixty Nine 
Other agreements, which are not included in the regulations of Articles 167 and 168 of 
this constitution, shall be subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, and the 








First: Both the President of the Republic and the Council of State, have the right to amend 
an article or more of the constitution's articles, with indicating the reasons behind this 
amendment. 
Second: The proposal to amend the constitution shall be presented by the Council of State, 
with the request of at least twenty of its members. 
Article One Hundred and Seventy One 
First: The Council of State shall discuss the constitutional amendment proposal presented 
by the President of the Republic. In case the Council approved the amendment, it then 
refers it to the President of the Republic to present it in a referendum. 
Second: The Council of State shall discuss the constitutional amendment proposal 
presented in the council. In case the council approved the amendment, it is referred to the 
President of the Republic who, in case approves it, shall present it in a referendum. 
Third: In case the President of the Republic and the Council of State failed to reach an 
agreement on any constitutional amendment plan, the President of the Republic called for 
a joined meeting between the Council of State and National Council to be convened in 
order to examine the amendment plans. In case both councils approved, with a two-third 
majority of its members, the President of the Republic shall therefore present it in a 
referendum. 
In case the draft constitutional amendment did not receive the two-third majority, then it 
is barred from consideration. 
Fourth: The President of the Republic shall announce the text of the constitutional 
amendment, if it were to be amended by the consent of the people through the referendum. 
Article One Hundred and Seventy Two 
Any proposal to amend the constitution, and which will cause damage to the unity of Iraq, 
its republican regime, its Arab origin, or which will aim at changing the official religion, 




Article One Hundred and Seventy Three 
The Head of the Revolution Leadership Council, and the Revolution Leadership Council, 
shall continue carrying out their specialties and powers as stated in the July 16, 1970 
constitution, until the elected President of the Republic takes up the duties of his position. 
The Revolution Leadership Council shall be considered disbanded from the date on which 
the elected President of the Republic commences the aforementioned duties. 
Article One Hundred and Seventy Four 
The President of the Republic is elected according to the regulations of this constitution, 
within sixty days after it enters into force. He shall take the constitutional oath, stated in 
Article 85 of the constitution, before the Revolution Leadership Council, and the National 
Council. 
Article One Hundred and Seventy Five 
First: For the first time after this constitution enters into force, the election of the President 
of the Republic shall be supervised by a committee led by head of the National Council, 
and membership of the Head of the supreme court, in addition to ten members from the 




judges of the supreme court. The committee accepts nominations, and monitors the 
elections, and announces the results by virtue of the regulations of Article 84 of this 
constitution, and its decisions shall be final. 
Second: The committee has the right to specify the areas and electoral centers within the 
administrative units on practical basis, and with the help of specialized administrative 
apparatuses. It also has the right to issue the needed instructions to organize and facilitate 
the elections. 
Article One Hundred and Seventy Six 
The procedures to elect a National Council shall first be implemented after this 
constitution enters into force by virtue of the regulations of the National Council law 
number fifty five (55) of the year 1980, which is amended with what complies with the 




Article One Hundred and Seventy Seven 
First: The decision of the Revolution Leadership Council, which has a valid legal power, 
shall remain, and shall not be terminated or amended except by a decision by the President 
of the Republic. 
Second: The legislative regulations, which have been valid before working under the 
provisions of this constitution, shall remain valid, except in the case when it is terminated, 
amended, according to the rules and procedures stated herein in this constitution. 
Article One Hundred and Seventy Eight 
The Supreme Court shall supervise the authenticity of the procedures underwent in any 
referendum carried out according to the regulations of the constitution, and it shall 
announce its results. 
Article One Hundred and Seventy Nine 
The regulations of this constitution shall enter into force after the people approve of it in 
the referendum, and after publishing it in the official gazette within no more than fifteen 
days after announcing the results of the referendum. 
 
  
  
  
 
 
